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# UPC Unfiltered, by Willem Hoyng – UPC decisions week 13, 2026

 30. März 2026  News Unified Patent Court (UPC) Hot Topic News Below, [Prof. Willem Hoyng](https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/our-team/legal-experts/prof-willem-hoyng) provides his unfiltered views on the decisions that were published on the website of the Unified Patent Court (“UPC”) last week. His comments offer a unique insight into the UPC’s case law, as he chairs the Advisory Board of the UPC and participated in drafting the Rules of Procedure of the UPC.

Interested in more of this? Stay tuned and subscribe [**here**](https://mailchi.mp/8fbd8890d03b/upc-unfiltered-by-willem-hoyng) for weekly updates.

On the go, multi-tasking or just prefer to listen? “Willem Hoyng’s UPC Unfiltered AI Podcast” – your weekly, AI-generated podcast discussing Willem Hoyng’s commentary on UPC case law of last week, offers a convenient alternative. Listen on [**Spotify**](https://open.spotify.com/show/53wwzF7LNSqqouR0wzXgJD?si=ae84739b09904ee1&nd=1&dlsi=71b6a174bdbd4f32) or [**Apple Podcasts**](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/willem-hoyngs-upc-unfiltered-ai-podcast/id1806092389).

**Note**: Due to Easter Monday, next week’s newsletter will be published on **Tuesday, 7 April**. Regular publication will resume the following week.





#### **18 March 2026 (late published)**
**Central Division Paris, Veolia v Tiru**

[UPC\_CFI\_417/2025; UPC\_CFI\_509/2025; UPC\_CFI\_528/2025 ](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/417-509-528-2025%20Decision.pdf)

***Prior public use/extension of subject matter***

**Facts**

1. Tiru started infringement proceedings on the basis of EP 3 178 578 B1 against Valinea et al.et al. on 17 February 2025.
2. Veolia, the parent company of Valinea, started a revocation action in the Central Division on 13 May 2025.
3. After Valinea et al. filed a counterclaim for revocation, the Paris Local Division referred the revocation action to the Central Division.
4. Tiru filed auxiliary requests.

**The Court**

1. The Court describes the patent and defines the skilled person.
2. The Court notes that two claim elements are given a different meaning by the parties and that these differences are decisive for the outcome of the case. All other points of dispute are irrelevant and will therefore not be discussed.
3. In general, a claim has to be interpreted in such a way that the examples in the description are covered, but there are exceptions, especially where the examples are inconsistent with the claim.
4. The reference numbers in the claims are not decisive for their meaning.
5. The Court follows Veolia’s claim interpretation, noting that the skilled person notices the inconsistencies between the description and the claim and will base the interpretation on the claim, because that is the starting point of any interpretation.
6. A rectification of a clear mistake, clear to the objective reader, can be made without the need for a formal request for claim amendment.
7. To establish whether there is an extension of protection (Article 123(3) European Patent Convention (“EPC”)), it is sufficient to see if certain products which did not fall under the scope of protection before the amendment of the claim fall under the scope of protection of the amended claim.
8. The Court considers, also in view that two different independent claims are involved, that seven auxiliary requests are not excessive.
9. The Court concludes that the primary auxiliary request contains an extension of the scope of protection.
10. Auxiliary request 2 does not violate Article 123(2) or 123(3) EPC.
11. Article 84 EPC (clarity) is applicable with respect to amended claims.
12. With respect to prior use, the Court states that the fact that the public can see the oven does not mean that they have access to its interior. The fact that companies have been cleaning the oven does not mean that these companies were not bound to confidentiality.
13. After citing the principles to be applied when assessing inventive step, while referring among other things to “reasonings with hindsight” by Veolia, the Court finds that auxiliary request 2 is inventive.

**Comment**

1. It is interesting to see that the representatives raised many small procedural objections, all of which were rejected by the Paris Central Division. Admittedly, Tiru made quite a number of errors, but they were all clear errors and there was no reason for Veolia to benefit from them. Nevertheless, Veolia raised every possible objection. It is good to see, and representatives should know, that this is wasted effort.
2. As to extension of the scope of protection, I think the Court is absolutely right. If, after an amendment of claim, a product that was not infringing before the amendment becomes infringing, there is an extension of the scope of protection.
3. Assume the claim consists of A + B + C and is changed to A + B + D, where D ≠ C or C + X. Then somebody who sold A + B + D was not infringing before the change and is infringing after the change. The conclusion must be: extension of scope of protection. However, somebody who, after the change, is selling A + B + C is no longer infringing . In that sense, the change limits the scope of protection. However, it is clear that what matters is the extension of protection, as that affects the legal certainty of third parties.
4. It is also interesting that the Court states that the fact that the ovens were cleaned by contractors, who could see the whole interior of the oven and therefore allegedly all the claim elements, does not deprive the patent of novelty because it is not proven that these contractors were not bound to secrecy. That seems to me only correct if one assumes that such contractors are bound to an implied duty of confidentiality. The Court does not say so explicitly, but I think that is implied and, in my opinion, that seems correct.

#### **20 March 2026** ***(late published)***
**President of the Court of First Instance, HyGear v Topsoe**

[UPC\_CFI\_1849/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/DUSSEL_order_R323_1849__2025_200326_FB.pdf)

***Language change***

**Facts**

1. On 4 December 2025, Topsoe, a Danish company, asked for a seizure and inspection order in German in the Local Division Düsseldorf on the basis of an English-language patent.
2. The defendants (in the main proceedings) are a Dutch company, two German companies and the Technical University of Munich, all represented by three different representatives.
3. The seizure and inspection order was granted, but two of the defendants, namely the Dutch company and one of the German companies, filed an application for review and suspension of the execution of the order, and a hearing was set for 23 March 2026.
4. The Dutch company further requested a change of the language of the proceedings to English.
5. Topsoe, the applicant in the main proceedings, and two of the three German defendants did not object to the change of language request. Only the Technical University of Munich objected.

**The President of the Court of First Instance**

1. The President set out the criteria of Article 49 (1) UPCA as well as the principles established by the Court of Appeal (UPC\_CoA\_101/2024, Apl\_12116/2024), namely that all relevant circumstances relating to the specific case are to be considered when deciding such a request:
    1. the language most used in the relevant technology;
    2. the position of the parties, including their nationality, domicile, respective size and how they could be affected by the requested change;
    3. the internal working language of the parties;
    4. the possibility of internal coordination and of support for technical issues;
    5. if the balance of all the circumstances is even, the emphasis should in particular be put on the position of the defendant as the claimant is often given flexibility with respect to the choice of language;
    6. the language of the patent cannot (in general) be considered unfair towards the claimant;
    7. are the proceedings likely to be (seriously) slowed down by the change of language.
2. Against this background, the President granted the application to change the language of the proceedings to English.

**Comment**

1. Nobody had a problem with the change of language because it is clear that this is the language of the technology (“hydrogen production by steam methane reforming”) and that communication between the parties is in English.
2. The only exception was the Technical University of Munich! I assume, but did not check, that English is not a problem for that university. So why create a problem?
3. I have repeated the list of criteria above. Reading that list and this decision, it is clear that if you sue a non-German defendant on the basis of an English-language patent in German, it is almost certain that the proceedings will end up being in English!
4. It is a mistake to assume that a Dutch defendant speaks German nowadays. The times of Rudi Carrell and Louis van Gaal are over, and Sylvie Meis is an exception!

#### **23 March 2026**
**Local Division Paris, Valeo v Bosch**

[UPC\_CFI\_1963/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Review%20PO%20VALEO%20BOSCH_RL_CL_CG.pdf)

***Internal competence***

**Facts**

1. Valeo sued five Robert Bosch companies, including one established in France.
2. Referring to Article 33 (1)(b) UPCA, last sentence, Bosch disputes the competence of the LD Paris with respect to the non-French companies because:
    1. there is no commercial relationship between the defendants;
    2. the action does not relate to the same infringement.
3. The Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) rejected the preliminary objection and refused leave for appeal.
4. The Bosch companies filed review proceedings.

**The Court**

1. The Court ruled that it is not necessary that there is a direct commercial relationship. There is a commercial relationship when all defendants are part of the same group.
2. It is not necessary that the infringing products are (exactly) the same. They are all alleged to infringe the same claims of the same patent.
3. The review is refused.

**Comment**

1. This outcome was predictable as the JR’s decision was completely correct. The only question is why Bosch keeps raising these, in my opinion, rather hopeless arguments? Even if the objection had been successful, Bosch would still have had to fight the same battle against the French defendant in Paris, as well as another battle elsewhere (in Germany?). In the end, there would have been a good chance that the case against the parent company would still also be heard by the Paris Division (see R. 340 RoP).
2. I fully agree with the Local Division Paris where it states that a liberal view of Article 33 (1)(b) UPCA, last sentence, avoids conflicting judgments.
3. Finally, with respect to the Serbian and Chinese Bosch companies, I think that (via Article 71b(2), Article 8 (1) of the Brussels I recast Regulation ((EU) no 1215/201; “BR”) is applicable, rather than Article 33 (1)(b) UPCA, last sentence. Article 8 (1) BR does not require a commercial relationship and/or the same infringement but (only) the risk of irreconcilable judgments.

#### **23 March 2026**
**Local Division Düsseldorf, Versah v Argimiro**

[UPC\_CFI\_649/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/2026-03-23%20Klager%C3%BCcknahme%20und%20R%C3%BCckerstattung%20von%20Gerichtsgeb%C3%BChren_signed%20%281%29.pdf)

***Settlement***

**Facts**

1. The claimant initiated infringement proceedings on 11 July 2025.
2. On 13 February 2026, before closure of the written proceedings, the claimant applied to withdraw its claim.
3. On 24 February, the claimant requested a return of 60% of the court costs.

**The Court**

1. The Court accepted the withdrawal, given that the defendant had agreed.
2. The parties do not ask for costs. Therefore, a cost decision was not necessary.
3. The Court ordered to return of 60% of the court costs.

**Comment**

As the stakes are high in UPC proceedings because they may cover multiple national markets, patentees use them as a powerful tool to force settlements. As said before, I see no reason why the Court, which is supposed to finance itself, should have to refund court fees if a settlement is reached following the written procedure, particularly since these court fees account in almost all cases for a very small part of the costs involved in preparing a Statement of claim. 
The 60% should according to the Court of Appeal (see hereafter UPC\_CoA\_646/2025) have been 50%!

#### **24 March 2026**
**Local Division Hamburg, BTL v Lexter**

[UPC\_CFI\_1049/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/1049-2025%20Order.pdf)

***Reimbursement of fees***

**Facts**

1. The case settled before the end of the written proceedings.
2. The claimant requested reimbursement of 60% of the court fees.

**The Court**

The Court agreed because the case began in October 2025, meaning that the old reimbursement table (valid until 31 December 2025) applied.

**Comment**

See my comment with respect to the previous case.

#### **24 March 2026**
**Court of Appeal, Alpina v CUP&CINO**

[UPC\_CoA\_44/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Anordnung%20-%20R%20223%20UPC_CoA_44-2026.pdf)

***Suspensive effect***

**Facts**

1. On 18 March 2026, the Local Düsseldorf granted an injunction against Alpina.
2. CUP&CINO had invoked three patents, but the Court decided to postpone the oral hearing to July 2026 with respect to two patents just before the oral hearing.
3. Alpina requested suspensive effect, arguing that they would like to await the result in the two other cases, so that, when changing their machine, they could also take these results into consideration. This would be less costly for a small company like Alpina than having to make changes twice.

**The JR of the Court of Appeal,**

The JR, citing the applicable criteria, refused the request for suspensive effect.

**Comment**

1. Asking for suspensive effect was bound to fail. This only succeeds in exceptional circumstances. Read this decision before you request this, because it tells you exactly whether your case is exceptional.
2. Alpina is apparently the victim of a very busy Division. At the last moment, Düsseldorf decided to deal with only one patent. If the Court notices that it is getting too busy, it should advise claimants to go elsewhere. Most cases can be dealt with in other less busy Divisions. If a claimant insists to staying despite such a recommendation, they cannot expect a hearing within a year, and they should be informed of this. It is very simple for a Division to announce publicly that the first available date for an oral hearing is in two years’ time. As long as the case can be heard in another UPC Division within a year, the UPC will have kept its promise. Parties and their representatives should take responsibility for not overloading Divisions.

#### 
**24 March 2026**
**Court of Appeal, Applicant v Amycell**

[UPC\_CoA\_935/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Order_Suspensive%20effect_Appellant%20vs%20Amycel_UPC_COA_935-2025_2026_03_24_Signed_anonym.pdf)

***Suspensive effect***

**Facts**

1. On 31 July 2024, the Local Division The Hague ordered provisional measures against the applicant.
2. As the applicant failed to file a Statement of defence in time in the proceedings on the merits, the Local Division issued a default decision on 21 October 2025.
3. On 22 December 2025, the applicant filed an appeal and a request for suspensive effect with respect to parts III, IV and VIII of the decision.
4. The Court of Appeal rejected the request for suspensive effect on 16 January 2026.
5. On 20 February 2026, the applicant filed their Grounds of Appeal and (again) requested that enforceability of parts III, IV and VIII of the operative part of the decision be suspended, arguing the same points as before and making some additional unsubstantiated arguments.

**The Court of Appeal**

1. The Court of Appeal held that the application was inadmissible.
2. It stated that an application for suspensive effect must be filed as early as possible, along with all reasons, facts and evidence that justify it.
3. A further application for suspensive effect is only admissible if it is based on submissions that could not reasonably have been made in the earlier application.
4. Consequently, as the second application in this case is based on the same arguments, it is not admissible.

**Comment**

1. It is not surprising that you cannot request the same order several times. This is only possible if you come with new, serious submissions that you could not have made earlier.
2. After the applicant lost in the PI proceedings, its conduct was strange. If you really think the PI decision was wrong, you should appeal against it and file a defence and counterclaim in time in the proceedings on the merits. Asking for suspensive effect is almost never successful. Asking twice for suspensive effect makes no sense. If a measure requested in the PI proceedings would have unacceptable consequences, you should argue this in the proceedings themselves. Also with respect to these measures (such as a recall, destruction, publicity) etc., proportionality must be observed. Of course, your arguments and evidence had better be very strong!

#### **24 March 2026**
**Central Division Munich, Reel v Fives**

[UPC\_CFI\_2296/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/2026-03-24%20CD%20Munich%20UPC_CFI_2296-2025%20anonymized.pdf)

***Preliminary Objection***

**Facts**

1. On 31 December 2025, Reel requested the revocation of EP 1 740 740 (“EP740”).
2. On 23 February 2026, Fives filed a preliminary objection (“PO”), arguing that the Court lacked jurisdiction due to lack of interest, as well as due to the decision of the German national court with respect to the German part of EP740.
3. As a subsidiary claim, Fives filed an application under Rule 361 RoP arguing that the action was manifestly bound to fail.
4. Fives also requested an extension for the deadline for filing its Statement of defence as long as no decision has been made on the PO.
5. On 26 February 2026, the JR refused to grant an extension for the Statement of defence.

**The JR**

1. The JR stated that a PO can only be based on the grounds mentioned in Rule 19.1 RoP, as confirmed by the Court of Appeal in a decision of 3 September 2024 (UPC\_CoA\_188/2024).
2. Neither the objection based on lack of interest nor the binding force of a national decision has anything to do with the question of the UPC’s jurisdiction.
3. Neither of these arguments put forward by Fives lead to the conclusion that Reel’s action is manifestly bound to fail.
4. Finally, the JR rejected Fives’ request to deal with the these two arguments first.

**Comment**

1. The patent has expired, but apparently one of Reel’s subsidiaries is being sued in Germany for damages due to patent infringement. The parent company wants to invalidate the patent.
2. In certain countries, a revocation case is considered an *actio popularis*, which does not require an interest, whereas in other countries an interest is required. Article 47 (6) UPCA states that anybody entitled to bring actions in accordance with its national law and who is concerned by a patent may bring actions in accordance with the Rules of Procedure.
3. Although the question of “having an interest” has been discussed with respect to an action for revocation in the Rules Committee, as far as I can recall, it was decided not to address it, and leave it to the Court to interpret what “concerned by a patent” means. This has nothing to do with national law, as was argued in this case, but is a question of UPC law. In my opinion, it is difficult to argue that you are not concerned by a patent if your subsidiary is sued for damages, which directly affects the value of the parent company.
4. It is highly far-fetched to argue that the action was manifestly bound to fail.
5. If Fives did not want to have to fight an expensive UPC lawsuit about an expired patent and only wanted to collect damages in Germany under the German part of EP740, then they should have opted-out the patent, before the UPC became operational or at least before the revocation proceedings began. Alternatively, they could have surrendered the patent immediately after receiving the revocation action and accepted the negative consequences for their German action.

#### **24 March 2026**
**Court of Appeal, Amgen v Sanofi**

[UPC\_CoA\_646/2025; UPC\_CoA\_641/2025 ](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Withdrawal%20app.%20rehearing%20_528%2C%20529-2024.pdf)

***Settlement***

**Facts**

1. The Local Division Düsseldorf dismissed the counterclaim for revocation of EP 3 536 712 filed by Amgen.
2. Amgen filed an appeal.
3. On 10 March 2026, the parties were summoned to the oral hearing scheduled for 6 October 2026.
4. On 12 March 2026, Amgen filed an application for withdrawal.
5. Sanofi agreed. Each party would bear its own costs.

**The Court**

1. The Court accepted the withdrawal.
2. The Court held that reimbursement must be assessed according to the new schedule, as the request was made after 31 December 2025.
3. The Court also held that the withdrawal was requested after closure of the written proceedings. The Rules do not provide for reimbursement of the court fees where withdrawal occurs after closure of the written proceedings.

**Comment**

1. As there is no reimbursement anymore if a case is settled after the closure of the written procedure under the new Rules, the Court does not return any fees.
2. The Court states that the new Rules are applicable because the request is made after 1 January 2026, but I read page 4 as saying that the new fees are applicable only to actions and applications filed after 31 December 2025. This action was filed before 31 December 2025. In any event, the normal rule is that new law takes immediate effect. So if that is the interpretation of the Court of Appeal, then that is fine with me, as it leaves more money with the Court.

#### **25 March 2026**
**Court of Appeal, Sanofi v Amgen**

[UPC\_CoA\_528/2024; UPC\_CoA\_529/2024](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Withdrawal%20app.%20rehearing%20_528%2C%20529-2024.pdf)

***Settlement rehearing***

**Facts**

1. On 1 June 2023, Sanofi initiated revocation proceedings in the Central Division Munich.
2. On 1 June 2023, Amgen initiated infringement proceedings in the Local Division Munich. Sanofi filed a Counterclaim for revocation, which was referred to the Central Division.
3. The Central Division Munich revoked the patent in both cases.
4. Amgen appealed, and the Court of Appeal set aside the Central Division’s decisions.
5. Sanofi filed a request for a rehearing.
6. Sanofi’s request for suspensive effect was rejected.
7. Sanofi has now asked for a withdrawal of the request for rehearing.
8. Amgen agreed with this request and did not want a decision on costs.

**The Court**

1. The Court agreed to the withdrawal.
2. It rejected the request for a 50% reimbursement of court fees because Sanofi was required to pay the fee in both cases, but only paid it once.

**Comment**

1. The Registry did not seem to have noticed that Sanofi had only paid for one case. The Court of Appeal took note of this and came up with a practical solution!
2. When the request for suspensive effect failed, it seems that Sanofi realized that it had no choice but to settle. In any case, we now know that a rehearing is not a second appeal and will only succeed in exceptional circumstances, which normally never occur. The UPC has only two instances, whereas many national systems have three instances, with a Supreme Court above the Court of Appeal.

#### **25 March 2026**
**Local Division Düsseldorf, Roche v Menarini**

[UPC\_CFI\_2107/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/2026-03-25%20Klager%C3%BCcknahme%20und%20R%C3%BCckerstattung%20von%20Gerichtsgeb%C3%BChren_signed_RT_AK_JS_LD.pdf)

***Settlement***

**Facts**

The parties settled before the end of the written procedure.

**The Court**

1. The Court accepted the withdrawal by the claimant in view of the defendant’s agreement.
2. A cost decision was not necessary as the parties had agreed on costs.
3. The claimant will receive 50% of the court fees back.

**Comment**

This decision relates to the settlement of an infringement case concerning EP 1 962 668. Note that the case started in December 2025 but Roche asked for 50%, apparently accepting that the new reimbursement rules have immediate effect, as confirmed by the Court of Appeal in CoA\_641/2025 discussed above.

#### **26 March 2026**
**Central Division Paris, IMI v Belparts**

[UPC\_CFI\_104/2025; UPC\_ CFI\_364/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/CD%20Paris%20-%20104-2025%20and%20364-2025%2026.03.2026_0.pdf)

***Settlement***

**Facts**

1. On 10 February 2025, IMI initiated a revocation action against EP 3 812 870.
2. The Court set the dates for the interim conference and the oral argument as 11 December 2025 and 5 February 2026, respectively. In doing so, it took into consideration the appeal hearing before the EPO’s Boards of Appeal (BoA) on 27 November 2026, as well as the dates set for the parallel cases before the LD Munich.
3. The BoA dismissed the appeal, and the patent was maintained in the version as amended by the Opposition Division.
4. On 4 February 2026, the parties requested a stay due to a settlement, which was granted.
5. On 12 March 2026, Belparts filed for withdrawal. IMI agreed. The parties did not ask for costs.

**The Court**

The Court accepted the withdrawal.

**Comment**

This is one of the many cases that ultimately settle, as this week’s Unfiltered shows. Was the outcome at the EPO the trigger this time? The Court accepted the request for a stay one day before the hearing, presumably because parties said that they had settled. The parties should realize that, if they had settled two weeks earlier, they could have saved the Court a great deal of work. However, sometimes the doorstep of the Court is the necessary trigger! It can be worse for a judge. Ask judges what has been their most frustrating experience (apart from representatives being unable to be brief and to the point) and the answer is: a settlement a day or even hours before the judgment is to be announced, after the judge has worked on it for many days. The Court of Justice in its first patent case (Monsanto v Cefetra, case C-428/08) did not want to throw their work in the dustbin and, despite a letter of the parties that the case had settled and a letter of the referring court that it withdrew its questions, still delivered judgment!

#### **27 March 2026**
**Court of Appeal, NUC v Hurom**

[UPC\_ CoA\_409/2025; UPC\_ CoA\_410/2025; UPC\_CoA\_420/2025 ](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/DECISION_NUC-Warmcook%20v%20HUROM%20CoA_409_410_420-2025_2026-03-27_Signed.pdf)

***Claim interpretation***

**Facts**

1. Hurom owns patent EP 2 028 981 with respect to a juice extractor.
2. The Local Division Mannheim granted an injunction against NUC for the UPC member states and separated the proceedings with respect to non-UPC member states (Poland, Spain, UK and Turkey).
3. The Local Division Mannheim dismissed the infringement claim with respect to Turkey holding that you can also raise lack of jurisdiction in the Statement of Defence despite R. 19.7 RoP, which states that if you do not raise a preliminary objection you cannot dispute jurisdiction anymore. The case for Poland, Spain and the UK was (again) separated.
4. NUC filed an appeal against the infringement decision.
5. Hurom filed an appeal with respect to the dismissal of its claim with respect to Turkey.

**The Court of Appeal**

1. Unlike the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeal concludes that there is no infringement because there is no longitudinal fixation which prevents the vibration of the juice extractor, which, according to the Court of Appeal, is one of the objects of the invention according to the description.
2. Hurom’s argument that on the basis of Art. 26(1) Brussels Regulation it has jurisdiction with respect to the claims with respect to Turkey because NUC filed an appearance by its representative actively logging onto the case management system and then did not contest jurisdiction with a PO, was rejected.

**Comment**

1. The decision shows that the Court of Appeal’s Nanostring v *10x Genomics* decision on the interpretation of patent claims *(“The interpretation of a patent claim does not depend solely on the strict literal meaning of the wording used. Rather the description and the drawings must always be used as explanatory aids to the interpretation of the patent claim and not only to resolve any ambiguities in the patent claim.”*) works both ways. In this case, the Court of Appeal gave a more limited meaning to the general wording “longitudinally fixed”. The allegedly infringing device was also longitudinally fixed but, according to the Court of Appeal, not in the sense of the claim in such a way that vibration is avoided.
2. It is also interesting to see that the fact that the subclaims claim specific fixation means, does not automatically mean, according to the Court of Appeal, that the main claim, in which such specific means are not mentioned, should be interpreted as covering all products which do not have specific fixation means. The Court of Appeal states that it only means that the main claim also covers products which use different fixation means which prevent vibration.
3. In general I think one has to be very careful with such claim interpretation which limits the meaning of the wording of the claim and reserve it for very clear cases where the reasonable certainty for third parties clearly dictates such interpretation. However, in a case where allegedly infringing products realize for instance 4 of the stated 5 advantages of the patented product, I have difficulty finding non-infringement by giving a limited interpretation of the wording of the claim because of the perceived necessity that also the fifth advantage must be realized. One can also reason that the main claim covers the four principle advantages and the subclaims some further advantages.
4. It again is also an important lesson for patent attorneys with respect to the (difficult) task of drafting applications. Summing up many advantages of the claimed product may be helpful to argue inventive step but it may hurt you in infringement proceedings.
5. After the separation of the case with respect to Turkey against only the non-EU company NUC, Hurom could only rely on Art. 26 under 1 BR for an injunction in Turkey.
6. I find it somewhat strange that the use of the key provided by the Registry to log onto the case file is not seen as filing an appearance. What is the difference in stating in Court on the date mentioned in the summons that you, the representative, appear for company X and be granted the normal term for filing your defence? In both situations the Court (and the Registry and the claimant) knows with whom to communicate about the case.
7. After such log in, the claimant cannot obtain a default judgment because of non-appearance as defendant has appeared in Court!
8. The Court states in 54: “The first step enable the party and its representative to have access to the file and to be aware of the case”. However, the Statement of Claim has to be served on the defendant, just as summons in national proceedings. So the defendant and his representative know without logging in exactly what the case is all about and decide not to log in.
9. That is also why I think that R. 19.7 RoP is in accordance with the BR. Art. 26(1) BR is not applicable if the appearance (in my opinion, the log in) is filed to contest jurisdiction. This can and should be done in the preliminary objection as this is the first occasion after the filing of an appearance where this defence can be raised.

**– All comments above are** [**Prof. Hoyng**](https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/our-team/legal-experts/prof-willem-hoyng "https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/our-team/legal-experts/prof-willem-hoyng")**‘s personal opinions –**