# News Detail Share now [](https://www.linkedin.com/uas/login?session_redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.linkedin.com%2FshareArticle%3Fmini%3Dtrue%26url%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.hoyngrokhmonegier.com%2Fes%2Fnoticias%2Fdetail%2Fupc-unfiltered-by-willem-hoyng-upc-decisions-week-22-2026%26title%3DUPC%20Unfiltered%2C%20by%20Willem%20Hoyng%20%E2%80%93%20UPC%20decisions%20week%2022%2C%202026%26summary%3D "Linkedin") # UPC Unfiltered, by Willem Hoyng – UPC decisions week 22, 2026 01 junio 2026 Unified Patent Court (UPC) Hot Topic News Below, [Prof. Willem Hoyng](https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/our-team/legal-experts/prof-willem-hoyng) provides his unfiltered views on the decisions that were published on the website of the Unified Patent Court (“UPC”) last week. His comments offer a unique insight into the UPC’s case law, as he chairs the Advisory Board of the UPC and participated in drafting the Rules of Procedure of the UPC. Interested in more of this? Stay tuned and subscribe [here](https://mailchi.mp/8fbd8890d03b/upc-unfiltered-by-willem-hoyng) for weekly updates. Find all decisions, commentary and more on our [UPC Intelligence Platform](https://upcintelligence.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/). On the go, multi-tasking or just prefer to listen? “Willem Hoyng’s UPC Unfiltered AI Podcast” – your weekly, AI-generated podcast discussing Willem Hoyng’s commentary on UPC case law of last week, offers a convenient alternative. Listen on [Spotify](https://open.spotify.com/show/53wwzF7LNSqqouR0wzXgJD?si=ae84739b09904ee1&nd=1&dlsi=71b6a174bdbd4f32) or [Apple Podcasts](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/willem-hoyngs-upc-unfiltered-ai-podcast/id1806092389). ##### **19 May 2026** ***(late published)*** **Local Division Munich, ASC v Xiaomi** [UPC\_CFI\_617/2024;](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/2026-05-19%20-%20Order%20-%20joint%20hearing%20of%20CFI_617-24%20CFI_398-25%20CFI_1321-25%20and%201340-26%20-%20signed_all%20and%20anynomized.pdf)[UPC\_ CFI\_398/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/2026-05-19%20-%20Order%20-%20joint%20hearing%20of%20CFI_617-24%20CFI_398-25%20CFI_1321-25%20and%201340-26%20-%20signed_all%20and%20anynomized.pdf); [UPC\_ CFI\_1321/2025;](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/2026-05-19%20-%20Order%20-%20joint%20hearing%20of%20CFI_617-24%20CFI_398-25%20CFI_1321-25%20and%201340-26%20-%20signed_all%20and%20anynomized.pdf)[UPC\_CFI\_1340/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/2026-05-19%20-%20Order%20-%20joint%20hearing%20of%20CFI_617-24%20CFI_398-25%20CFI_1321-25%20and%201340-26%20-%20signed_all%20and%20anynomized.pdf) *Joining proceedings* **Facts** 1. ASC sued the defendants for patent infringement of EP 3 016 454. 2. ASC argued that the defendants used the 4G standard, which required the use of the patent. 3. The defendants denied infringement and filed a counterclaim for revocation. 4. In response to the defence, ASC argued that defendants were also using the 5G standard and that this likewise resulted in infringement of the patent. 5. The panel considered this to be an amendment of the claim and dismissed it. ASC field thereupon a further infringement action for the use of the 5G standard and the defendants filed another counterclaim for revocation. **The Court** 1. The Court decides to hear all cases together. 2. The Court states that the longer duration of the first proceedings is outweighed by the need of avoiding conflicting decisions, especially since the claimant does not object and the defendants suffer no disadvantage. **Comment** 1. Certainly now that the claimant does not object, the Court is absolutely right to hear the cases together. It avoids conflicting decisions and, more importantly, is far more efficient. 2. It was the claimant who unnecessarily caused these complications by failing to state in its Statement of Claim that the defendants also infringed the patent through their use of 5G. One may therefore ask whether the defendants cannot argue that the claimant’s second case is not admissible on the basis that it constitutes duplicative proceedings and could arguably be regarded as a misuse of proceedings. 3. At least, this conduct can (should?) be taken in consideration when costs are awarded. ##### **20 May 2026** ***(late published)*** **Central Division Paris, Ambaflex v X** [UPC-CFI-2286/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/UPC%20CFI%20CD%20Paris%20-%202286-2025%20-%2020.05.2026%20%281%29.pdf) *Settlement* **Facts** 1. Revocation action with respect to EP 2 743 216, commenced on 30 December 2025. 2. On 19 March 2026, the defendant asks an extension of time for filing its defence as parties are negotiating a settlement. 3. On 6 May 2026, the claimant files a request for withdrawal, indicating that parties have reached an agreement and that each party will bear its own costs. **The Court** The Courts decides in accordance with the request. **Comment** 1. The case was settled before the end of the written proceedings. However, the claimant did not ask for a reimbursement of court fees. 2. From a Dutch claimant, that is an unexpected generosity towards the Court! ##### **22 May 2026** ***(late published)*** **Local Division Mannheim, Eyesmatch v Google** [UPC\_CFI\_808/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/increase%20in%20the%20amount%20in%20dispute%20808-26.pdf) *Provisional value of dispute* **Facts** The claimant sets a low value for the case, which with the result that it paid €7,400 on court fees. **The JR** Considering this amount to be clearly too low (given that the defendant’s products are sold throughout the whole UPC territory), the JR doubled the value and ordered the claimant to pay the higher court fee. **Comment** 1. Trying to keep the value of the litigation low not only reduces the court fees, but also limits your exposure to costs in the event of a loss, since the ceiling for recoverable costs is lower. 2. A very attentive JR (and/or Registry), which quickly picked this up. ##### **22 May 2026** ***(late published)*** **Local Division Paris, Sun v Vivo** [UPC\_CFI\_361/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/procedural%20order%2022%20May%202026%20%20CFI361%20signedCL.pdf) *Preparation of oral hearing* **The JR** 1. The JR sets three days for the oral hearing. 2. The JR orders the parties to submit a summary of all arguments of at most 50 pages. **Comment** 1. I assume that, closer to the date of the oral hearing, the JR will circulate a kind of agenda (with time limits?), particularly given that a three-day hearing is exceptional. 2. If you cannot be brief (which is an art), you should at least start each submission with a summary. ##### **26 May 2026** **Court of Appeal, ASC v Motorola** [UPC\_CoA\_74/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Order-SJ_UPC-CoA_74-2026%20Advanced%20Communication%20v%20Motorola_2026-05-26_Signed.pdf) *Discretionary review requirements* **Facts** 1. ASC started infringement proceedings. 2. The Local Division (“LD”) Munich ordered ASC to provide security for costs within 8 weeks after 24 April 2026. 3. ASC filed a request for discretionary review. 4. Motorola asked the JR either to reject the request or give it one additional week to respond. **The JR of the CoA** 1. The JR repeats that, for a request for discretionary review to be allowed, it is necessary that the first instance decision be manifestly erroneous, or that it raises a fundamental question of law, or that review is necessary to ensure a consistent application of the law, or to achieve any other objective of discretionary review. 2. ASC did not even argue that the decision was manifestly erroneous. 3. New arguments not presented to the LD are not relevant. 4. The request was rejected. **Comment** 1. At the very least, to stand any chance of obtaining discretionary review, you have to invoke one of the grounds referred to by the JR. 2. New arguments that could have been raised at first instance will not be taken into consideration, even if they have been discussed in parallel proceedings. 3. Both points should be known to every representative! ##### **26 May 2026** **Court of Appeal, Hurom v NUC** [UPC\_CoA\_916/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Decision%20RoP%20265_Hurom%20v%20NUC_UPC-CoA_916-2025_2026-05-26_Signed.pdf) *Withdrawal of appeal* **Facts** 1. Hurom filed an application to withdraw its appeal (following the unfavorable outcome of the appeal proceedings in parallel cases). 2. NUC did not comment within the time limit set by the Court. 3. Hurom requested reimbursement of the (over)paid court fees. **The Court** 1. The Court allowed the withdrawal because NUC had not reacted within the prescribed time and ignored the comments later made by NUC in its later filed response to the appeal. 2. The Court explained that, even if NUC’s comments had been taken in consideration (NUC stated that it had an interest in the continuation of the appeal because the LD should not have ruled that each party bear its own costs, but instead that Hurom had to pay the costs), then the outcome would not have been different because, in the present order, the Court ordered Hurom to pay the costs of both the first instance and appeal. 3. The Court ordered Hurom to pay the costs of the first instance and appeal proceedings and ordered the reimbursement to Hurom of the court fees (50% plus the overpaid fees). **Comment** 1. Hurom had stated in its application that is was prepared to pay the costs of both the first-instance and appeal proceedings in order to prevent NUC from arguing that the appeal should continue, while the outcome would ultimately be that Hurom would have to pay these costs. 2. The Court of Appeal left open the question whether NUC, which was not happy with the cost decision at first instance, would have had to file a cross appeal to change that decision. 3. I would certainly recommend filing a cross appeal in such a situation, because I do not see why if the appeal is unsuccessful, the Court of Appeal would change the costs decision if no cross appeal had been filed. The unsuccessful appeal, in itself, does not provide grounds for changing the costs decision, as it does not alter the decision of the LD. ##### **26 May 2026** **Local Division Milan, Pirelli v Yuanxing Rubber** [UPC\_CFI\_770/2024 ; UPC\_CFI\_556/2025 ](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/2026-05-26_LDMilan%20UPC_CFI_770-2024%20DEC_Anonim.pdf.pdf) *Infringement / revocation* **Facts** 1. After an evidentiary seizure, Pirelli files an infringement suit based on EP 3 519 207 for a motorcycle tire. 2. Yuanxing filed a counterclaim for revocation. **The Court** 1. For the claim interpretation the Court first refers to Art. 69 EPC and the Protocol and “come chiarito dalla Corte d’Appello del Tribunale Unificato dei Brevetti” referring to Nanostring v 10x Genomics (UPC\_CoA\_335/2024). 2. The Court interprets the meaning of the different claim elements. While the defendant does an effort to give a limited meaning to many claim elements (except for “motorcycle” where defendant defends that this includes also four-wheel vehicles) the Court chooses (with a convincing reasoning) for Pirelli’s interpretation. 3. The Court rejects the revocation claim. With respect to sufficiency of disclosure, it notes “A reasonable amount of trial and error does not mean the invention not being enabled. The burden of presentation and proof lies with the party invoking invalidity of the patent.” 4. With respect to inventive step, both parties had argued on the basis of the problem-solution-approach. When asked during the hearing about the criteria of the Court of Appeal’s decision of 25 November 2025 (*Meril v Edwards*), neither party offered additional observations. 5. The Court discusses, applying the principles of the Court of Appeal, the different combinations of prior art documents proposed by defendant, and concludes that there was no lack of inventive step. 6. The Court concludes that the patent was valid and infringed. **Comment** 1. The Court, referring to a decision of the Board of Appeal of the EPO, holds that in general the content of a patent (application) is not “common general knowledge”, but if the same information can be found in several patents on the same subject, this can be considered common general knowledge (here: the way in which the tread pattern of a tire is depicted). 2. The Court refers to a decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) to hold that if the proof is in the hands of the defendant, the burden of proof may shift if the claimant provides strong indications that a certain fact that he has to prove, exists. I would add that the rules of evidence should also be governed by reasonableness and fairness, which depending on the circumstances can lead to a reversal of the burden of proof. If the person who has the burden of proof makes what he has to prove very credible, the other party cannot simply state that the asserted fact is not proven. Instead, he will have to contest the credibility of what is alleged. 3. As to evidence which is in the possession of the other party, the Rules of Proceedings provide the possibility for an application for an order to produce evidence in R. 190 RoP (Art. 59 UPCA), which in my opinion is based on the same principle. 4. In my opinion, a well-reasoned and correct decision delivered within a year after the service of the Chinese defendants. Bravo! ##### **26 May 2026** **Local Division Milan, Pirelli v Kingtyre** [UPC\_ CFI\_771/12024 ](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/2026-05-26_LDMilan%20UPC_CFI_771-2024%20DEC_Anonim.pdf-1.pdf) *Default judgment* **Facts / Decision of the Court** In this case after having concluded that the Statement of Claim had been served on the Chinese defendant and no defence has been filed within the three months period, the Court granted a default decision after having concluded in a reasoned decision that the patent is infringed. **Comment** 1. The interesting thing in this case is that apparently the service in China of the Statement of Claim was successful. 2. The value of the litigation (€ 500.000) seems very low, which results in a (too?) low court fee. ##### **26 May 2026** **Local Division Lisbon, Transsion v Ericsson** [UPC\_ CFI\_850/2026 ](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/UPC-CFI_850-2026%20Order%202026-05-26.pdf) *Security for costs* **Facts** Ericsson, the defendant in infringement proceedings with respect to EP 4 123 910, requests security for costs. **The Court** The Court, referring to the case law with respect to Chinese claimants, orders a security of 50% of the ceiling for costs based on the value of the litigation set by Transsion at € 1.500.000, which amounts to € 100.000 for costs of each defendant (total: € 200.000). **Comment** Ericsson had asked for € 300.000 but the Court based its decision on the value of the litigation as indicated by Transsion. As such, that seems not automatically reasonable as that value of the litigation could have been set too low. However, from the decision it appears that Ericsson did not argue in its application that that value should be higher. ##### **26 May 2026** **Court of Appeal, Xingi v Avient** [UPC\_ CoA\_76/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/order%20-%20suspensive%20effect_UPC_COA_76-2026_Signed.pdf) *Suspensive effect* **Facts** 1. The Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) of the Local Division The Hague ordered Xingi to produce within two weeks: 1. 30 kg of ballistic sheets; 2. the English version of a video which had been online on or after 28 November 2018. 2. The JR refused to order to produce internal tests, as they were not relevant for proving infringement, and communications with respect to the withdrawal of the video, as this was considered unnecessary and not proportionate. 3. On 15 May 2026, the appellants filed an appeal and asked for suspensive effect citing various reasons. **The Court of Appeal** 1. The application is admissible, as the appeal was timely filed and the application for suspensive effect sets out the grounds for suspensive effect alongside the facts, evidence and legal arguments. 2. Suspensive effect shall only be granted under exceptional circumstances, as the principle is that also an order to produce evidence shall not prevent continuation of the proceedings. 3. Grounds for suspensive effect are if the appeal would be rendered devoid of purpose or the order is manifestly wrong or an evident breach of fundamental rights. 4. The Court rejects the argument that there was a violation of the right to be heard because the JR did not consider the fact that the patentee had stated that it was already in the possession of infringing samples. That statement was made in the reply and therefore not known to the JR at the time of the decision. 5. Also the argument that the applicant was not heard about the location where the evidence had to be delivered fails, because the JR under R. 190(3) RoP can determine the modalities of the execution and the appellant could have made arguments on that point in their submission. 6. The Court *prima facie* accepts the arguments that exporting the samples from China within two weeks is impossible, because of severe penalties when exports take place without the necessary approval by the Chinese authorities. 7. The Court sees no manifest errors. 8. The Court grants suspensive effect in that the time limit for compliance with the order of the Court of First Instance is extended to 15 July 2026. **Comment** 1. Although the appellants should have argued in the first instance proceedings that they could not deliver samples within two weeks because they needed approval from the Chinese authorities for export, the Court of Appeal helps them by extending the deadline for compliance. All other reasons for suspensive effect were rejected. 2. If the appellants would have gone to the JR explaining that it was impossible to comply with the order, I assume that the JR would have changed the order. In addition, in my view you will likely not forfeit penalties if it is impossible to comply with the order. A risk of imprisonment in China seems to amount to the impossibility to comply! ##### **27 May 2026** **Local Division Düsseldorf, Brita v Wessper** [UPC\_CFI\_779/2024](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/R.%20262%2C%20262A%20RoP%20Order_final_signed.pdf) *Confidential Information* **Facts** 1. Infringement proceedings concerning Brita’s patent EP 1 748 830. 2. On 16 April 2026, the Court granted an injunction on the basis of indirect infringement, together with the usual orders regarding information, etc. 3. Wessper sought a confidentiality order with respect to the information it had to provide to Brita. **The Presiding Judge** The request was rejected, as Wessper did not explain why it could not have raised it already in the main case. **Comment** 1. As the Presiding Judge explains, this decision was to be expected in light of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Kodak v Fujifilm (UPC\_CoA\_699/2025). 2. I have already stated before that a defendant has to raise (proportionality) defences and confidentiality issues relating to all the claims in the Statement of Claims in the (first) defence. ##### **27 May 2026** **Local Division The Hague, BMSI v BYD** [UPC\_ CFI\_2228/2025; UPC\_ CFI\_1546/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/20260527%20R.158%20order.pdf) *Security for costs* **Facts** 1. BYD requests the Court to order BMSI (a US company) to provide security for costs (€ 400,000). 2. BMSI does not object, but argues that € 300,000 would be sufficient and, instead of 3 weeks, it should be given 7 weeks to provide the security. **The JR** 1. The JR orders a security for costs of € 350,000. 2. To be provided within 4 weeks. **Comment** Do you really have to bother the JR with this? One telephone call and reasonable representatives would have cut the cake in the middle! ##### **27 May 2026** **Local Division Düsseldorf, Wonderland v Cybex** [UPC\_CFI\_807/2024](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Decision%20Wonderland%20v%20Cybex%20Decision_signed_all.pdf); [UPC\_ CFI\_334/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Decision%20Wonderland%20v%20Cybex%20Decision_signed_all.pdf) *Equivalence / revocation* **Facts** 1. Infringement proceedings concerning EP 1 905 615 relating to a swivel locking device for a stroller wheel. 2. The defendant is a Chinese company allegedly selling infringing strollers. 3. The claimant argued that two features of claim 1 were realized by equivalent means and that all the others features were literally reproduced. 4. The defendant denied infringement and filed a counterclaim for revocation. 5. In its reply, the claimant argued that, with respect to two other claim features: if the Court were to accept the defence of non-literal infringement, these features were also realized by equivalent means. The claimant sought leave to amend its case to include these arguments. 6. The JR decided that such an amendment was not necessary, and the panel rejected a request for review. 7. The defendants also filed a request to amend its case by invoking prior public use in relation to a particular stroller. **The Court** 1. The Court discusses the patent, identifies the object of the invention, cites the known principles of claim construction, and interprets the different claim elements. 2. The Court dismissed the counterclaim for revocation: 1. applying the gold standard, there is no extension of subject matter; 2. some (further) added-subject-matter arguments raised by the defendants are irrelevant in light of the (more limited) interpretation of the claim elements; 3. the same applies to the insufficiency of disclosure arguments, which are likewise based on a different interpretation of the claim; 4. claim 1 and, therefore, all subclaims, are novel; 5. the Court cites the principles for establishing inventive step (Meril v Edwards; Amgen v Sanofi) (considerations 157-168). 6. the defendants applied the EPO’s problem solution approach, starting from 14 realistic starting points. During the oral hearing, the defendants were given the possibility to argue one or more combinations in greater detail in light of the case law of the Court of Appeal. 7. a publication on the priority date does not belong to the prior art. Prior art is everything known before the priority date. 8. in general, the defendants failed to establish a “motivation” (“pointer”) / or to provide a sufficiently detailed explanation as to why the invention lacked inventive step. 3. With respect to infringement, the Court adopts the principles set out by the Local Division in The Hague: *“239. A variation is equivalent to an element specified in the claim if the following four questions are answered in the affirmative: 1) Technical equivalence: Does the variation solve (essentially) the same problem that the patented invention solves and performs (essentially) the same function in this context? 2) Is extending the protection of the claim to the equivalent proportionate to a fair protection for the patentee? 47 This needs to be assessed in view of the patentee’s contribution to the art and taking into account the question whether it is obvious to the skilled person from the patent publication how to apply the equivalent element (at the time of infringement). 3) Reasonable legal certainty for third parties: Does the skilled person understand from the patent that the scope of the invention is broader than what is claimed literally? 4) Is the allegedly infringing product novel and inventive over the prior art?* *240. The Panel will apply the assessment criteria set out by the Local Division The Hague. These criteria form a coherent whole, and are, as such, suitable for the purpose of examining equivalence. At least in the present case and taking into account the submissions of the parties, there is no indication that applying a different standard would produce a different outcome.”* 4. The Court rules that there is no technical equivalence, stating: *“251 While it is true that the claim must always be considered as a whole, it is nevertheless necessary to determine the function of each substituted feature in relation to the claim. Only in this way can a comparison be made between the technical functions of the claimed and substitute means.* *252. Therefore, it is not sufficient to focus solely on the objective task of the patent in suit. Rather, what matters is the function of each exchanged features in achieving this task. This includes the function of the arrangement and location of the respective components, as set out specifically in the claim.”* 5. With respect to the certainty of third parties, the Court states: *“270. In the Panel’s opinion, a skilled person would not understand that such significant modifications in almost all parts would be covered by the patent. The Claimant’s arguments fail to consider that the claim sets out specific requirements regarding the arrangement of the components. According to the patent in suit, it is precisely this arrangement that achieves the desired secured connection between rotatable and non-rotatable elements.”* 6. The infringement action and the revocation action were dismissed. 7. The parties reached agreement on costs during the oral hearing. **Comment** 1. A good lesson for representatives on how to deal with a revocation action. Representatives should realize that such proceedings are very different from EPO proceedings and, therefore, for representatives who are used to arguing before the EPO, this decision is, in my opinion, a must read. 2. I am not enthusiastic about the Local Division The Hague’s criteria for equivalence because it is far to flexible and can easily lead (as I have seen in practice) to a finding of no equivalence based on rather subjective criteria, such as the legal certainty of third parties. I think that the means + function (US style) principle leads to a more objective result. 3. Having said that, even under the means + function approach, this decision of the Local Division is convincing, as the Court, in my opinion, correctly finds that there is no technical equivalence. 4. I have more reservations on what the Court states about the legal certainty of third parties. Although I agree with the Court's reasoning in this case, it should not be understood (as I have seen in national case law) that the doctrine of equivalence can never be applied to a so-called portrait claim. 5. However, I agree with the Court that it is not sufficient to argue, on a general level: “your stroller has the same advantages and therefore infringes”. It must be shown that a claim element has been replaced by an element which performs essentially the same function, in essentially the same way, with essentially the same result. 6. Bravo: the Court got the parties to agree on costs! ##### **27 May 2026** **Court of Appeal, Hefei v Grundfos** [UPC\_ CoA\_622/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Decision%2027-05-26%20anonymized.pdf); [UPC\_CoA\_623/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Decision%2027-05-26%20anonymized.pdf) *Reversal of infringement decision* **Facts** This concerns an appeal against a decision of 8 May 2026 of the LD Düsseldorf concerning EP 2 778 423, in which the Court granted an injunction and related relief. **The Court of Appeal** 1. Both parties successfully challenged the interpretation of the words “umschalten” and “zuschalten” in the claim. The Court of Appeal holds that a patent establishes its own lexicon. 2. Hefei’s arguments for a different (more restrictive) interpretation of the claim are not followed by the Court of Appeal. The Court repeats that claim elements have to be interpreted in the light of the claims. In general, the same words in a claim have the same meaning. However, the same term may have a different meaning in different claims, if the interpretation of claims in the light of the description leads to such a different understanding. 3. The appeal against the revocation decision is successful. 4. The Court of Appeal repeats that it is not enough, when arguing invalidity, to refer to a number of prior art documents. A party must substantiate why a certain prior art document constitutes a relevant starting point and why it would be combined with other documents. Where a combination with the common general knowledge is relied upon, it must also be substantiated why that knowledge forms part of the common general knowledge. 5. The Court of Appeal rules that, although a combination of D5 with the common general knowledge had not been explicitly relied upon in the inventive step attack in the claim for revocation, D5 (in combination with the common general knowledge) had already been invoked in the Statement of Claim as depriving the claim of novelty. This was sufficient to allow the same combination to be relied upon in support of a lack of inventive step. 6. The Court discusses all the dependent claims and concludes that claim 4 and 6-10 are inventive, while revoking the other claims. 7. As the infringement claim was based on claim 1, 5 and 11, all of which were revoked, the infringement action has to be dismissed. **Comment** 1. This decision shows that, if at all possible, invalid patents should not be kept alive by a too strict application of the Rules. 2. Although it was of course not very smart of the defendant to only argue in the counterclaim of revocation lack of novelty on the basis of D5 and the common general knowledge, the Court allowed the defendant to later also invoke lack of inventive step. Indeed, an experienced representative for the claimant can expect this, and as long as there is a possibility to react, I do not see a problem. This is an important message to the Local, Regional and Central Divisions. 3. All representatives should read what is stated hereabove under 4 with respect to a claim for revocation! ##### **27 May 2026** **Court of Appeal, Anker v Belkin / Philips** [UPC\_CoA\_39/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Final%20order%20anonymized.pdf) *Access to pleadings and evidence* **Facts** 1. Anker requested access to the pleadings and evidence in the appeal proceedings between Philips and Belkin, insofar as these are not confidential. It stated that it seeks access only to the technical agreements. 2. Philips did not object, provided that non-technical arguments and confidential information are not disclosed. 3. Belkin did not object. **The JR of the Court of Appeal** 1. The Judge-Raporteur (“JR”) cites the relevant case law. 2. If Anker does not want to access the non-technical arguments, that is not something it can request, as this would require the Court (Registry) to make that distinction. The parties themselves may, however, redact those parts. 3. The JR nevertheless considers that Anker’s request should be seen merely as an indication that it was not interested in the non-technical parts, rather than a request that those non-confidential parts of the pleadings and exhibits should not be disclosed. 4. The JR grants the request. **Comment** There still appears to be some misunderstanding about R. 262.2 RoP. If a third party asks for access, the parties concerned can and should file an R. 262.2 RoP request, in principle also for information that was subject to a confidentiality regime during the proceedings under R. 262.A RoP. In this case, this was not necessary because Anker requested access only to non-confidential information. However, Philips stated that it did not want Anker to obtain non-technical information (in line with Anker’s own request). Philips should therefore have filed a R. 262.2 RoP request together with a redacted version of the pleadings and exhibits in which the non-technical information had been blacked out. As Philips did not do so, Anker also obtained access to that information (in the end, Philips may simply have considered that information insufficiently important to justify the effort to go through all pleadings and exhibits for removing it?). ##### **27 May 2026** **Central Division Milan, LS v Bellissa** [UPC\_ CFI\_860/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/26-05-27%20Regel%20105%20Verfuegung%20final%20signiert_GDPR%20checked.pdf) *Report of the interim conference* **Facts** The interim conference was held by the JR. The President and the Technical Judge were both present. **The JR** 1. Value of the litigation: according to the Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”), the basis should be the value of the litigation in the pending infringement case in Mannheim. 2. The parties are urged to agree on costs. 3. With respect to the requirement of Article 47.6 UPCA that the claimant in a revocation action has to be “concerned”, the JR states that a distinction should be made between private persons (who cannot infringe) and companies, which are in fact always concerned because they are commercially active. It is not necessary to be “specifically concerned”. The JR also refers to R. 44 RoP, which does not require to be “concerned”. 4. The Court does not see a reason to regard the claimant as a strawman. 5. The new prior art produced in the reply is to be considered only in relation to the auxiliary requests. It cannot be taken in consideration with respect to the granted claim and dependent claims (including where the latter are proposed as auxiliary requests). 6. The JR stated that D1 could be considered novelty-destroying on a correct interpretation of the claim. 7. The JR also provided further preliminary views of the Court. 8. A schedule for the oral hearing was set. **Comment** 1. In this case, the parties did not receive a preliminary opinion at the start of the hearing. Instead, they received it during the interim conference, in the presence of the full panel. 2. Moreover, the JR engaged in a lot of housekeeping. It is clear that claimant cannot rely on the late filed prior art to attack the granted claims. It is also clear that claimant had to do a better job at substantiating its attacks and clearly identifying the grounds on which they are based. 3. I do not think that R. 44 RoP, which does not require a party to be "concerned", is very relevant, as the UPCA overrides the Rules that are not consistent with it. I agree that a distinction may be made between a private person and a company when determining whether a party is “concerned” by the patent. However, a company without assets that has been incorporated solely to act as a strawman is in my opinion not “concerned with the patent”. However, in my opinion, a parent company filing a revocation action because a subsidiary is sued for infringement is “concerned with the patent”. ##### **28 May 2026** **Local Division Hamburg, Dreame v Dyson** [UPC\_CFI\_962/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/962_2026%20Order-redacted.pdf) *Settlement confirmed by the Court* **Facts** 1. Dreame filed PI proceedings requesting a provisional declaration of non infringement and an injunction. 2. Parties settled during the oral hearing. 3. Part of the settlement was the withdrawal of the determination of non infringement and no cost decision. 4. The Court was asked to confirm the settlement in accordance with R. 365.2 RoP and to order its confidentiality. **The Court** 1. Accepts the withdrawal. 2. Confirms the settlement. 3. Orders that in the Register the decision shall be entered. 4. The agreement may be enforced as a final decision. 5. The details of the settlement agreement shall be treated as confidential. **Comment** 1. The Court states that a member of the public can request access which then has to be decided by the Court. The Court refers to R. 262.6 RoP. In my opinion R. 365.2 RoP is a species of R. 262 RoP and a member of the public cannot request access. If that would be the case it would be unattractive for parties to use R. 365 RoP for settlement purposes. 2. In PI proceedings you cannot ask for a declaration of non infringement. However, you could ask for an order not to state that the product is infringing etc. in other words an order to do or not to do something. ##### **28 May 2026** **Local Division Düsseldorf, Avago v Renault** [UPC\_ CFI\_629/2025; UPC\_CFI\_ 1292/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/R.265_R.370_629_1292-2026__final_IR_BT_TZ_RB.pdf) *Settlement* **Facts** 1. Patent infringement action (EP 3 651 429) and counterclaim for revocation. 2. Both parties withdrew their claims before closure of the written proceedings. 3. Both parties asked a return of 60% of the court fees and agreed to pay their own costs. **The Court** 1. Permits the withdrawal. 2. No need for a cost decision. 3. Return of 50% (and not 60%) of the court costs because withdrawal was requested after 1 January 2026 and the new rules apply. **Comment** The Court decides that only 50% of the court costs is returned in accordance with the decision of the Court of Appeal of 26 May 2026 (UPC\_CoA\_916/2025), because the Court of Appeal considers that the new rules apply to applications to withdraw filed after 31 December 2025. I think that the specific provision on page 4 of the decision of the Administrative Committee of 4 November 2025 had a different intention, being applicability of these rules on cases filed after 31 December 2025. However, the interpretation of the Court of Appeal can be defended because the withdrawal is based on an application, and is anyway better for the financing of the Court. ##### **29 May 2026** **Local Division Paris, TIRU v Valinea** [UPC\_CFI\_130/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/DECISION%20AU%20FOND%20TIRU%20anonymized%20signed%20by%20the%20full%20panel%20%281%29.pdf) *Seizure not valid? Abuse of proceedings* **Facts** 1. TIRU alleges infringement of EP 3 178 578. 2. Valinea disputes the validity of an evidentiary seizure, asserting the expert was biased because he had held a meeting with the claimant before the seizure, and had not correctly stated the information obtained from certain persons. 3. The Local Division had sent the counterclaim for revocation to the Central Division, because a revocation action was already pending before that Division. 4. The Central Division maintained the patent. **The Court** 1. The Court rejects the allegations with respect to the seizure. 2. The Court adopts the same claim interpretation as the Central Division. 3. The Court concludes that several claim features are not infringed. 4. With respect to equivalence, the Court adopts the test of the Local Division in The Hague. 5. The Court rejects a claim by defendants for abuse of proceedings. 6. The Court awards costs up to the ceiling, because the actual costs exceed the ceiling. **Comment** 1. It is quite customary in France to raise procedural objections against the acceptance of evidence (here the evidentiary seizure). One of the stories I was told about procedural niceties in France: a young associate of the law firm bought the infringing product in France while the bailiff stayed outside the shop and testified that he had seen her going in the shop without and coming out of the shop with the infringing product. However, after a procedural objection, the Court held that there was no evidence that the infringing product was sold in France. 2. The foregoing is certainly not the attitude of the Paris Local Division, which rejects all objections with respect to the neutrality of the expert and shows realism. Of course, every responsible expert will organize a briefing in order to know what the case is all about, what kind of evidence the claimant is looking for, etc. 3. The same is true for a claim for abuse of procedure. The Court is right that such a counterclaim belongs to the competence of the UPC, but of course such a claim will only have success in extreme situations. In this case, the claim clearly lacked basis. 4. The equivalence test of the Local Division The Hague is popular. Also in this case, the risk and uncertainty which that theory can cause, do not play a role, because the Court rightly held that there was no technical equivalence. 5. The Court deals with costs in an efficient way. The parties have established that they spent more than the ceiling, so the Court awards the ceiling. 6. The Local Division gives its decision in 14 months, which in view of the various complications is a perfect result in accordance with the Rules. 7. Living in Paris during a heat wave (with this week a temperature of 34 degrees Celsius), I am happy that the garbage is collected and can be incinerated. This would have been a good example of an injunction (to stop the ovens used by the city of Paris) being disproportionate! ##### **29 May 2026** **Local Division Mannheim, Nokia v Geely et al.** [UPC\_CFI\_160/2026; UPC\_ CFI\_662/2025 ](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/2026-05-29-%20Entscheidung%20R.%20265%20RoP_signed.pdf) *Settlement* **Facts** 1. Nokia sued several defendants because of infringement of EP 3 799 333 among which Lynk & Co, Lotus and Smart. 2. After the defendants have filed their defence and counterclaim in revocation, the parties settle. **The Court** The Court accepts the withdrawals etc. **Comment** As said before, a UPC action has such serious economic consequences that a defendant, even if he thinks that he has a reasonable chance to win, is forced to settle, as an injunction will increase considerably the settlement amount. That is particularly the case also because there is no suspensive effect, and a request for suspensive effect at the Court of Appeal will succeed only in (very) exceptional circumstances. The rate of settlements is considerably higher than in national courts. **– All comments above are** [Prof. Hoyng](https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/our-team/legal-experts/prof-willem-hoyng "https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/our-team/legal-experts/prof-willem-hoyng")**‘s personal opinions –**