# News Detail Share now [](https://www.linkedin.com/uas/login?session_redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.linkedin.com%2FshareArticle%3Fmini%3Dtrue%26url%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.hoyngrokhmonegier.com%2Ffr%2Factualites%2Fdetail%2Fupc-unfiltered-by-willem-hoyng-upc-decisions-week-14-2026%26title%3DUPC%20Unfiltered%2C%20by%20Willem%20Hoyng%20%E2%80%93%20UPC%20decisions%20week%2014%2C%202026%26summary%3D "Linkedin") # UPC Unfiltered, by Willem Hoyng – UPC decisions week 14, 2026 07 avril 2026 News Unified Patent Court (UPC) Hot Topic News Below, [Prof. Willem Hoyng](https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/our-team/legal-experts/prof-willem-hoyng) provides his unfiltered views on the decisions that were published on the website of the Unified Patent Court (“UPC”) last week. His comments offer a unique insight into the UPC’s case law, as he chairs the Advisory Board of the UPC and participated in drafting the Rules of Procedure of the UPC. Interested in more of this? Stay tuned and subscribe [**here**](https://mailchi.mp/8fbd8890d03b/upc-unfiltered-by-willem-hoyng) for weekly updates. On the go, multi-tasking or just prefer to listen? “Willem Hoyng’s UPC Unfiltered AI Podcast” – your weekly, AI-generated podcast discussing Willem Hoyng’s commentary on UPC case law of last week, offers a convenient alternative. Listen on [**Spotify**](https://open.spotify.com/show/53wwzF7LNSqqouR0wzXgJD?si=ae84739b09904ee1&nd=1&dlsi=71b6a174bdbd4f32) or [**Apple Podcasts**](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/willem-hoyngs-upc-unfiltered-ai-podcast/id1806092389). #### **26 February 2026** ***(late published)*** **Local Division Munich, Huawei v MediaTek** [UPC\_ CFI\_1235/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/1235-25%20AE%20Dritter%2020260226%20-%20signed%20anonymisiert%20%C3%9Cbersetzung%20EN.pdf) ***Suspension because of panel review*** **Facts** 1. On 27 January 2026, the Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) allowed a third-party inspection of the Court file. 2. MediaTek filed an application for review on 2 February 2026, arguing that no inspection should be granted or, alternatively, only under certain confidentiality obligations. 3. MediaTek furthermore asked for suspension of the order. **The JR** The JR granted the suspension, stating that the decision whether or not to grant such a suspension depended on the circumstances, and that under certain circumstances, the JR would be obliged to suspend, especially when the appeal without suspension would no longer make sense anymore because of a fait accompli. **Comment** 1. R. 262.2 RoP states that parties have two weeks to argue confidentiality, and that to that end, the Registrar shall give access only 14 days after the content of the register is made available to all recipients. 2. In general, before deciding to allow inspection, the JR has to consult the parties. At that point in time, the parties can argue that no access should be given to certain information, or that certain parts of the pleadings or evidence should be kept confidential. #### **12 March 2026** ***(late published)*** **Local Division Milan, Biopsafe v Kaltek** [UPC\_ CFI\_2216/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/2026-03-12%20LDMilan%20UPC_CFI_2216-2025%20ORD.pdf) ***Extension of time*** **Facts** 1. On 27 February 2026, Kaltek asked for an extension of the term for filing its defence, at a date not earlier than 25 May 2026. 2. As substantiation, Kaltek stated that the oral hearing before the Opposition Division (“OD”) would take place on 8 May 2026, which is 9 days after the deadline for filing its defence. 3. The OD’s preliminary opinion showed that the patent would likely to be revoked or maintained in an amended form. **The Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”)** The JR granted the request **Comment** 1. The decision of the OD is of course a logical decision. 2. The decision illustrates the somewhat difficult situations which may arise if oppositions and proceedings run in parallel. It is difficult to formulate a hard and fast rule for such situations, because circumstances can vary enormously. You could for example say that a party who initiates a revocation action before the UPC can only do so, as long as he does not lodge opposition or abandons opposition already lodged, but that does not prevent third parties (including parent companies/subsidiaries) to lodge oppositions, so this is not a good solution. 3. So, for the moment, the line should stay that the UPC avoids delays because of opposition proceedings but allows extension when that is practical and reasonable, as was the case here. #### **19 March 2026** ***(late published)*** **Local Division Milan, Pirelli v Sichuan** [UPC\_ CFI\_770/2024; UPC\_ CFI\_556/2025 ](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/2026-03-19%20LDMilan%20UPC_CFI_770-2024%20ORD.pdf) ***Procedural order*** **Facts** 1. On 13 February 2026, the Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) ordered the examination of the seized tires during the oral argument, and especially the cutting of the tires so that the radial carcass structure and its characteristics could be observed. 2. Both parties had agreed with this, but Pirelli’s representative had to verify if that was technically possible. 3. On 24 February 2026, Pirelli informed the Court that this cutting could only be done with special equipment which was too heavy to bring to the civil court room. 4. Pirelli offered to make a lab available where this was possible. 5. The defendant did not agree that this operation would be done at Pirelli’s premises. 6. During a case management hearing of 6 March 2026, Pirelli stated that the cutting up was not necessary as the infringing characteristics were all visible from the outside. 7. The JR invited the parties to reach agreement on a way to make technical inspection of the tires possible before 13 March 2026. 8. The parties filed a motion on 13 March agreeing on a protocol and asking two experts to be appointed. The defendant indicated that it is also of the opinion that an inspection is not necessary. **The JR** The JR orders that the oral hearing on 14 April 2026 will take place without the cutting. **Comment** 1. Again Milan continues the very strange habit in not mentioning the names of the representatives. 2. All participants – the JR and the representatives – seem to make the proceedings as inefficient (and costly for the parties) as possible! 3. If both parties agree that cutting is not necessary, then why spend all this time on it? Pirelli has the burden of proof of the infringement and thinks it is not relevant. So if in the end you cannot establish infringement without knowing the interior, then they lose. Anyway, they should have established the interior of the tire before starting the proceedings by buying one and cutting the tire up. 4. The defendant should have done the same, if they would have thought it would have been necessary in view of the evidence brought by Pirrelli. 5. The JR organizing an interim conference so close to the oral hearing, was now confronted with a situation that he was running out of time. The whole (unnecessary!) cutting up should of course have been taken place before the oral hearing following an order during the interim conference. 6. By the case number, it is clear that the case started in 2024, and still no oral hearing took place. This is not a show case for the UPC. Italy was known for long national proceedings, often with the appointment of a technical expert, which unfortunately did not give it a reputation as a good venue for patent litigation. 7. I sincerely hope that the Milan Division and the Italian representatives now abolish old habits and use the new and modern Rules of Procedure to become as efficient as the other Local Divisions. It may be a good idea to temporarily appoint the third non-Italian judge (a judge who is used to fast patent proceedings) as a JR, in order to show how oral arguments within a year can be reached. I cannot imagine a foreign judge not being willing to go to Italy and Milan, the country of history, culture, taste good food with its beautiful language! #### **19 March 2026** ***(late published)*** **Local Division Milan, 3V Sigma v AGA** [UPC\_CFI\_2052/2025 ](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/2026-03-24%20LDMilan%20UPC_CFI_2052-2025%20ORD.pdf) ***Synchronisation of dates*** **Facts** 1. The Statement of Claim is served with respect to two defendants on 30 December 2025, and with respect to the third defendant on 13 March 2026. 2. On 23 March 2026, the two defendants served on 13 December 2025 request alignment of the data for the defence to 15 June 2026, the date when the Statement of Defence of the third defendant is due. 3. The Claimant agrees. **The JR** The JR grants the request. **Comment** 1. It is for all parties involved more practical to have the same dates for all written pleadings for all defendants. 2. When the Rules are revised, it may be good to have a Rule which states that the dates for the written pleadings in case of multiple defendants will be the date of the defendant which is served last. However, if the defendant chooses to file his Statement of Defence earlier, then that earlier date is the starting date for time periods for the written proceedings. #### **19 March 2026** ***(late published)*** **Local Division Mannheim, NEC v Hisense** [UPC\_CFI\_717/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/CFI_717-2025%20-%20Decision%20on%20withdrawal%202026.03.19%20-%20Signed.pdf) ***Settlement*** **Facts** 1. NEC filed an application for withdrawal, with each party bearing their own costs. 2. Hisense agreed. 3. NEC requested reimbursement of 60% of the Court fees. **The JR** 1. The JR granted the application. 2. The JR ordered that 60% be reimbursed. **Comment** 1. I note that the JR is not one of the two German judges, but the foreign judge. This makes the proceedings more international and it is a good division of the work for the Division, as the JR will generally also prepare the draft decision. 2. The Claimant was awarded a 60% reimbursement of court fees. Having read the elaborate JR’s reasoning in *Nokia v Warner Bros* (decision of 27 March 2026, UPC\_CFI\_1390/2025), I agree that this is correct. #### **27 March 2026 (*****late published)*** **Court of Appeal, Onward v Niche** [UPC\_CoA\_898/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Anordnung%20UPC_CoA_898-2025.pdf%20%28Skl%29.pdf) ***Auxiliary request in PI proceedings*** **Facts** 1. Onward initiated PI proceedings against Niche on the basis of alleged infringement of EP 3 421 081. 2. The Local Division denied the PI application because it considered it more likely than not that claim 1 was not novel. 3. It also stated that, in PI proceedings, you cannot argue on the basis of auxiliary requests. 4. Onward appealed. **The Court of Appeal** 1. The Court of Appeal referred to R. 211.2 RoP and concludes that the Rule does not state that a PI is only possible with respect to a granted patent. It also concluded that R. 30 RoP is not applicable, since a PI procedure is not a revocation procedure. 2. Therefore, it is possible to initiate PI proceedings based on an amended claim or to submit an auxiliary request during the PI proceedings. In the latter case, R. 263 RoP (leave to change claim or amend case) is applicable. 3. The Court clarifies that the allowance of such a request depends on the circumstances of the PI case and the (limited) number of auxiliary requests. 4. On appeal, the Court allowed a minor amendment (R.222.2 RoP) to the (new) claim, which had already been formulated in first instance, stating that R.222 RoP also applies to PI appeal proceedings. 5. For direct infringement, all elements of the claim must be present in the infringing product. This was not the case, as the product still required programming by medical staff at the hospital. 6. There was also no indirect infringement, as it could not be established in this case that the products were intended to be programmed in accordance with the claim. 7. The appeal was rejected. **Comment** 1. This is a very important and welcome, well-reasoned decision, which also demonstrates a reasonably flexible attitude towards the Rules of Procedure. The UPC’s purpose is to administer justice, not to get bogged down by procedural formalities. 2. In my view, the decision of the Munich Local Division to only allow PIs on the basis of granted patents is not only a sign of inflexibility, but also an indication that they are dealing with too many cases. 3. The Court of Appeal clarifies the purpose of PI proceedings. These proceedings are not for establishing or deciding whether a patent is valid or infringed. They are about the possibility of quickly taking measures to protect the patentee’s interest in situations where the patentee acts diligently (urgency) and such measures are necessary for the protection of the patentee (necessity). 4. Therefore, you cannot (always) require a patentee who is confronted with an infringement to go through central limitation proceedings, which take a considerable amount of time. 5. In my opinion, the best way to conduct a PI is to start with a claim that is as invalidity-proof as possible and clearly reads on the infringing product. Ideally, the claim would be (a combination of) granted (sub-)claims, but this is not necessary. It should be clear that claimant should try to avoid any discussion about the extension of subject matter or clarity. 6. This does not preclude filing one or two auxiliary requests after receiving the objections (provided there is such a written statement). However, you have to make sure that you give the other party ample time to respond and provide a clear and concise explanation of the basis for the requests, why you are filing them, and how they overcome the (invalidity) arguments put forward by the opposing party. #### **27 March 2026** ***(late published)*** **Local Division Mannheim, Nokia v Warner Bros.** [UPC\_CFI\_1390/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/2026-03-27%20Entscheidung%20R.%20265%2C%20R.%20370.9_signed.pdf) ***Settlement*** **Facts** Withdrawal and consent before the written procedure **The JR** awarded a reimbursement of 60% of the Court fees. **Comment** The JR provided an extensive reasoning for why he believes that the old reimbursement rules remain applicable, and I must admit that he has convinced me. I was wrong to defend the view that the new rules apply to withdrawals after 31 December 2025, even if the action was started before that date. #### **30 March 2026** **Court of Appeal, Rematec v Europe Forestry** [UPC\_CoA\_302/2025; UPC\_CoA\_305/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Anordnung_Kostenfestsetzung_Rematec%20vs%20Europe%20Forestry_UPC_CoA_302-2025_305-2025_2026_03_30_Signed.pdf) ***Application for costs*** **Facts** 1. The Local Division Mannheim revoked Rematec’s patent EP 2 548 648 and dismissed the infringement case against Europe Forestry. 2. Rematec appealed against the decision, and on 17 February 2026, the Court of Appeal ruled that the patent was valid and had been infringed, ordering Europe Forestry to pay 80 % of the costs. 3. On 17 March 2026, Rematec started cost proceedings in the Court of Appeal for its costs in first and second instance. 4. On 17 March 2026, the Registry of the Court of Appeal informed Rematec that they must file for cost proceedings in the Local Division Mannheim. 5. On 18 March 2026, Rematec, after amending their application, asked the JR of the Court of Appeal to forward the application to the Local Division Mannheim with the instruction that the Local Division consider 17 March 2026 as the application date. 6. On 18 March, Europe Forestry also applied for costs directly at the Local Division Mannheim. **The JR of the Court of Appeal** 1. The JR referred to the fact that the application for costs is a separate procedure (R. 150 RoP) which begins in first instance at the Local Division. This still applies even after the Court of Appeal has ruled on the case. 2. This means that it is up to the Local Division to decide the applicable date on which the application for costs is made. 3. The Court of Appeal can only refer cases to the Local Division on the basis of specific provisions in the Rules of Procedure. 4. There are no special circumstances in this case to justify an exception, given that the Court of Appeal has already ruled that the cost application has to be made at the Local Division and not at the Court of Appeal. 5. The request was denied. **Comment** 1. Rematec was successful on appeal and is entitled to recover its costs in both instances. 2. Rematec waited until the last day of the one-month period under R. 150 RoP to apply for costs. 3. However, had they been aware of the case law of the Court of Appeal (see the decision of 29 July 2024 re *Hanshow v Vusiongroup*, UPC\_CoA\_1/2024), they would have known that, even after an appeal, cost applications must be filed with the Local Division of the first instance and not at the Court of Appeal. 4. Although the Registry of the Court of Appeal warned them on the last day, they did not file in the Local Division Mannheim on that day, and were therefore one day late! 5. As it was very clear what they should have done, the JR of the Court of Appeal was understandably not prepared to instruct the Local Division to consider the application filed on the last day. 6. Lesson for representatives: 1. Make sure that, if you wish to act as a representative, you are familiar with the Rules of Procedure and the case law. 2. Make sure that you read the messages from the Registry, especially if you are filing on the last day. 7. Let’s see what the Local Division Mannheim decides, but I am afraid that this cannot be repaired. #### **30 March 2026** **Court of Appeal, Amazon v Interdigital** [UPC\_CoA\_012/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Order%20-%20UPC-CoA-12-2026_Signed.pdf) ***Transcription of hearing*** **Facts** 1. On 16 March 2025, Amazon requested that the Local Division Mannheim grant them access to the video recording of the oral hearing held on 14 November 2025, clarifying clearly that they intended to produce a transcription with a designated stenographer. 2. Interdigital indicated that they had no problem with the request. 3. The JR refused the request to make a transcription with a stenographer. The JR said, among other things, that such a transcription was unnecessary for coordination with proceedings in non-UPC countries, especially since US and UK counsel had been present during the oral hearing. 4. Amazon appealed. **The Court of Appeal** 1. The Court of Appeal referred to R. 115 RoP, which states that an audio recording of the oral hearing must be made and shall be made available to the parties and their representatives at the court’s premises after the hearing. 2. “Shall be made available” means that no further order is necessary. 3. “Making available” means that copying the recording is not allowed. 4. The audio recording may be important, for instance, for appeal proceedings, and the private transcript does not replace or compromise the audio recording. 5. After the public consultation, the Drafting Committee expressly stated that parties could make a transcript. 6. A transcript can be made by an assistant or support staff, such as a stenographer, of the representative, as they are also bound by confidentiality obligations. 7. The transcript may be used in other (i.e., foreign) proceedings by the parties, provided that the foreign court is informed: 1. that it is a private transcript, and only the recording provides proof of what was said; and that 2. judges’ remarks are provisional and that their final opinion can only be found in the judgment. Furthermore, the transcript must be complete and confidentiality orders and the protection of personal data must be complied with. **Comment** 1. This is not a surprising decision, as it was discussed during the public consultation on the Rules. At that time, the UK was still participating in the UPC, and UK proceedings are transcribed. Some UK participants therefore asked for the same to be done in the UPC. 2. However, the Drafting Committee did not want to change the Rule for practical (and cost) reasons, but made it clear that a private transcription could be created. 3. In my view, if a party can transcribe the recording, they should also be able to transcribe the hearing, but this has not yet been decided. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see why a court, during an oral hearing, would forbid a party (or a journalist) from taking notes. What about a representative (or a journalist) who is also a stenographer? Of course, journalists and the public should leave the hearing if confidential issues are discussed. 4. If you are a law student aspiring to become a representative, make sure you learn shorthand. This may enhance your chances of being hired by an IP law firm. Good English and shorthand are assets! #### **30 March 2026** **Central Division Paris, Emporia v Seoul** [UPC\_CFI\_258/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/CD%20Paris%20-%20258-2025%20-%2030.03.2026.pdf) ***Revocation*** **Facts** 1. Emporia filed a revocation action against Seoul regarding EP 3 926 698, which relates to a light emitting diode. 2. The Claimant argued that the patent was invalid due to extension of subject matter and lack of inventive step. 3. The same patent had already been the subject of appeal proceedings, but between different parties. For this reason (i.e., “not pending between the same parties”), the Court rejected the preliminary objection based on Article 33 (4), second sentence, UPCA. 4. The JR refused to accept the late addition of “lack of novelty” as a ground for invalidity, as this was only raised for the first time in the rejoinder. **The Court** 1. In the meantime, the Court of Appeal, in the parallel proceedings, revoked claims 1, 4, 5, 6, and 9 on the grounds of extension of subject matter. 2. The claims that were not invalidated were not at issue in the proceedings before the Court of Appeal, as no revocation of these claims had been requested by the parties. 3. The Court held that the invalidation of independent claim 1 does not automatically affect the validity of unchallenged subclaims. 4. As the parties did not make a submission about the skilled person the Court itself defined who the skilled person is. 5. The Court found an extension of subject matter due to an intermediate generalization (resulting “from the omission of the openings between the mesas or within the inner part of the device”). 6. The Court stated that the mere deletion of claims does not make a consolidated version necessary. This also applies in the case at hand following the decision of the Court of Appeal, as the changes did not constitute a substantive amendment. 7. The Court remarked that it is not permissible for the Court to assist a party in drafting or clarifying amendments. 8. The Court concluded that none of the auxiliary requests filed with the Statement of defence addresses the “extension of subject matter”-issues. 9. The Defendant requested permission to file further auxiliary requests, arguing that they are justified because they are triggered by the Court of Appeal’s decision, which was given two months after the Statement of Defence. 10. The Court did not agree, stating that a diligent defendant should have filed these requests as part of their defence. Furthermore, the auxiliary requests were not prompted by a new line of attack. 11. The patent was revoked to the extent of the claims at issue in these proceedings. **Comment** 1. The invalidity arguments based on an extension of subject matter were clearly mentioned in the Statement of Claim. The fact that the Local Division Düsseldorf did not accept this as a ground for invalidity did not mean that you could rely on that (first instance) decision (UPC\_CFI\_363/2023). 2. As the Court states, a prudent defendant would have filed auxiliary requests with their Statement of defence that addressed all arguments relating to the extension of subject matter. However, none of the auxiliary requests addressed this issue! 3. As I understand it, if the Court finds the independent first claim invalid, auxiliary requests are not necessary to defend the validity of your dependent claims. This seems absolutely correct to me, as these are granted claims which do not require amendment. However, you have to make it clear that you are also defending the validity of these claims independently of the main claims and ensure that the other party understands which dependent claims you are defending. 4. The latter is also necessary as, most of the time, dependent claims are inventive for the same reasons as independent claim 1. Therefore, if that claim falls due to a lack of inventive step (or extension of subject matter), all dependent claims fall. However, this is not always true with regard to inventive step. Such claims may have (further) inventive merit and can therefore be valid even if the independent claim is not. 5. We are used to speaking about “dependent” claims[\[LLD1\]](https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/fr/actualites/detail#_msocom_1) , but in fact these claims have the same status as the independent claim. We call them “dependent” because they include the elements of the claim that are also found in the independent claim. #### **30 March 2026** **Court of Appeal, Sinocare and Menarini v Abbott** [UPC\_CoA\_899/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Order%20899-2025%20%28Sinocare%20et%20al%20v%20Abbott%29%20%281%29_signed.pdf) ***Appeal PI*** **Facts** 1. The Local Division The Hague granted a PI against Sinocare (a Chinese company) and Menarini (an Italian company) on the basis of Unitary Patent EP 4 344 633. 2. Sinocare and Menarini appealed. **The Court of Appeal** 1. The Court of Appeal rejected Menarini’s defence that the Court had no jurisdiction, as Menarini had not contested the jurisdiction in first instance. In any event, this argument was incorrect because Sinocare offered the infringing products on a website accessible to European consumers, which established jurisdiction and competence. 2. Sinocare was not just a supplier to Menarini, but also cooperated with them with respect to the infringement in the UPC. This (potentially) caused damage in The Netherlands, so (also for that reason) jurisdiction and competence were established. 3. The Appellants argued that there were manifest procedural errors, but these are irrelevant because they did not allege that they would have led to a different outcome. Moreover, the alleged manifest errors were not (manifest) errors. 4. The Court discussed the patent. With respect to who the skilled person is, the Court stated that this is a legal question and that a court is entitled to provide its own definition. 5. The Court of Appeal interpreted the disputed claim elements (applying standard case law). 6. The Court did not agree that, if one party provides a certain claim interpretation that is not contested by the other party, the Court is bound by this interpretation. R. 171.2 RoP is not applicable, as claim construction is a matter of law. 7. The Court rejected the interpretation put forward by the Appellants with a very elaborate reasoning, holding among others 1. that a claim is generally not limited to the embodiments; 2. that, for the interpretation of a patent claim, the patent itself is decisive, not the configuration of a subsequent product of the patent proprietor; 3. that it is not decisive for the interpretation of a patent claim whether the claim is legally valid according to the Examiner’s understanding; and 4. that figures in the description that are not covered by claim 1 cannot be used to interpret the features of the claim. 8. On appeal, the Appellants raised an added matter argument with respect to validity for the first time. They stated that this is due to the claim interpretation by the Local Division Düsseldorf. 9. The Court cites R.222.2 (a) and (b) RoP with regard to this new objection raised on appeal, concluding that the Appellants could and should have raised the added matter argument in first instance. Moreover, the Court explains that this was not a good argument. 10. The Court also rejected the sufficiency, novelty and inventive step arguments after stating the applicable criteria. In conclusion, the skilled person had no incentive. 11. With respect to infringing acts, the Court reiterated that an infringer may also be someone to whom the acts of a third party can be attributed because they may be an instigator, accomplice or accessory. 12. Both Appellants are infringing. 13. Regarding urgency, the Court states in consideration 228: *“The urgency required for the order of provisional measures is only lacking if the injured party has pursued its claims so negligently and hesitantly that it can objectively be assumed that it has no interest in the rapid enforcement of its rights and it therefore does not appear appropriate to order provisional measures. In this context, it should be noted that no party can be expected to initiate proceedings without preparation. Rather, an adequate preparation of the proceedings is required. The applicant should only apply for a preliminary injunction if it has reliable knowledge of all the facts that make legal action in PI proceedings promising.”* 14. The Court confirmed “necessity” and awarded 50% of the cost ceiling as interim damages on appeal. 15. The Court stated that a broadly worded injunction is justified to ensure that minor changes to the product are still covered by the injunction. **Comment** 1. This is an excellent source of reading material for students and inexperienced representatives, as it covers almost all the aspects of (procedural) patent law and how the law should be applied in PI proceedings. 2. I conclude the following: 1. Urgency is only a good defence argument if it is very clear that the patentee accepted the (infringement) situation and only later decided to take the necessary actions. Therefore, it is certainly not a (very) strict criterion. 2. This decision is a reminder that what is considered a tort under many national laws is now direct infringement. For example, making a market authorization available for infringing products is direct infringement. This is excellent, of course, because it means that the UPC can deal with it. It is also very good from a harmonization point of view, as UPC law is applicable to these acts (instigator, accomplice or accessory). #### **31 March 2026** **Local Division Hamburg, Nixu v Infoblox** [UPC\_CFI\_360/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/UPC_CFI_360-2025_Time%20regime%20order-1.pdf) ***Alignment of term for defence*** **Facts** 1. Nixu initiated infringement proceedings against three Infoblox companies: a US company and two German companies. 2. The action was filed on 4 February 2026. 3. 6 days later, i.e., on 10 February, the subregistry in Hamburg asked the Claimant to provide them with hard copies for service. 4. Service in Germany was carried out on 13 February. 5. On 13 February, the subregistry asked the Claimant to transfer money, as in the US, where service and advance payment are required. 6. On 17 February, the subregistry sent a reminder to the Claimant. 7. The Claimant stated on 23 February that they had transferred the necessary amount. 8. Service in the US took place on 11 March. 9. The German defendants asked the Court for an extension to their deadline for filing their defences to 11 June 2026, so that all defences could be filed on the same day. 10. The Claimant objected. **The JR** 1. pointed out that it would be more efficient for all involved if all written pleadings were due on the same day. 2. The JR also stated that the delay in serving the US defendant was caused by the Claimant not paying the fees for US service proactively. 3. The JR granted the request. **Comment** 1. Parties usually agree on synchronization, but apparently that was not possible this time. As soon as the German defendants have been served, the defendant can start working on the defence. In general, the parties would agree on an extension that lies somewhere between the first and last defendant to be served. 2. In this case, the Claimant caused most of the delay with regard to service in the US by not immediately providing the subregistry with hard copies and money for the US. 3. In the Drafting Rules Committee, I advocated that the parties should be responsible for service themselves. Why should the Court (registry) have to do this when, as we can see from this case, it can only lead to delays. However, I lost that battle because representatives in countries such as Germany were not used to doing so. To avoid mistakes, the Court should therefore help by checking that the Statement of claim is correct, and ensuring that all formalities for (good) service are fulfilled! I am still amazed that people with university degrees cannot do this, and that we need such an impractical (and costly for the Court) system. 4. Lesson for representatives: when filing your Statement of claim, provide the subregistry with sufficient hard copies and the money for service. 5. Last week, I attended a meeting in Amsterdam where the subregistry of the Local Division The Hague gave a very interesting lecture about the Do’s and Don’ts for representatives. I recommended to the Registrar that they organize an online tutorial for representatives with the same content. This would benefit both subregistrars and representatives, enabling them to work as efficiently as possible. #### **1 April 2026** **Local Division Lisbon, Illumina v Element** [UPC\_CFI\_1920/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Order%20-%20UPC_CFI_1920-2025.pdf) ***Correction of the Statement of claim*** **Facts** 1. This case concerns an infringement action. 2. The Defendant, Element, asked the Court to apply R. 363 RoP (“Orders dismissing manifestly inadmissible claims”), because the Claimant forgot to mention a part of the patent claim and the demanded injunction. 3. The Claimant stated that this was a clerical error and requested permission to be allowed to correct it (R. 9.1 RoP). **The JR** 1. found that she can decide this without the full panel because it is a denial of the R. 363 RoP request. 2. The JR ruled that this was an obvious clerical error and not a manifestly inadmissible claim. 3. The request of the Defendant was refused and the correction was obtained by the Claimant, for which no request for an amendment of the claim is necessary. **Comment** Why does the Defendant waste the time of the Court and his client’s money by filing such a request when he knows it cannot succeed? Of course, small, obvious errors will always happen, but this again shows how important it is to prepare diligently. #### **1 April 2026** **Local Division Düsseldorf, Yangtze v Micron** [UPC\_CFI\_1034/2025; UPC\_CFI\_931/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/2026-04-01%20R.%20262A%20RoP%20Order%201034_2025_signed%20geschw%C3%A4rzt.pdf) ***Protection of confidential information*** **Facts** 1. The Defendant submitted an application in accordance with R. 262.A regarding certain economic aspects of its defence (relating to turnover of allegedly infringing products). 2. The Claimant did not contest these arguments, but pointed out that the Defendants had disclosed an estimated amount and, if the figure falls within this range, it cannot be considered confidential business information. **The JR** 1. listed what constitutes confidential information, and concluded that the conditions of R. 262A RoP are met. As the Defendant did not object to the Claimant’s list of four individuals, there was no reason to deny these individuals access. 2. The JR granted the request. **Comment** Although I thought that the idea was for the non-German judge to act as JR to divide the workload more effectively in this busy Division, I do not think this applies in this case! #### **3 April 2026** **Court of Appeal, Valeo v Robert Bosch** [UPC\_CFI\_13/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/PROCEDURAL-ORD_VALEO%20v%20BOSCH_004%20and%20013-2026_2026-04-03_Signed.pdf) Language issues **Facts** 1. Valeo applied for an injunction against 6 Bosch companies at the Central Division Paris. 2. Robert Bosch asserts that there is no competence and requests a change of the language. 3. The Central Division states that it is not competent to hear the case and, at the request of Valeo, refers the case to the Local Division Düsseldorf with English as language. 4. Valeo appealed. The date for the interim conference is fixed for 27 April 2026. 5. Bosch demands simultaneous interpretation, because their representative does not speak the language of the procedure. 6. Valeo does not agree. **The JR** 1. The fact that the representative does not speak the language of the procedure is no reason to order simultaneous translation. A party should choose a representative who masters the language of the proceedings. 2. As all parties master English, English will be used. The Rule of Procedure should be applied in a flexible way! **Comment** 1. How can a serious company like Bosch apparently have a representative which does not master French in proceedings in French and concerning a patent in the French language? There are more than sufficient very capable representatives who master the French language. 2. The (French) JR of the Court of Appeal saves Bosch (and the representative) in being practical and willing to do the interim procedure in English (Bravo!). 3. Why did Valeo object while they state that English is no problem for them? 4. If everybody would have had the same cooperative attitude as the JR, this all would not have been necessary and the parties could have agreed to do the hearing in English, which no doubt the JR would have accepted. **– All comments above are** [**Prof. Hoyng**](https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/our-team/legal-experts/prof-willem-hoyng "https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/our-team/legal-experts/prof-willem-hoyng")**‘s personal opinions –** [](https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/assets/user_upload/Work-Visuals/upc-header-hrm.jpg)