# News Detail Share now [](https://www.linkedin.com/uas/login?session_redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.linkedin.com%2FshareArticle%3Fmini%3Dtrue%26url%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.hoyngrokhmonegier.com%2Ffr%2Factualites%2Fdetail%2Fupc-unfiltered-by-willem-hoyng-upc-decisions-week-31-2026%26title%3DUPC%20Unfiltered%2C%20by%20Willem%20Hoyng%20%E2%80%93%20UPC%20decisions%20week%2031%2C%202026%26summary%3D "Linkedin") # UPC Unfiltered, by Willem Hoyng – UPC decisions week 31, 2026 03 août 2026 UPC Unfiltered News Unified Patent Court (UPC) Hot Topic News Below, [Prof. Willem Hoyng](https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/our-team/legal-experts/prof-willem-hoyng) provides his unfiltered views on the decisions that were published on the website of the Unified Patent Court (“UPC”) last week. His comments offer a unique insight into the UPC’s case law, as he chairs the Advisory Board of the UPC and participated in drafting the Rules of Procedure of the UPC. Interested in more of this? Stay tuned and subscribe [here](https://mailchi.mp/8fbd8890d03b/upc-unfiltered-by-willem-hoyng) for weekly updates. Find all decisions, commentary and more on our [UPC Intelligence Platform](https://upcintelligence.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/). On the go, multi-tasking or just prefer to listen? “Willem Hoyng’s UPC Unfiltered AI Podcast” – your weekly, AI-generated podcast discussing Willem Hoyng’s commentary on UPC case law of last week, offers a convenient alternative. Listen on [Spotify](https://open.spotify.com/show/53wwzF7LNSqqouR0wzXgJD?si=ae84739b09904ee1&nd=1&dlsi=71b6a174bdbd4f32) or [Apple Podcasts](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/willem-hoyngs-upc-unfiltered-ai-podcast/id1806092389). #### **1 May 2026** ***(late published)*** **Local Division The Hague, Dolby v CPYou /Acer** **Intervener: Vectis** [UPC\_CFI\_1536/2025; UPC\_CFI\_982/2026; UPC\_CFI\_168/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/20260501%20Dolby%20v%20Acer%20Licences%20extension%20intervention%5B36%5D%20REDACTED.pdf) ***Production of license agreements*** **Facts** 1. Dolby asked that all deadlines for the claimant and the intervener shall be extended with two months after the confidentiality order and to set a separate deadline regime for the counterclaim for rate-setting. 2. With regard to the R. 190 RoP request, Acer requested to order Dolby and Vectis to disclose all license agreements or settlement agreements with respect to patents essential to the Opus standard and all documents relating to one or more of these agreements. In addition, Acer requested the Court to order a confidentiality regime (under R. 262A RoP and R. 262.2 RoP) with respect to all documents which Dolby and/or Vectis has to disclosed as a result of the R. 190 RoP order of 12 February 2026. 3. Vectis asked to be added as an intervener on the side of the claimant. **Order of the JR** 1. Dolby, Fraunhofer and NTT did not participate in setting the Opus standard. Vectis is managing the pool containing their patents. 2. Dolby and Acer do not object against the intervention of Vectis in support of Dolby. The Court rules that a counterclaim for rate-setting against Vectis is possible because Vectis has become a party to the proceedings and because Vectis is the company which licenses the patent on behalf of Dolby. 3. The arguments put forward by Dolby/Vectis, namely that such a counterclaim is not possible as Vectis has no standing to sue because it neither owns the patents nor is a licensee, are rejected as these rules apply to a party who brings an action, not to an intervener. 4. Whether or not Dolby made a FRAND declaration and whether or not Acer is a willing licensee is for the panel to decide. This may not be deemed a necessary requirement for the panel to look at the counterclaim for rate setting. 5. The JR orders Dolby and Acer to produce the license agreements. Only licenses that are clearly not comparable do not have to be submitted as seemingly different licenses may still shed a light on the non-discrimination nature of the offer. A solution may be to start with an *attorney-eyes-only* regime and if there still remains a dispute about the relevance of certain agreements, the parties can ask the Court for a new decision. 6. The Court allows a short extension because all documents except 1 were already accessible. 7. The counterclaim for rate setting will have the same deadline regime as the counterclaim for revocation. #### **4 May 2026** ***(late published)*** **Local Division The Hague, Dolby v CPYou/Acer** **Intervenor: Vectis** [UPC\_CFI\_1536/2025; UPC\_CFI\_982/2026; UPC\_CFI\_1168/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/20260504%20procedural%20order%20correcting%20error.pdf) *Correction of order* **Order** The order concerns the correction of the order of 1 May 2026 under which Dolby and Acer (see hereabove under 5) were incorrectly ordered to produce license agreements while this should have been Dolby and Vectis. **Comment** The JR was caught off guard because of a mistake in the defendant’s application for an order to produce the license agreements by Dolby and Acer which should have read Dolby and Vectis. #### **8 July 2026** ***(late published)*** **Local Division The Hague, Dolby v CPYou / Acer** **Intervener: Vectis** [UPC\_CFI\_1536/2025; UPC\_CFI\_982/2026; UPC\_CFI\_1168/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/20260708%20Dolby%20v%20Acer%20intervention%20review%20R.%20333%20REDACTED.pdf) ***Cross complaint against intervener*** **Facts** 1. Vectis asked for a panel review of the 1/4 May order that a counterclaim for rate-setting against the intervener is possible. 2. Alternatively, Vectis wanted an independent deadline regime for the counterclaim for rate-setting, starting from the date it was officially served. **The Court (full panel)** 1. The Court agrees with the Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) that Vectis has become a party to the proceedings (R. 315 RoP), meaning that a counterclaim can be directed against intervener Vectis, particularly since Vectis intervened on the side of the claimant against whom the same counterclaim has been raised. 2. The argument that Vectis applied in support of Dolby is unconvincing, as the counterclaim for a license essentiality constitutes a defence against Dolby’s claim and the claim supported by Vectis. 3. It would be both strange and also contrary to R. 316.3 RoP if, in order to defend itself against Vectis, Acer would have to file rate setting proceedings in a different forum. 4. The fact that Vectis may not bring proceedings does not mean that one cannot file a counterclaim for rate setting. **Comment** 1. Vectis wanted to intervene. It is not clear to me why it wanted to intervene. I cannot see what Vectis and or Dolby gain from this. 2. All parties agreed to have Vectis as an intervener, although it does not seem to have any rights under the patent other than being the administrator of a patent pool. Therefore, it can apparently represent the patentee, but this is a contractual relation that in my opinion does not affect Acer’s position in any way. Acer is confronted with a claim from Dolby. Assuming that Dolby has a dominant position and that the patent is a SEP (which seems the case), Dolby must make a FRAND offer to Acer. Whether or not this is done by Vectis as its representative is in my opinion irrelevant. 3. I cannot see the relevance of Vectis as an intervener. If it were the case that Vectis has negotiated with Acer on behalf of Dolby and Acer would allegedly not be willing to make a FRAND counteroffer, Vectis can be called as a witness. I do not see any necessity for support of Dolby as an intervener. However, for Acer, Vectis is of interest as Vectis is the pool administrator and can grant licenses for the pool. If indeed Acer is using the Opus standard, it of course prefers a license under all pool patents and not a license only under the Dolby patents. 4. So the fact that Vectis became a party enabled Acer to initiate a rate-setting counterclaim against Vectis, according to the Court. Even if Vectis would not have intervened, Acer could have asked to add Vectis as a party (based on R. 305.1(a)). 5. In my opinion, a Court that is requested based on R. 190 RoP to order the disclosure of all the license agreements should not do so as long as it is clear from the implementer’s behavior that they are not a willing licensee. I assume that in the case at hand, there has been a counteroffer and security is provided. In such a situation the production of license agreements (under a confidentiality regime) makes sense. If the Court has first to decide whether or not the implementer is infringing the invoked patent(s) and if it has been willing, then the proceedings would become unnecessarily long. #### **10 July 2026 (late published)** **Local Division Milan, Cardo v Ziwu** [UPC\_CFI\_766/2024](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/54b98fb2-539a-4a15-ab8c-8ae493a28e62.pdf) ***Damages*** **Facts** 1. Cardo filed an infringement case against Ziwu, among others. 2. The service of the Statement of Claim was filed twice. 3. The JR rules that the steps already taken constitute valid service. 4. Ziwu filed no appearance and did not submit a defence. 5. Cardo asks for a decision by default. **The Court** The Court concludes that a decision by default is justified. It also concludes that the defendant knowingly infringed, because it was copying the patentee’s product and continued infringing despite an injunction. **Comment** 1. The Court considered in detail the question of infringement and other measures demanded by Cardo, and came to a reasoned decision. 2. The result of all this is in my opinion that Cardo obtained a judgment which now has to be served on the defendants before it has any meaning. I am not optimistic that that will succeed, and in any event the Statement of Claim has not been served in accordance with the The Hague Convention. If Ziwu has no assets in the European Union, I am afraid that all these actions by Cardo will not have any practical result. If infringing products remain to be exported to the UPC territory or the European Union, then it may be more efficient to attack the recipients in the UPC territory. #### **22 July 2026** ***(late published)*** **Local Division Milan, Primetals v Danieli** [UPC\_CFI\_377/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/e556e5c9-af38-43ea-a1c2-6768592555df.pdf) *Results of the Interim Conference* **The JR** 1. The parties agree that only the infringement of claims 1, 3, 4 and 8 are at issue here. 2. The Court adopts the feature breakdown of claim 1 proposed by the defendant as it closely reflects the wording of the claim. 3. The Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) rules that 25 auxiliary requests is not reasonable. The claimant should identify the 5 most relevant auxiliary requests. 4. The JR does not make a decision if invoking infringement under the doctrine of equivalence is too late as it was only submitted for the first time in the reply. This will be decided by the panel after the oral hearing. 5. The claimant’s request for a further written submission is dismissed. 6. The JR grants both parties the possibility to file a further submission regarding the law applicable to the infringement. 7. The parties agree on the value of the litigation. **Comment** 1. The JR uses the interim conference for its intended purpose and makes the necessary management decisions. However, the JR does not decide on the late arguments about infringement on the basis of the doctrine of equivalence. This forces the parties to prepare the argument for the oral hearing, after which the Court can often avoid making a decision about the lateness if it holds that there is literal infringement or that there is no infringement, also not under the doctrine of equivalence. In my opinion, the idea behind the UPC was that this would be a typical management decision. The oral argument should only deal with the relevant issues are. 2. Neither party apparently addressed the applicable law in relation to the infringement. I assume that this refers to the EP non-UPC countries. All of these countries have, with respect to infringement, Article 69 EPC, and with respect to invalidity, Article 138 EPC incorporated in their national law or by virtue of them being directly applicable. Therefore, in my opinion, the UPC should not unnecessarily complicate matters and assume that the law on these points in these countries is the same as in the UPC, unless a party proves that it is different. #### **23 July 2026** ***(late published)*** **Local Division Düsseldorf, Franz Kaldewei v Bette** ***Requestrant*****: Rechtsanwaltskanzlei Gulde & Partner** [UPC\_CFI\_7/2023 ](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/b25d55b2-5261-47e3-8c66-83be0f089a5d.pdf) ***Request for public access*** **Facts** 1. The case between Kaldewei and Bette ended on 3 July 2024. 2. Gulde asks for access to pleadings and evidence. 3. Parties resist and ask alternatively for confidentiality with respect to certain exhibits. **The Court** The Court grants access, but not to the summons of the Court to the oral hearing and the audio recording of the oral hearing, as these are not pleadings or evidence. **Comment** The oral hearing is open to the public but the recording can only be accessed at the premises of the Court by the parties. So, if you have not been at the hearing in the audience, you have no access to what has happened during the hearing! I do not see a good reason for such exception and find it somewhat in contradiction with the fact that the hearing is public. Do I have to ask a party to tell me what happened during the hearing, and if truly important for my case, call such party as a witness? #### **27 July 2026** **Local Division Munich, Reinhausen v Huaming Power Equipment** [UPC\_CFI\_1752/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/86b79e97-c80b-46d5-87c4-66f9bf382dfe.pdf) ***Evidentiary seizure and inspection*** **Facts** 1. Reinhausen is the owner of EP 3 427 284 for an ‘on-load-tap-changer’. 2. From 19 to 21 May 2026 an exhibition took place in Berlin. 3. On 20 May 2026 the Local Division Munich granted an evidentiary seizure and inspection order. The order, among other things, allowed for the dismantling of the allegedly infringing product on display and the seizure of components. If this was not possible, the complete product could be seized. 4. On 19 June 2026, the defendant filed a request for (partial) revocation. **The Court** The Court acknowledges that the original order did not sufficiently guarantee that those involved in the seizure would keep the information they obtained secret, and corrected the order. **Comment** In this case, the seizure related to a technical product displayed behind plexiglass, which made it impossible for the public to see the product’s internal components. Of course, it is generally wise to ensure that the results of a seizure are kept secret until the expert’s report is released by the Court and tailor-made confidentiality orders have been issued. However, if one knows the procedure for an evidentiary seizure and inspection, it seems quite clear that the professionals involved in the seizure are bound by an implied duty of confidence. Nevertheless, it is indeed better to be safe than sorry, as there may be a patent attorney who wishes to disclose information to their client! I would have also liked the Court to refer to such an implied duty of confidentiality, as I have difficulty with a duty of confidentiality that works retroactively, as appears to be the case here. How can information which was not confidential become confidential certainly in a situation in which it has been disclosed in the meantime. #### **27 July 2026** **Central Division Munich, Sypox v Topsoe** [UPC\_CFI\_894/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/48cd3363-69c9-4812-890f-5bd3372b14a4.pdf) ***Only the redacted version*** **Facts** 1. This case concerns a revocation action with respect to EP 3 802 413. 2. The parties disagree on the question whether Sypox qualifies as an “SME”, as that may have relevance for determining the court fee and the cost ceiling. 3. Sypox believed that it had made a valid confidentiality request regarding an investment agreement. It decided to withdraw the unredacted version, but continued to rely on the redacted version. **The Court** 1. As Sypox withdrew the unredacted version this version will remain in the case file with the code HC (‘Highly Confidential’). As Topsoe had not been granted access, there is no reason for an order preventing them from using the information outside of this case. 2. Sypox can only rely on the redacted version. 3. As Sypox only relies on the redacted version, Topsoe has not provided sufficient justification for its interest in the unredacted version. **Comment** 1. How can you justify your request if you do not know what is in the unredacted version? In principle, if someone produces the redacted version of a document in order to prove a certain fact, the opposing counsel (of course under a confidentiality obligation) should be able to see the whole document, unless it is already prima facie clear that the unredacted version is totally irrelevant to the issue in question. 2. How often has the meaning of a part of a text changed for you when reading it in context? Is that not exactly how we interpret patent claims? #### **27 July 2026** **Local Division Düsseldorf, Dolby v Beko** [UPC\_CFI\_1923/2025; UPC\_CFI\_1062/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/cf2cbdd6-52dc-4b4a-9fc9-2943eaa9a6f9.pdf) ***Settlement*** **Facts** 1. The claimant informed the Court by letter that parties have reached a settlement agreement and asked for an immediate stay of the infringement and revocation actions. 2. The defendant agreed. **The Court** 1. The Court grants the stay. 2. The Court asks the parties to inform the Court before 30 July 2026 if they want to object against the cancelling of the date for the oral proceedings. **Comment** Rule 295 (d) RoP states that the Court may stay the proceedings at the request of both parties. The fact that parties did not file for a withdrawal shows that the agreement was not yet signed. In that case, it is understandable to ask for a stay, especially if the next deadline for a submission is only some days away. I underlined “may”. I can imagine that a Court would be more hesitant if, a few days before the oral hearing, the parties ask for a stay because they are in the process of settling. If the settlement does not happen for one reason or another, the Court loses a hearing date and has to prepare for the hearing again. It is much better to keep the pressure on the parties so that they are forced to reach an agreement before the hearing! #### **27 July 2026** **Court of Appeal, WEPA v ESSITY** [UPC\_CoA\_113/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/d7492325-5c14-46d1-8f73-084f7ff4e7ba.pdf) ***Preserving evidence*** **Facts** 1. WEPA filed an appeal against an order for an evidentiary seizure and inspection by the Local Division The Hague. 2. WEPA was ordered by the CMS to pay an appeal fee of € 14.600. However, they argued that they should pay € 5.000. **The JR** 1. The Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) rules that, until now, no value of the litigation in appeal has been determined. 2. In that case, the value in first instance will be taken as (provisional) value on appeal. 3. The JR states that, up to € 500.000, the court fee for appeal is € 5.000. 4. The JR orders the return of € 9.600. **Comment** 1. WEPA was prudent and first paid the wrongly indicated amount to make sure the formalities for valid appeal had been fulfilled and thereafter asked for a return of money. 2. That is a general rule in litigation: better be safe than sorry! #### **28 July 2026** **Court of Appel, Beko v Dolby** [UPC\_CoA\_77/2026; UPC\_CoA\_78/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/6a659035-dfcf-4080-af94-680c689d2bb6.pdf) ***Stay / Settlement*** **Facts** Dolby asked for a stay (and Beko agreed) because parties reached a settlement. **The JR** 1. The Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) grants the stay. 2. “*The parties shall inform the Court of Appeal once the respective obligations arising under the settlement agreement have been fulfilled*”. 3. Each party is entitled to request the Court to resume the proceedings stating reasons for the request. **Comment** 1. Note what the JR mentions under 2. Dolby started the proceedings in order to force Beko to sign a license, but does not want to withdraw its claim yet because it first wants to make sure it receives the money it is owed. Or at least, that is my speculation. 2. Experience teaches us that it is one thing to have an implementer sign a license agreement, but sometimes another to receive payment. If the patentee has negotiated a lump sum or at least a one-time payment for past use of the patent, it is prudent not to withdraw before the money is received. #### **28 July 2026** **Local Division Düsseldorf,** **Request by mr. Eggersdorfer re Dolby v Optoma** [UPC\_CFI\_226/2024; App\_57167/2024](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/48e22871-4e60-4ce0-9c93-9f34dcad3f24.pdf) ***Request for documents*** **Facts** A request by Dr. Eggersdorfer who is a practicing representative to receive the submissions and evidence in the case of Dolby versus Optoma which ended in settlement. **The Court** 1. If proceedings are initiated, you do not need to have a specific interest in obtaining pleadings and evidence. 2. Certain exhibits as requested by the parties are considered confidential and will therefore not be disclosed. 3. Personal data must be blacked out. 4. The requester also asked for the different orders of the Court, but these are public anyway and can be obtained without the Court’s approval. 5. As blacking out personal data is time-consuming for the Registry, the requester will first be given the pleadings. He can then indicate which exhibits he wants to be blacked out. **Comment** 1. Once again, a Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) had to spend 34 paragraphs to come to a conclusion which could be predicted. The parties also made substantial efforts and spent money resisting a request that they should know would be granted, except for the parts they indicated should be kept confidential. 2. As far as confidentiality is concerned, I remain of the opinion that everything that is produced or said during proceedings without a confidentiality regime in place is not confidential. It does not matter if parties both consider it as confidential. 3. I have already advocated several times to change R. 262 RoP and to make the file accessible to everybody after the end of the first instance and appeal except for the information which during the litigation has been declared confidential. I add to this that parties should be obliged to always file pleadings and evidence in a version in which personal data are blacked out. This version, also containing the blacked out confidential information, will go in the public register to be consulted after the case has ended. #### **28 July 2026** **Local Division Milan, Primetals v Danieli** [UPC\_ CFI\_377/2025; UPC\_ CFI\_702/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/1cf6f9b2-cbe3-49c8-93c5-b22ce1476f82.pdf) ***Correction*** **The JR** The JR corrects a clerical error in an order of 22 July which on 28 July was not yet published! The value of the counterclaim for revocation is set at € 1,875,000, as per the agreement of the parties at the interim conference, and not € 1,850,000. **Comment** I admire parties who can estimate the value of the litigation with such precision (1,35% margin). One may wonder what material difference this makes in practice, as the applicable ceiling for recoverable costs remains the same. #### **28 July 2026** **Local Division Milan, Astes4 v Bystronic** [UPC\_CFI\_1146/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/18df9e78-ca38-4d33-9abd-ca809c8bbd1e.pdf) ***Language change*** **Facts** 1. On 2 April 2026, Astes4 started an infringement case in Italian against four Bystronic defendants. 2. Bystronic applied for a language change to English, i.e. the language of the patent, before filing its Statement of Defence. 3. Astes4 answered and the President of the Court of First Instance consulted the panel. **The President of the Court of First Instance** 1. Although R. 323.1 RoP states that a request has to be included in the Statement of Defence, this is not a requirement of Art. 49(5) UPCA. What matters is that such request takes place as early as possible. 2. All the relevant circumstances must be taken into consideration, which should primarily relate to the specific case: 1. the language most commonly used in the field of technology; 2. the position of the parties; 3. their nationality; 4. their domicile; 5. their respective size; 6. the internal working language of the parties; 7. the way they are affected by the change; 3. If overall both parties’ interests balance out, the choice of the defendant prevails. The claimant had the possibility to choose the language of the patent. 4. The President, weighing up the different circumstances and applying the above criteria, orders the change to English. **Comment** 1. I suggest that the Presidium propose an amendment to R. 323.3 RoP. It is very important that a language change is done as early as possible, as indicated by the President in this decision. I suggest that a request should be filed within two weeks of receiving the Statement of Claim and that the claimant gets one week to react. As the President is always fast with her decision, it leaves two months for the defendant to draft its defence immediately in English. 2. For the functioning of the UPC, it would be preferable that cases be filed in English. As all UPC judges master English, it is then (more) easy to put together an international panel and choose technically-qualified judges. It allows orders and decisions to be immediately accessible to all interested persons. It has become extremely rare to find a claimant only active in their own country and in their own language and who does not understand English. This means that most of the filings made in a language other than English are done by representatives who prefer to work in their own language and not necessarily for the benefit of the client! #### **28 July 2026** **Local Division The Hague, CJ CheilJedang v Eppen** [UPC\_CFI\_1540/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/18af3ffe-40d2-4fb3-a099-2842a3d70815.pdf) ***No evidence of infringement!*** **Facts** 1. CJ was granted an evidentiary seizure and inspection order. 2. The seized samples were tested in a lab, which found no evidence of infringement contrary to earlier analyzed results of CJ. 3. CJ, which (apparently) had in the meantime started proceedings on the merits, was allowed to run its own tests on the seized samples. 4. The defendant asks for an extension of time for filing its defence until the new results would be known. 5. The expert in the seizure procedure had not looked in detail at the seized documents. **The Court** 1. The Court grants the extension of time. 2. The Court asks the parties to agree on an independent lab, as well as on an independent expert who should go through the documents to tell which ones are relevant for the infringement question. **Comment** 1. Apparently, the claimant did not have proof of infringement when it started the case on the merits and is now trying desperately to get some. 2. The granted extension seems reasonable as there is nothing to defend against if the claimant has not yet filed its infringement evidence. 3. However, what if the defendant had asked the JR to apply R. 334(h) immediately after the “non-infringement” result of the lab was known? 4. The claimant executes an inspection order, obtains samples, has them tested in a lab of their choosing (I assume), applying a testing protocol which (I assume) they also suggested. Why would the claimant then be allowed to run its own tests? The case should have been dismissed or the claimant should have withdrawn its claim and, should it get the evidence it needed in the end, have filed a new action. 5. In my opinion, this has nothing to do with front-loaded proceedings and the objective of having a decision in 12-14 months, which does not seem possible here. #### **29 July 2026** **Local Division Milan, Cardo v Ziwu and Resosport** [UPC\_CFI\_1902/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/d0ef728d-38a4-4e68-bd84-77dbaedb6469.pdf) ***Alignment of dates for filing the Statement of defence*** **Facts** 1. Ziwu was duly served with the Statement of Claim on 23 April 2026 and had to answer by 23 July 2026. 2. On 30 June 2026, Ziwu asked for alignment of the service dates and deadlines for the Statements of defence (SoD), stating that in that case Renosport (a Hong Kong company, not served yet) would voluntarily accept service. 3. The same firm, who had represented Ziwu and Resosport in PI proceedings, is acting for both parties but was not authorized by Resosport to accept service. **The JR** The JR ordered the sought alignment. On the condition that Resosport would accept service, the date for the SoDs of both companies would be set on 10 September 2026, which would still be earlier than if normal service on Resosport through the Hague Convention were confirmed on the date of the JR’s present order. Cardo asked for a panel review of the JR’s order. **The Court** The Court confirmed the JR’s finding that this was a reasonable solution, in the interests of the parties and the Court. With respect to the argument of Cardo that this was a misuse of the system, the Court remarked that one cannot oblige somebody to appear in court. **Comment** I have a lot of sympathy for Cardo as this clearly was a set-up to get more time for preparing a defence, basically frustrating the UPC regime. If I would have been Cardo’s representative, I would have asked to split the cases against the defendants and if I would have been a JR I would have done so in order to sanction this kind of scheming to circumvent the three-months’ time limit for filing a defence. But I am not Cardo or the JR! I hope that the Local Division sets the date for the oral argument for end of March next year to make sure that the case is decided within 14 months. #### **29 July 2026** **Local Division Milan, Prinoth v Xelom** [UPC\_CFI\_703/2025; UPC\_CFI\_1757/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/6e989070-f344-4490-858f-79e9c06708f4.pdf) ***Case management*** **Facts** 1. On 11 February 2025, Prinoth filed an *ex parte* evidentiary seizure and inspection order based on EP 2 507 436 and EP 1 995 159. 2. On 18 March, the order was granted and executed on 2 April, when a snow groomer was seized. 3. In the Statement of Claim, Prinoth asked the Court, among others, to order Xelom to provide further evidence and to allow experiments with the seized snow groomer and further inspection by a court-appointed expert. 4. Xelom filed a defence and counterclaim for revocation. 5. On 27 January 2026, Prinoth filed its reply in the infringement action and defence in the revocation case, along with an application to amend the patent with respectively 5 and 6 auxiliary requests for the two asserted patents. 6. Xelom responded with more than 100 invalidity attacks against the auxiliary requests. 7. The JR, after hearing the panel, organized a case management hearing and invited parties to reduce the number of auxiliary requests and the invalidity attacks. **The JR** 1. The JR allows the experiments by the court-appointed expert in the period between 7 and 18 September 2026. 2. The JR appoints a further IT expert to inspect the source code to be communicated by Xelom and the software used and to answer the questions formulated by the Court. 3. First, the expert has to see if he can answer the questions formulated by the Court on the basis of the documentation to be handed by Xelom. Only thereafter inspection of the source code will take place (if necessary and restricted to the confidentiality club). 4. The JR restricts the request for documentation, refusing to order the production of commercial information stating that this relates to possible damage proceedings. 5. The JR sets precise dates for the execution of her order, the reports of the experts and the briefs to be filed by the parties with respect to the expert reports. 6. The JR gives precise orders to limit the number of auxiliary requests and invalidity attacks. 7. The JR instructs the parties to follow the principles formulated by the Court of Appeal with respect to the question of inventive step. 8. The JR sets the date for the interim conference on 25 November 2026 and the oral hearing on 26 January 2027. **Comment** 1. The JR shows in this case a very laudable proactive hands-on attitude in order to try and make sure that the case does not end up in a classical Italian patent case but will stay in the UPC framework. 2. She is not helped by the Italian representatives of the parties who, one gets the impression, try to litigate as much as possible as they are used to in their national system with court-appointed experts, endless invalidity attacks and just ignoring the case law of the Court of Appeal but continuing to apply the problem-solution approach with respect to inventive step. 3. The main case started on 27 August 2025 and, despite the heroic effort of the JR, the hearing will not take place within a year but on 26 January 2027. The reason for that basically lies in the procedural attitude of the claimant: it started with an evidentiary seizure and inspection order, which was not precise enough and did not yield the necessary information; subsequently, the claimant filed with its SoC a new request for documents and inspection which is now leading to further delays, together with the fact that in August 2026 the plant of the defendant is closed. 4. One wonders whether the Court should allow further requests for information and inspection orders in the proceedings on the merits where the claimant has had the possibility to obtain such information before the start of the case on the merits. At least, such requests should not delay proceedings. All parties (and the Court) should behave in such a way that the UPC can, as much as possible, deliver a decision within 12-14 months. 5. To avoid this, next time I think that the JR should make this kind of management decisions with respect to further inspection and study of documents immediately after the filing of such requests in the Statement of claim. The management work of the JR starts in my opinion with the kick-off of the proceedings. 6. The order is dated 21 July 2026 but was published on 29 July 2026 (and is registered on the UPC website as a decision issued on 29 July 2026). If this means that final decisions are now reported by publication date, that would be a big step forward as somebody not reading or listening to the Unfiltered would not miss a case if he/she reads all published decisions on a weekly basis. #### **29 July 2026** **Local Division Lisbon, Ericsson v AsusTek** [UPC\_CFI\_757/2024](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/337fcd4a-bb47-4ab7-a1e3-dc4e81b1cf8d.pdf) ***Legal costs*** **Facts** 1. At the interim conference, the JR suggested that the parties reach an agreement on costs. 2. On 10 March 2026, the parties submitted the following agreement: 1. If AsusTek is successful in its Counterclaim for Revocation and successfully defends against the infringement action, Ericsson will bear the costs in the total amount of EUR 150,000; 2. If Ericsson is successful in the Counterclaim for Revocation proceedings, but the Court rules that the Patent is not infringed, then the costs will be split between the parties; 3. If Ericsson is successful in its Infringement Action and successfully defends against the Counterclaim for Revocation, AsusTek will bear the costs in the total amount of EUR 150,000. 3. Ericsson won both in the infringement and the revocation actions. 4. In its decision of 6 May 2026, the Court stated: *“Parties have settled on costs, and the Court refers to the settlement (see above para. 5). No confirmation of the Court was required by the parties (R. 365.1 RoP). In that regard, nothing is to be ordered on costs.”* 5. On 7 July 2026, Ericsson asked the Court to confirm that AsusTek must reimburse €150,000. 6. AsusTek had until then refused to pay “*as the agreement does not constitute an independent basis for liability*”. 7. AsusTek opposed Ericsson’s request, arguing that: 1. the agreement only constituted the ceiling for reimbursement, the reimbursable costs would have to be determined in cost proceedings; 2. Ericsson is too late. It should have started cost proceedings within a month of the decision; 3. there is no legal basis to apply R. 365 RoP (settlement) as it requires the consent of both parties before the JR can confirm the agreement; 4. Ericsson’s request requires an inadmissible substance assessment, at least as to the deadline for payment. **The Court** The Court confirms the settlement and states that AsusTek must pay € 150,000 to Ericsson within one week of service of the decision. **Comment** 1. “*A representative must always have due regard for the fair conduct of proceedings. He or she shall exercise his or her rights in good faith and shall not abuse the Court process*.” (first two sentences of Art. 22 of the Code of Conduct for Representatives). 2. Judge for yourself: is this behavior of AsusTek’s representative “fair”? Has it exercised its rights in good faith? My opinion is that the representative should have advised his client to pay. 3. These types of agreements about costs have never raised any issues in The Netherlands. Mr. Maas, Ericsson’s representative, mustn’t have believed his eyes when he read AsusTek’s reasons not to pay! 4. The lesson is: 1. make sure that a cost agreement covers all costs, not only representative costs, otherwise you will still have to go through cost proceedings for getting your travel and other expenses back; 2. make sure that it is clear to the Court that the parties expect the Court to make a cost order in the decision in accordance with the agreement! #### **29 July 2026** **Local Division Paris, Keeex v Adobe** [UPC\_CFI\_530/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/5f9e4b5d-eb77-496f-9970-ba7822350a0d.pdf) ***Panel review of case management order*** **Facts** 1. On 25 June 2026, the JR dismissed Keeex’s application for leave to: 1. further amend its patent; 2. add new products to the infringement case; and also declared various statements and evidence inadmissible for being late-filed. 1. Keeex filed an application for review, requesting that the Court: 1. accept the (further) auxiliary requests; 2. accept the statements and evidence which were not accepted by the JR; 3. rule that the addition of the new products does not qualify as a change of claim under R. 263 RoP. **The Court** 1. The refusal of further auxiliary requests (R. 30.2 RoP) was fully in line with the case law. Such further auxiliary requests are only allowed in exceptional circumstances, on the conditions that they could not have been made earlier and do not unreasonably hinder the defendant in its defence. 2. With respect to the new products, it is clear that, at the time of the Statement of claim, Keeex had already all the facts to argue that these products were infringing but failed to include them in the Statement of claim. 3. The decisions of the JR with respect to the (in)admissibility of the new statements and evidence are correct; the defendant should have the last word on infringement (and therefore the statements with respect to infringement made in the rejoinder to the counterclaim for revocation are not allowed). On the other hand, a simple summary in a rejoinder of all the arguments which have already been made are allowed. 4. The Court dismisses the application for review. **Comment** 1. This outcome, as in 99% of the applications for review, was not surprising: the JR followed the Rules of Procedure and the case law of the Court of Appeal and motivated her decision convincingly. 2. A further example and warning that, as a representative, you have to make sure that you have prepared your case in full before launching the action (and, as I have said before, conducted a very thorough prior art search – with creative thinking and (non-artificial) intelligence –). Once you receive the counterclaim for revocation (which, if you have prepared your case thoroughly, should not come as a surprise), you should start thinking about the best auxiliary requests from day 1. 3. I strongly suggest to the Presidium to delete from the Rules the possibility of a review. Most JRs have now gained considerable experience and, before deciding, they can – if they are in doubt – always consult with their colleagues. Also, it is quite clear from the outcome of the panel review decisions, that it does not serve any purpose except being time-consuming for the Court and making litigation for the parties more expensive. 4. If a new Rule is introduced which states that the JR (or the panel) when issuing a case management order must indicate whether or not leave for appeal can be given, the JR (or panel) can also express in an indirect way if he/she feels that the request for the order (here review) had some merit or (as in this case) is totally unjustified. #### **30 July 2026** **Local Division Milan, Biopsafe v Kaltek** [UPC\_CFI\_1829/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/20920954-7c1e-4f9d-95de-3a27f31c32cc.pdf) ***Security for costs*** **Facts** 1. Biopsafe filed an infringement action based on EP 2 720 617, EP 3 061 401 and EP 3 653 132 against Kaltek. 2. Kaltek filed an application for security for costs. **The JR** 1. The minimum share capital and the microenterprise status are as such no good indicators for the financial status of a company. 2. All other financial arguments are not convincing. 3. The JR dismisses the request. **Comment** The Court’s remark under 1) is, I would say, common sense. If you bother to react the further facts of the case and you know the case law of the Court of Appeal, then it becomes pretty clear that this was a mission impossible filed more than 6 months after the start of the proceedings which does not add to the credibility of the defendant’s case. #### **30 July 2026** **Local Division Paris, Sun v Vivo** [UPC\_CFI\_361/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/c471ceec-8042-4eb2-94b5-28a82ab02f5f.pdf); [UPC\_CFI\_362/2025 ](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/4437f105-bfc7-4cee-b272-a25d755e8d0a.pdf) ***Order after interim conference*** **Facts** 1. The interim conference was held at 29 July 2026. 2. The Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) had sent a letter with points of discussion on 24 July 2026. **The JR** 1. Settlement? Parties are still negotiating. 2. Value of the case: the parties agreed total value € 10 million. 3. Recoverable costs: the parties are expected to agree. 4. The JR asked for consolidated documents, setting out operative parts of their requests. 5. Parties would prefer a non-public hearing with respect to FRAND issues. 6. The JR proposes a public hearing on 9 and 10 September 2026, and a non-public hearing on 11 September 2026, and proposes a detailed agenda. 7. Parties have no comment with respect to the JR’s proposal with respect to the main legal points. **Comment** Textbook preparation by the JR of the oral argument! #### **30 July 2026** **Local Division The Hague, Qord v Samsung** [UPC\_CFI\_2094/2026 ](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/10b5aac8-9fb6-44dd-932c-9a456b9aa4cf.pdf) ***Alignment*** **Facts** Parties agreed on an alignment of the date for the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim for revocation, with a voluntary appearance of defendant 1. **The JR** The Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) confirmed the deadline for lodging Defence and Counterclaim for all defendants at 26 October 2026. **Comment** It means in fact that some defendants get three months as of now, while the other defendants get a longer term. The claimants know that if they file against multiple defendants, especially from one group, they may expect such an alignment game if there is a defendant in a country where service is more difficult and/or time-consuming. This all means that defendants often get (much) more time to prepare their defence/counterclaim. Moreover, as to the efficiency of service, they are in the hands of the Registry. It would, as I have already advocated, better to leave this to the parties. #### **30 July 2026** **Local Division Paris, Merz v Viatris** [UPC\_CFI\_1901/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/173864ed-0d8c-4f24-ae38-84239c41dab2.pdf) ***Lis pendens*** **Facts** 1. This concerns infringement proceedings. 2. Viatris filed a request for a stay in a preliminary objection because of a case before the national French court in Paris. **The JR** 1. The Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) does not agree that the *Merz v Viatris* case was first pending in the UPC because the filing for the PI proceedings was before the filing of the case in the national court in Paris. 2. However, Art. 29 Brussels Regulation is not applicable because the two cases do not concern the same subject nor the same course of action, as the national Paris court has to look at the validity of the French part of the European patent, while the Local Division Paris has to deal with infringement. 3. The cases are related in the sense of Art. 30 Brussels Regulation, but that is not in itself a reason to grant a stay. 4. Request for a stay rejected. **Comment** The only correct decision in view of the aim of the UPC to deliver judgments in 12-14 months. **– All comments above are** [Prof. Hoyng](https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/our-team/legal-experts/prof-willem-hoyng "https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/our-team/legal-experts/prof-willem-hoyng")**‘s personal opinions –**