# News Detail Share now [](https://www.linkedin.com/uas/login?session_redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.linkedin.com%2FshareArticle%3Fmini%3Dtrue%26url%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.hoyngrokhmonegier.com%2Ffr%2Factualites%2Fdetail%2Fupc-unfiltered-by-willem-hoyng-upc-decisions-week-21-2026%26title%3DUPC%20Unfiltered%2C%20by%20Willem%20Hoyng%20%E2%80%93%20UPC%20decisions%20week%2021%2C%202026%26summary%3D "Linkedin") # UPC Unfiltered, by Willem Hoyng – UPC decisions week 21, 2026 26 mai 2026 News Unified Patent Court (UPC) Hot Topic News Below, [Prof. Willem Hoyng](https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/our-team/legal-experts/prof-willem-hoyng) provides his unfiltered views on the decisions that were published on the website of the Unified Patent Court (“UPC”) last week. His comments offer a unique insight into the UPC’s case law, as he chairs the Advisory Board of the UPC and participated in drafting the Rules of Procedure of the UPC. Interested in more of this? Stay tuned and subscribe [**here**](https://mailchi.mp/8fbd8890d03b/upc-unfiltered-by-willem-hoyng) for weekly updates. Find all decisions, commentary and more on our [**UPC Intelligence Platform**](https://upcintelligence.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/). On the go, multi-tasking or just prefer to listen? “Willem Hoyng’s UPC Unfiltered AI Podcast” – your weekly, AI-generated podcast discussing Willem Hoyng’s commentary on UPC case law of last week, offers a convenient alternative. Listen on [**Spotify**](https://open.spotify.com/show/53wwzF7LNSqqouR0wzXgJD?si=ae84739b09904ee1&nd=1&dlsi=71b6a174bdbd4f32) or [**Apple Podcasts**](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/willem-hoyngs-upc-unfiltered-ai-podcast/id1806092389). #### **27 April 2026** ***(late published)*** **Local Division Düsseldorf, fiskaly v SwissBit** [UPC\_CFI\_1332/2026 ](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/2026-04-27%20Anordnung%2027042026_signed_all%20geschw%C3%A4rzt.pdf) ***Evidentiary seizure / inspection*** **Facts** 1. The claimant requests an evidentiary seizure and inspection order at the German premises of the two defendants on the basis of unitary patent 4 285 308 for “securely registering a sequence of transactions”. 2. The claimant points to several facts which seem to imply infringement, and points out that defendants (while denying infringement) were willing to negotiate a license. **The Court** The Court grants the request. **Comment** 1. I cannot see demonstrable risk of evidence being destroyed. Therefore, I see no reason why the defendant was not heard. 2. Even more so, as parties have been or are negotiating a license agreement. It looks like the applicant wants to use the invasive measure to put more pressure on the defendant. 3. Reading the 35-pages decision, I also wonder if indeed this measure is necessary for proving infringement. Of course, if you do not hear the defendant you only hear one side of the story! 4. In this case, the applicant is apparently willing to grant a license. Even more reason to hear both parties and make them agree! The problem is that if you file in a very busy Local Division, judges may have no time for such exercise. #### **4 May 2026** ***(late published)*** **Local Division Hamburg, Dyson v Dreame** [PC\_ CFI\_851/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/UPC_CFI_851-2025.pdf) ***Stay of proceedings*** **Facts** 1. Dyson started infringement proceedings based on EP 3 119 235. 2. In their Statement of Defence, the defendants requested a stay of proceedings for two reasons: 1. the necessity of waiting for the interpretation of Art. 8 (1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation (“BR”) by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) to which the Court of Appeal of the UPC had already referred a related question; 2. a pending opposition against the patent, which will be decided in 7 months. **The Judge-Rapporteur (JR)** 1. Using its discretionary power, the Court refused to stay the proceedings. 2. For the most part, the questions referred to the CJEU are not decisive for the case and, should they prove to be relevant for some defendants, the Court could always stay the case against those defendants at a later point in time. **Comment** 1. An effort of Dreame to try to avoid an early decision which was bound to fail. 2. Only in exceptional circumstances should the UPC stay cases because of an opposition. The mere acceleration of proceedings before the EPO is no such circumstance. 3. As to the interpretation of EU law, the Local Division has no obligation to refer questions to the CJEU and it would certainly be quite unusual to do so already during the written proceedings. In this case, some questions referred by the Court of Appeal are already pending but there was no reason not to continue with the case where these questions may only have relevance for some defendants. The Court can – if necessary – always stay the case against these defendants in its final decision. Delaying tactics do not work at the UPC! 4. Of course, if the claimant chooses a very busy court, it should not expect a decision within 12-14 months. In this case, the UK plaintiff could for instance have filed in less busy venues such as the Nordic Baltic Regional Division or the Local Divisions of Paris or The Hague. #### **6 May 2026** ***(late published)*** **Local Division Hamburg, Horl v Magna** [UPC\_CFI\_388/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Final%20Order%20UPC_CFI_388-2025.pdf) ***Long-arm jurisdiction*** **Facts** 1. The case concerns an infringement action based on EP 4 117 857 regarding an installation for sharpening knives. 2. The claimant requested an injunction for the UPC territory as well as for many non-UPC countries where the European patent has been validated. 3. After the oral hearing, the defendant asked to be allowed to file a further pleading with respect to a video shown by the claimant at the hearing. **The Court** 1. The Court discusses the patent and cites the technical problem it claims to solve. 2. The Court repeats all the principles of claim construction with reference to a complete list of all the UPC decisions on this issue so far. 3. The Court interprets claim features 3 and 4 and opts for a broader interpretation than the defendant argued. 4. The Court finds that the defendant has infringed claims 1 and 14. 5. The claimant did not comment on the law of the non-UPC states in its Statement of Claim (SoC). 6. The fact that the defendant’s website is in German does not amount to an offering in the countries where the national language is not German. With respect to Switzerland and Liechtenstein, the defendant did not establish that offering on the internet amounts to an infringing act under the laws of Switzerland and Liechtenstein. 7. The Court grants injunctive relief, as well as the publication of the decision at the defendant’s expense, considering it justified in this case where the claimant’s product has been described negatively in a comparison with the defendant’s infringing device on the latter’s website, while the infringing product was positively described in a professional magazine. **Comment** 1. A straightforward infringement case in which the defendants did not raise any invalidity arguments. 2. I wonder why the Court took the trouble to go through all the case law from all the Local and Regional Divisions on claim construction (on top of the Court of Appeal’s case law). 3. I also wonder about the way the R. 9 RoP request lodged after the oral hearing was handled. The oral hearing is, in my opinion, the final stage of the proceedings. Further submissions should only be allowed if during the oral hearing the Court explicitly allows such submissions. 4. Showing a video at the hearing should only be allowed if sent to the Court and the other party before the oral argument (e.g. 4 days prior to the hearing) and the video should not contain new information. 5. Of course, the defendant, confronted (apparently without prior notice) with the video (even if it was a video coming from his client) should have protested during the oral hearing, or asked to be able to comment in a further written submission during the oral hearing. Absent such a request raised at the oral hearing, the Court should, in my opinion, have declared the R. 9 request filed after the oral hearing inadmissible. 6. When it comes to the assessment of the pan-European infringement claims, it seems that the German Divisions of the UPC might still not be comfortable with cross-border cases, and that many representatives are unfamiliar with this type of cases. 7. I agree with the Court that the claimant did not bring enough material evidence that the German defendant was actually committing infringing acts in the non-UPC countries. 8. But I disagree to the extent that the Court found that the claimant should also have proven that there is also (literal) infringement under the laws of all the non-UPC countries. Putting such undue burden on the claimant could discourage these cross-border cases which are the (apparently unwanted) result of the BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux decision (CJEU, 25 February 2025, Case C-339/22). 9. I say this because another German Local Division (Mannheim) stated that a cross-border decision cannot be enforced as long as it has not been recognized in the non-UPC countries for which an injunction has been granted (LD Mannheim, 30 January 2026, UPC\_CFI\_365/2023). Practically speaking, does this mean that a UPC decision cannot be enforced within the UPC territory? Imagine: a German driver causes a serious accident in the UK (by driving on the wrong side of the road). The UK victim sues them in Germany. The German court applies UK law and awards considerable damages. However, the victim now first has to go to the UK to have the decision recognized before they can enforce the decision in Germany against the German-based defendant. That cannot be right! 10. The Local Division Hamburg did not seem to consider the fact that all European countries belonging to the European Patent Convention (EPC) are bound by Art. 69 EPC. As a result, literal infringement is pretty much assessed along the same lines in all countries. In these circumstances, it should rather be on the defendant to prove that, nonetheless, there is no infringement under the case law of the foreign country. 11. In this case, the representatives apparently did not argue this point, but only made some general remarks about the laws of Switzerland and Liechtenstein. #### **7 May 2026** ***(late published)*** **Local Division Hamburg, Silimed v Polytech** [UPC\_CFI\_481/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/UPC_CFI_481-2026.pdf) ***Preliminary objection / opt-out*** **Facts** 1. The claimants sued the defendants for infringement of the German part of EP 2 581 193 on 5 February 2026. 2. Claimant 1 had obtained the patent from defendant 1 through a transfer of ownership by judgment of the German national courts on 5 January 2026. 3. The previous owner had opted-out of the UPC on 30 March 2023. 4. On 9 January 2026 (i.e. 4 days after the ownership transfer became effective), PTH&A (not a party to the UPC proceedings) filed an invalidity action with the German Federal Patent Court against defendant 1. 5. On 4 February 2026, claimant 1 filed for withdrawal of the opt-out with the UPC. 6. The defendants filed a Preliminary Objection, arguing that the UPC had no jurisdiction. **The Court** 1. Under German law, a transfer of the German part of an EP operates *ex nunc*, with no retroactive effect. 2. The opt-out by the previous owner on 30 March 2023 is therefore valid. 3. One cannot withdraw an opt-out if proceedings are pending in a national court, as in this case (invalidity proceedings). 4. Therefore, the patent remains opted-out and the UPC lacks jurisdiction. **Comment** 1. It is not completely clear from the decision what exactly was the subject of the German national action. I do not think these were proceedings about entitlement to the European patent application (Art. 60 EPC and the Protocol on recognition). It seems to me that the proceedings concerned the different national parts of the European Patent, resulting in an order to transfer the national parts of the EP to the claimant for which the German court had jurisdiction as the defendant was established in Germany (see CJEU, 15 November 1983, 288/82, Duijnstee v Goderbauer). Maybe it only had to do with the German national part, which is the only part invoked in the UPC proceedings. 2. The claimants stumbled upon Art. 83.4 UPCA, like others before them who, as a “safety precaution” opted out with the idea to first look how the UPC would do and withdraw the optout later on, without realizing that it is quite easy for an alleged infringer to make that impossible. 3. If Claimant 1 had filed the withdrawal on January 5, 2026, the day it became owner of the patent, it would not have been barred from acting in the UPC. Of course, if defendant 1 wanted to prevent that from happening, it could have asked its friends at PTH&A to start the revocation action just before January 5. It all shows that a close read of the UPCA (and the Rules of Procedure!) is strongly recommended. #### **13 May 2026** ***(late published)*** **Paris Central Division, Dacia v Avago** [UPC\_ CFI\_1332/2026 ](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Decision%20signed%20withdrawal%202282.pdf) ***Settlement*** **Facts** 1. On 30 December 2025, the claimant filed a revocation action with respect to EP 1 770 912. 2. On 27 April 2026, the defendant filed a defence and an application to amend the patent. 3. The parties settled, and each party will bear its own costs. **The Court** 1. The Court accepts withdrawal of the claim. 2. The Court orders the decision to be entered in the Register. **Comment** 1. The panel does not bother about costs if that has not been asked. Certain (formalistic) panels feel that they have to say something about costs because R. 265.2(c) RoP states that you have to issue a cost decision. That is all too formalistic. 2. Let us hope that if the Rules are revised, a simple message of the parties to the Registry is sufficient for settling a case (unless parties want to apply R. 365 RoP). 3. The claimant did not ask for reimbursement of 50% of the court fees. The claimant is going to cause more unnecessary work if it is still going to ask for it. If so, I hope the Court would use its discretion and refuse. #### **13 May 2026** ***(late published)*** **Central Division Paris, Nissan v Avago** [UPC\_ CFI\_1176/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Decision%20signed%20withdrawal%201176.pdf) ***Settlement*** **Facts** Like in the *Dacia v Avago* case discussed above, Nissan requests withdrawal of its claim, in this case even before the Statement of Claim has been served. **The Court** 1. In such a situation, the defendant does not have to be heard because it is not yet participating in the proceedings. 2. The Court permits the withdrawal. 3. The Court orders the reimbursement of 50% of the court fees. **Comment** 1. Different from Dacia, Nissan asks the court fees back at the same time as the request for withdrawal. 2. The big question is: why do these car manufacturers withdrew their revocation action? Did Avago offer them a better deal? Did they find knock out prior art (not found by the EPO) which caused Avago to give a cheap license? We will never know! #### **13 May 2026 (late published)** **Local Division The Hague, Ericsson v Transsion** [UPC\_ CFI\_1568/2025; UPC\_ CFI\_1791/2025; UPC\_ CFI\_1793/2025 ](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/20260514%20Procedural%20Order%201568-2025%201791-2025%201793-2025%20REDACTED.pdf) ***Delay tactics*** **Facts** 1. The Court has aligned the dates for the Statement of Defence in all three cases. 2. One week before the Statement of Defence is due, the defendants ask an (open ended) extension. 3. Although the Court had asked the parties to come to an agreement with respect to confidentiality, the defendants do not seem not very interested in a quick resolution of the issue (according to the JR). **The JR** 1. Extensions can only be granted in exceptional circumstances. As the defendants’ representatives and also their expert already have unredacted copies of the Statement of Claim for quite some time, there are no exceptional circumstances. 2. The request is denied. 3. The Court asks the dates between 1 December 2026 and 31 May 2027 with respect to the availability of the parties for the interim conference and the oral argument. **Comment** 1. It is clear that the defendants are trying to delay the proceedings and are unwilling to be cooperative. 2. The decision of the JR is the one to be expected. Delaying tactics and uncooperative behavior is not going to work at the Local Division in The Hague. #### **15 May 2026** ***(late published)*** **Court of Appeal, Bosch v Valeo** [UPC\_CoA\_50/2026 ](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/ORDONNANCE_Bosch%20v%20Valeo_CoA_50-2026_2026-05-15_Signed.pdf) ***Language*** **Facts** 1. This concerns an appeal lodged by the Bosch defendants domiciled outside the UPC territory against the decision of the Local Division in Paris which confirmed the decision of the JR to dismiss their Preliminary Objection while giving leave for appeal. 2. The representatives for Bosch request to have the hearing in English. **The JR** The French JR discussed the request with the German President and allowed the request, also because the French representatives for Valeo did not object. **Comment** 1. It is surprising that Bosch, in a case in French, appoints a representative who does not speak the language. 2. Of course, the UPC would even be better if English would be the only language of the Court. If you want to follow the case law from week to week, it is difficult if you do not master the different UPC languages. This certainly applies to German, as German representatives (for reasons unknown to me - in general they are good in English -) still file often in German. #### **18 May 2026** **Central Division Paris, Dacia v Avago** [UPC\_CFI\_1039/2025 ](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Decision%20signed%20withdrawal%201039.pdf) ***Settlement*** **Facts** The facts are the same as in the decision of 13 May 2026, but this decision concerns a different patent, i.e. EP 1 903 733. **The Court** Same decision as 13 May 2026. **Comment** Again Dacia did not ask for reimbursement of court fees and, as a consequence, such return is not ordered. #### **19 May 2026** **Central Division Milan, La Siddhi v Athena** [UPC\_CFI\_927/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/GDPR-checked_R262a_order%20panel%20signed.pdf) ***Confidential information*** **Facts** 1. The claimant, La Siddhi, seeks the revocation of unitary patent 3 592 333. 2. With its rejoinder to the patentee’s application to amend the patent, the claimant wanted to file a confidential document. 3. It argued that the confidential document was only submitted to show that it is “concerned by the patent” within the meaning of Art. 47.6 UPCA, but that the rest of the document (an agreement between the claimant itself and a third party) was contained sensitive business information that was not relevant to the dispute. It therefore asked for an attorney’s eyes only regime. 4. The claimant argued that the defendant’s request (access to Indian counsel or external experts) is not necessary and premature. **The Court** 1. With reference to the applicable case law, the Court reiterates that an attorneys’ eyes only regime is only acceptable in exceptional circumstances. There are no such exceptional circumstances. 2. The Court grants the request for a confidentiality regime, but two natural persons on the defendant’s side get access. **Comment** 1. A well-reasoned and balanced decision. 2. However, I wonder why this issue comes up so late in the proceedings. You would think that the argument that the claimant has no standing to bring a revocation action because it is not “concerned by the patent” should have been raised in the defence to the SoC. If this was not the case, the objection appears to be late-filed and inadmissible. 3. I am (also) surprised that the issue (apparently) may have an impact on the application to amend the patent, which I find difficult to understand. 4. The condition of “being concerned by the patent” to bring a revocation action seems to be justified by the objective to avoid “strawman” actions. A strawman is used for a revocation action where one does not want a competitor to know the true identity of the company who wants the patent to be revoked. There can be several reasons for that: for instance, the truly interested party may not want to show that it is interested in the use of the patented invention or is afraid to be confronted with an infringement action. 5. As I have written before, the question whether or not you need to have an interest (or be “concerned by the patent”) is not answered in the same way in all countries. Where no interest is required, the rationale is that removing exclusive rights which should not have been granted is good for society. A revocation action is considered a so-called “actio popularis”. #### **19 May 2026** **Court of Appeal, Advance Standard Communication (ASC) v Xiaomi** [UPC\_CoA\_67/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Order_UPC-CoA_67-2026%20Advanced%20Communication%20vs%20Xiaomi.pdf) ***Security for costs / application for review*** **Facts** 1. ASC, a US-based company, started an infringement action against Xiaomi. 2. Upon a request by Xiaomi, ASC was ordered to provide security for costs within 8 weeks of the decision (order of the JR of 27 March 2026). 3. An application for review was rejected by the full panel by order of 23 April 2026 without leave for appeal. 4. On 8 May 2026, ASC filed a request for discretionary review and for suspensive effect with the Court of appeal, and corrected deficiencies in its statement of appeal on 15 May 2026. 5. Xiaomi got until 20 May 2026 to react. Instead, it asked for an extension of time. **The JR** 1. Xiaomi did not react before 20 May 2026. Since a decision for suspensive effect would only make sense if issued before 22 May 2026 (because by that time ASC has to provide security to comply with the JR’s order), Xiaomi’s request for an extension of time has to be rejected. 2. For deciding on the application for a discretionary review, the Court of Appeal must determine if there was a manifest error or if the order raises a fundamental question of law. 3. As ASC failed to argue that the decision was manifestly wrong, the application is rejected. 4. Whether or not to grant suspensive effect is normally decided by the Court of Appeal. However, pending a request for discretionary review, the standing judge is competent to take that decision. Moreover, the case is very urgent, which also calls for the decision to be made by the standing judge. 5. Since the application for discretionary review by the court of appeal is rejected (and the impugned order is therefore final), the application for suspensive effect has become devoid of purpose in the absence of appeal. **Comment** 1. Excellent service by the standing judge! It took ASC three weeks to file a (correct) request for discretionary review, leaving the JR with 6 days to reach a decision. 2. The representatives for Xiaomi were unable to react in 5 days. I find that quite incredible as they had already twice argued against ASC’s arguments (during the request in the Local Division and the revision procedure in the Local Division). Or they thought that an answer was not necessary, but then they should have told so to the Court and not asked for an extension. 3. The standing judge was able to decide in 4 days. He did not simply state that ASC had not argued that the Court had made a manifest error, but he even dealt with all of ASC’s arguments as to why the JR’s decision was supposedly wrong. 4. In short: a fast-working Court of Appeal, with representatives who were not too helpful. #### **19 May 2026** **Local Division The Hague, Abbott v Sinocare** [UPC\_ CFI\_1613/2025; UPC\_ CFI\_943/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/20260519%20R.20%20Order%201613-2026.pdf) ***Preliminary Objection*** **Facts** 1. Abbott sues 13 defendants for infringement. Among those defendants are 2 Dutch companies,1 Chinese company, 2 Italian companies, 1 Spanish company, 1 UK company, 1 Portuguese company, 1 French company, 1 Austrian company, 1 German company, 1 Swiss company and 1 Belgian company. 2. The defendants raise a Preliminary Objection contesting the jurisdiction with respect to the UK, Spanish and Swiss company and with respect to the other companies contesting the jurisdiction for countries outside the UPC. 3. Both parties suggest a practical approach in view of the fact that the Court has jurisdiction against certain companies and the fact that case law is evolving. The decision should be stayed to the main proceedings. **The JR** The JR agrees. **Comment** Practical parties! Bravo! #### **19 May 2026** **Local Division The Hague, BMS v BYD** [UPC\_ CFI\_2228/2025; UPC\_CFI\_1546/2026 ](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/20260519%202228-2025%20and%201546-2026%20Order%20R.20%20signed.pdf) ***Infringement action*** **Facts** 1. BMS filed a Statement of Claim on 23 December 2025. 2. The parties requested that all dates of service on all defendants were set to 5 February 2026. 3. The defendants filed a preliminary objection on 3 March 2026 supplemented with an additional submission on 17 March 2026 to comment on the referral to the Court of Justice by the Court of Appeal of 5 March 2026. 4. The defendants asked the Court to dismiss jurisdiction for all non-UPC states. **The JR** 1. The scope of the PO is limited to three of the nine defendants, the Chinese BYD Company, the Chinese BYD Auto and BYD UK. 2. BYD UK BYD UK is only active in the UK. This means that Art. 4 or Art. 7(2) Brussels Ibis Regulation (“BR”) are not applicable. The JR also considers Art. 8(1) BR not applicable (among others) because it is unlikely that BYD UK will be sued in the UPC for infringement in the UPC. 3. The Chinese BYD companies The question if the LD The Hague is competent to hear the infringement of these companies in the UK is subject of the referral and will be decided in the main proceedings. **Comment** I think the JR is right with respect to BYD UK. I do not see the possibility of conflicting judgments with respect to BYD UK, except if you consider a different outcome of the application of Art. 69 EPC with respect to the same product as conflicting. In *Primus v Roche*, this was not considered conflicting, also not in the case of group companies. There is (as the JR correctly remarks) only one court which can deal with the infringement and that is the UK court. #### **20 May 2026** **Local Division Hamburg, Occlutech v Lepu** [UPC\_ CFI\_553/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/UPC_CFI_553-2025_Order%20penalry%20payment_anonymized.pdf) ***Non-compliance with a preliminary injunction order*** **Facts** 1. On 21 October 2025, the LD issued a PI order forbidding the infringement of EP 2 387 951 under a penalty payment of up to € 250,000 for each individual case of non-compliance, repeatedly if needed. 2. On 2 March 2026, Occlutech requested the Court to order a penalty payment for non-compliance with the order on three aspects (offer on defendant’s website, offer through a B2B-marketplace and directly via email). **The Court** The Court discusses the three types of infringing acts and rejects all the defences of the defendant. After a detailed calculation, the penalty sum is set at € 58,800. **Comment** 1. In its PI order, the Court had not followed the recommendation of the Court of Appeal to set a penalty sum for each infringing product or for each day the infringement continues, but simply stated a maximum amount for each individual case of infringement. This means that there is no starting point for the penalty to be paid and that the Court had to spend considerable time to justify and calculate the amount to be awarded. All that subsequent work can be avoided (see the decision of the Court of Appeal in Philips v Belkin). 2. I do not understand why in no. 4 of the order one reads: *“on 6 November 2025 the applicant notified the Court that it intends to enforce the order in full. The enforceable copy of the final order has been served on the defendants on 17 November 2025”*. A PI order is immediately enforceable and I assume will immediately have been served by the Registry (i.e. on 21 October 2025). The Court correctly states that the time period for complying with the order started on 21 October 2025. 3. Therefore, the action described in no. 4 of the order (quoted above) was not necessary. This must have been very confusing for a defendant: an enforceable copy was served on 17 November 2025, but the Court decides that the decision was actually enforceable as of 21 October 2025 and penalties are due! 4. This confusion is apparently due to German national habits (triggered by the actions of the German applicant and the registry in Hamburg, and not corrected by the foreign judge). 5. All representatives and Local Divisions should realize that PI orders are immediately enforceable upon service. In practice, it is often difficult to comply with the order upon being served. But there are in my opinion several ways of avoiding that penalty sums are immediately forfeited after service of the judgment: 1. the Court can state in its order that penalty sums are due as of X days after the order is served, if the defendant does not comply with the order; 2. the Court can state that penalty sums are only forfeited after the applicant has notified the Court and the defendant’s representative that it wants the penalty provisions to be applied. No further Court action is then necessary. In the PI order, the Court can set a period of a few days between the notification and forfeiture of penalties. 6. An applicant can of course also request this in its PI application. It gives them the possibility to decide whether or not to (truly) enforce the decision and gives room for negotiations. 7. The decision that the defendant did not comply with the judgment seems correct and convincing to me. It should be clear that a defendant is responsible for acts which it requests of third parties (such as updating a website). A disclaimer which clearly has no effect is not enough for one to argue compliance with the order! #### **21 May 2026** **Local Division Hamburg, Avago v Renault** [UPC\_CFI\_643/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/UPC_CFI_643-2026_R%C3%BCcknahme-anonymized.pdf) ***Settlement*** **Facts** 1. After the Statement of Claim, the parties settled the case. 2. The claimant requests withdrawal of the action, with parties bearing their own costs. No cost decision necessary. 3. The defendant agreed. **The Court** 1. Orders accordingly. 2. Sets the value of the litigation at € 1 million. 3. Orders a 50% return of court fees. **Comment** The settlement rate of UPC infringement cases is (far) higher than in national proceedings. It seems logical since the stakes are (much) higher. Many companies (like Renault apparently) cannot afford an injunction on the whole UPC market. As long as proportionality is (almost) a dead letter, first-instance decisions are immediately enforceable and suspensive effect is only granted in exceptional cases, the risks are indeed very high! #### **21 May 2026** **Local Division Paris, SharkNinja v SEB** [UPC\_ CFI\_1599/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/anonymised-%20R262A%20%26%20translation%28%20costs%29%2021.05.2026-signed.pdf) ***Costs*** **Facts** 1. On 10 April 2026, the LD dismissed SharkNinja’s request for a PI. 2. On 10 May 2026, SEB started cost proceedings and requested confidentiality, both under R. 262.A RoP (attorneys’ eyes only) and R. 262.2 RoP, and for not having to translate exhibits from French into English. 3. SharkNinja requested access to four natural persons. SEB resisted. **The Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”)** 1. The JR Cites EU Directive 2016/943, Art. 58 UPCA, R. 262.A.5 and 6 RoP and CoA 621/2024. 2. SharkNinja does not object against the request for confidentiality. Confidentiality is granted. 3. Access to one inhouse person is deemed sufficient. 4. SharkNinja does not object against the non-translation request, which is also granted. **Comment** 1. The parties did not agree on costs. The result is time-consuming (for the Court) and costly (for the clients) cost proceedings which start with confidentiality requests and continue after this first decision of the Court. 2. I have already said that the Rule about costs should be changed. Costs should be awarded at the end of the proceedings on the basis of a schedule which awards fixed amounts depending on the value of the litigation, the type of action and the complexity of the case (easy, normal, complex). We have already a schedule of court fees for different actions. It should not take an ad hoc “cost committee” or the Advisory Committee (with the input of the Observers) more than a few days to propose such a schedule, leaving open the possibility to deviate from such a schedule in exceptional circumstances at the request of the party. #### **22 May 2026** **Court of Appeal, Suinno v Microsoft** [UPC\_CoA\_21/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Decision%20by%20default%2021-2026%20signed.pdf) ***Default*** **Facts** 1. The Local Division revoked Suinno’s patent and ordered Suinno to pay the costs. 2. Suinno appealed. 3. Microsoft requested security for costs with respect to the appeal proceedings and for a default judgment if Suinno would not put up the required security. 4. The Court of Appeal ordered a security of € 600.000 and dismissed a further application of Suinno to revoke or alter the order. 5. Suinno did not provide the security and Microsoft asked for a decision by default. **The Court of Appeal** 1. Only in a case where the claimant asks for a default judgment, a default judgment should only be given if the facts put forward by the claimant justify such judgment. 2. This rule applies also in appeal proceedings, which means that the respondent in appeal proceedings asking for a default judgment does not have to justify that he would be successful in the appeal. 3. The Court of Appeal explains that if this would be different it would mean that the respondent who won in first instance would then still have to file a statement of response to argue that the decision was correct despite the fact that appellant had not put up security. **Comment** 1. A well-reasoned and logical decision. Interestingly, R. 357.3 RoP (about default judgments in appeal) does not mention as example the failure of the appellant to put up security but it seems totally logical that it is also applicable in that situation. 2. For the followers of the Suinno decisions, you maybe wonder why Suinno continues defying the obligations to put up security. I would not be surprised if Suinno would go to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasburg arguing that the (high) requirements prevent access to justice (Article 6 ECHR regarding fair trial, Article 13 regarding effective remedy, in combination with Article 1 of the Protocol). If they want to do so, they should have first tried all the possibilities of the UPCA. #### **22 May 2026** **Court of Appeal, SharkNinja v SEB** [UPC\_CoA\_61/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/order%20confidentialty%2022%20May%202026signed_anonym.pdf) ***Retroactive extension / time period*** **Facts** 1. SharkNinja appealed the refusal of the Local Division to grant a preliminary injunction (“PI”) and asked for a confidentiality regime. 2. SEB was given until 5 May 2026 to respond to the confidentiality request. 3. SEB filed two observations on 5 May 2026, but without electronic signature. 4. On 6 May 2026, SEB requested a retroactive extension of time of 1 day and filed the same observations with an electronic signature. 5. SEB asked for a 7-day extension to react to SharkNinja’s unredacted version of the Statement of Appeal. **The Court of Appeal** 1. The Court of Appeal stresses the importance of the electronic signature because of the guarantee of authenticity. 2. The Court of Appeal grants the one-day retroactive extension because this is the first decision with respect to the electronic signature. 3. It also grants a confidentiality regime, which includes a confidentiality club. 4. The Court of Appeal does not grant the 7 days extension, as there are still 5 days left of the 14 days for the response. This is enough for the internal people getting access to the confidential information to study the confidential information. **Comment** 1. The Court explains convincingly why the electronic signature is important. 2. It is very clear that the decision stresses that time periods in the UPC are important and exceptions (extensions) should only be granted in exceptional circumstances. This is evidenced by: 1. The one-day extension is only granted because of the exceptional circumstance that it is the first time that the Court rules on the importance of the signature. So filing something on the last day without electronic signature (for example on the last day for lodging an appeal) will in the future be fatal! 2. The term to respond to the Statement of Appeal in PI proceedings is two weeks, and the Court (in my opinion fully justified) did not grant an extension of a week on the basis of the reason that the client had only 5 days to see the confidential information. Every representative knows of course that is not going to fly! 3. If you want to be a representative (or a judge) in the UPC (which is one of the most interesting jobs which you can have already with a simple law degree) then you must accept that the UPC wants to render high-quality decisions in a relatively short time period, which leads to having to accept the discipline defined by the Rules! **– All comments above are** [**Prof. Hoyng**](https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/our-team/legal-experts/prof-willem-hoyng "https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/our-team/legal-experts/prof-willem-hoyng")**‘s personal opinions –**