# News Detail Share now [](https://www.linkedin.com/uas/login?session_redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.linkedin.com%2FshareArticle%3Fmini%3Dtrue%26url%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.hoyngrokhmonegier.com%2Ffr%2Factualites%2Fdetail%2Fupc-unfiltered-by-willem-hoyng-upc-decisions-week-46-2026%26title%3DUPC%20Unfiltered%2C%20by%20Willem%20Hoyng%20%E2%80%93%20UPC%20decisions%20week%2046%2C%202026%26summary%3D "Linkedin") # UPC Unfiltered, by Willem Hoyng – UPC decisions week 46, 2026 16 novembre 2026 UPC Unfiltered News Unified Patent Court (UPC) Hot Topic News Below, [Prof. Willem Hoyng](https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/our-team/legal-experts/prof-willem-hoyng) provides his unfiltered views on the decisions that were published on the website of the Unified Patent Court (“UPC”) last week. His comments offer a unique insight into the UPC’s case law, as he chairs the Advisory Board of the UPC and participated in drafting the Rules of Procedure of the UPC. Interested in more of this? Stay tuned and subscribe [here](https://mailchi.mp/8fbd8890d03b/upc-unfiltered-by-willem-hoyng) for weekly updates. Find all decisions, commentary and more on our [UPC Intelligence Platform](https://upcintelligence.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/). On the go, multi-tasking or just prefer to listen? “Willem Hoyng’s UPC Unfiltered AI Podcast” – your weekly, AI-generated podcast discussing Willem Hoyng’s commentary on UPC case law of last week, offers a convenient alternative. Listen on [Spotify](https://open.spotify.com/show/53wwzF7LNSqqouR0wzXgJD?si=ae84739b09904ee1&nd=1&dlsi=71b6a174bdbd4f32) or [Apple Podcasts](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/willem-hoyngs-upc-unfiltered-ai-podcast/id1806092389). Dear reader, As we the start our fourth year of the Unfiltered, Prof. Willem Hoyng made a small change at the request of some of his readers. While Prof. Willem Hoyng will still discuss all the decisions published last week, he will always start with what he considers as the most interesting (must read / listen) decisions, marked with an asterisk. The other decisions will then be published / discussed in the order in which they were published. #### **\*19 October 2026** ***(late published)*** **Local Division Düsseldorf, Edwards Lifesciences v Jenscare** [UPC\_CFI\_3051/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/3e5e7bef-8560-453f-9aab-5cafd45dc529.pdf) ***PI proceedings*** **Facts** 1. Preliminary Injunction (“PI”) proceedings against Dutch and Chinese defendants. 2. The Registry tried serving the Statement of Claim on the Dutch company without result. 3. The letter came back with “address unknown or incomplete”. 4. Thereafter, the applicant had a Dutch bailiff serve in accordance with Art. 20(1) of the Regulation (2020/1784) on service. 5. The applicant asked for a declaration of good service in accordance with R. 275.2. RoP. **The JR** The Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) grants the request and sets 2 November 2026 as date for filing an Objection. **Comment** 1. We have seen it before: service of documents by the (sub) registry and dealing with service by representatives and the Court is a mess. As is the case here. The application for a PI was filed on 24 August. Is has now been almost three months. I have seen no decision. What about urgency? 2. The errors of judgment/mistakes: 1. Why did Edwards file in the very busy Düsseldorf Division, thereby adding the complication of suing a defendant in a different country. If Edwards would have filed in the Local Division in The Hague it would have already had, in my opinion, a decision against both the Dutch defendant and the Chinese defendant. 2. As I have said several times before, it was not smart of the German subregistry to use Art. 18 of the Service Regulation, and certainly not without verifying the address of the defendant in the Dutch Chamber of Commerce register just before sending. As you should know by now, such service almost never works because the defendant has to sign for receipt, which a smart defendant almost never does, assuming that the portal service in the country of receipt works properly. Therefore, the Registry should always use the official route of Art. 8 or, if possible, Art. 20(1). I note that R. 271.4(a) RoP does not oblige the Registry to use the Art. 18 route, and , as we now know, if this does not work - certainly if you send it to the wrong address! - you should not use that route , particularly in PI proceedings. 3. It is wrong to conclude that service according to R. 271.4(a) RoP was not possible. First of all, the normal Art. 8 route was not even attempted. Second of all, the applicant showed that service according to Art. 20(1) was possible. 4. So, ultimately, a valid service was carried out according to R. 271.4(a) RoP. 5. Why, then, did the applicant turn to “service by an alternative method” and ask for a declaration of “good service” according R. 275.2 RoP, and why did the JR grant such a request? The only reason I can think of is that the applicant, rather than the Registry, asked the Dutch bailiff to perform the service but that has nothing to do with the validity of the service. 6. Finally, the decision is silent about the Chinese defendant which had to be served in accordance with The Hague Convention. We know that this is always difficult and also the reason for delay in PI cases in many Divisions. The smart choice here would also be the Local Division in The Hague, as I assume that they would apply Art. 15 last paragraph of the Convention, and do not wait for any return of documents as long as the applicant makes sure that the Chinese defendant knows about the PI and the date for an objection and/or a hearing. 3. The above shows that it would be wise to consider how this can all be more effective and change the Rules accordingly both with respect to service (which should be done by the applicant) and with respect to the objection and date or dates for a PI hearing . Before serving, the applicant should ask for both dates and make sure that service is done at a certain period before the objection (oral hearing) is due, which period is determined by the Court. 4. Why was this order only published on 12 November? Was it so that nobody would find it? Unless, of course, they check all the published decisions from the past months every week. I have complained many times about this method of publishing, but to no avail! #### **\*10 November 2026** **Local Division The Hague, GSK v Pfizer/BioNTech** [UPC\_CFI\_620/2025; UPC\_CFI\_1509/2025; UPC\_CFI\_1511/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/f6e4d61a-f9c4-4003-8aed-9b21536f5db4.pdf) ***Infringement*** **Facts** 1. This was an infringement case concerning the COVID-19 vaccine developed, manufactured and marketed by the 26 Pfizer and four BioNTech defendants. 2. GSK claimed infringement of EP 2 590 626, concerning liposomes with lipids having an advantageous pKa value for RNA delivery. 3. The opposition against the patent was withdrawn after the Board of Appeal had held, unlike the Opposition Division, that the patent was novel. No decision on inventive step was made by the Opposition Division. 4. After the JR had rejected the late-filed stained Cryo-TEM images of the allegedly infringing products, the Court reversed that decision after the oral hearing and gave the parties the right to comment. **The Court** 1. With respect to jurisdiction and competence, the Court holds that it has jurisdiction under Art. 4 of the Brussels Regulation (BR) over all companies established in the UPC territory. As Art. 4 confers universal jurisdiction for infringement actions, the Court also has jurisdiction over acts of these Art. 4 defendants outside the UPC territory where the European patent is valid and the acts are encompassed by the request (thus excluding the UK and Ireland). 2. The Court also has jurisdiction over all non-UPC and Lugano defendants under Art. 8(1) BR and Art. 6(1) Lugano Convention because of the close connection between those defendants and the anchor defendants. The Court also has long-arm jurisdiction over those defendants. The allegation that infringing acts must be proven in the countries for which jurisdiction under Art. 4 or Art. 8(1) BR or Art. 6(1) Lugano Convention, is asserted is incorrect. 3. The competence of the LD The Hague is established on the basis of Art. 33(1)(b) UPCA for the same reasons. 4. The Court explains the technical background of the patent and formulates the problem addressed by the patent as “offering a combination of improved production, storage and stability, achieving a strong cellular and humoral immune response”. 5. The Court interprets the claim after citing the principles established by the Court of Appeal. In general, the Court adopts a functional interpretation and rejects several of the defendants’ arguments for a more limited interpretation. 6. The Court does not read the numerical claim language (the range of 5.0 to 6.8 pKa) literally, as the defendants argued but holds that the measuring method mentioned in the description qualifies those numerical values. The description refers to another patent application, which states that the method has a precision of ± 0.2 pKa units. 7. The Court accepts partial priority from the two priority documents and states the following: > *“According to the EPO Guidelines Part H Chapter V-3.5, which are based on longstanding and consistent caselaw of the Boards of Appeal, ”\[i\]n the case of a disclosure of both a general and a preferred range, a combination of the preferred disclosed narrower range and one of the part-ranges lying within the disclosed overall range on either side of the narrower range can usually be derived from the original disclosure of the application”.”* > > The Court concludes: > > *“Applying these principles to the present case, the Court finds as follows. The patent may rely on P1 (US830) with date 6 July 2010 for the pKa range of 5.0-6.7 (so partially according to G1/15) and for the upper pKa limit of 6.8 on P2, US 837 (dated 31 August 2010).”* 1. Although all elements of the claim are contained in one prior art document (WO 748), this is not in itself sufficient to destroy novelty. In this case, this would entail unallowable mosaicking. There is no direct and unambiguous disclosure of claim 1. 2. The Court holds that the patent involves an inventive step, having held, with respect to common general knowledge, that not all expert evidence is to the point because it is not based on the skilled person as defined by the Court. 3. In general, the Court rejects the propositions by the defendants (which have the burden of proof) and adopts a more limited definition of common general knowledge. 4. The Court finds that the patent involves an inventive step, rejecting the defendants’ proposed realistic starting points and/or finding that there was no pointer. 5. The Court holds that claim 13 is insufficiently disclosed. 6. Applying the 0.2 pKa margin, the Court finds infringement and also rejects all further non-infringement arguments. 7. The Court holds that all defendants infringe or at least facilitate infringement. 8. GSK sought an injunction enforceable only after a decision of the Court of Appeal upholding the first-instance decision and only insofar as the defendants had not concluded a license agreement within three months after that decision of the Court of Appeal had become final. 9. With respect to the fact that GSK did not develop its own vaccine and is in fact a non-practicing entity, while an injunction would mean that the vaccine would no longer be available, the Court states in paragraph 254: > *“However, the fact that its patent is infringed merits an injunction. Denying GSK an injunction may not be in compliance with (Art. 3 of) the Enforcement Directive \[…\] as this will deny GSK an effective, dissuasive way to enforce its patent.”* **Comment** 1. I assume that almost all readers have been vaccinated against COVID-19. If you do not know yet but are curious to know how such a vaccine works, read paragraphs 67 to 87. 2. The case will proceed on appeal, where the numerous contentious issues will be discussed anew, such as: 1. who is the skilled person in this highly specified field; 2. what constitutes common general knowledge in such a field; 3. if the patentee claims a precise numerical range, how far can one deviate from it because the measuring method used has a deviation of 0.2 pKa units? Would a patentee not have to take that into consideration when formulating its claim; 4. whether the case law of the Boards of Appeal is indeed such (and should be followed) that the lower value of a range can be found in one priority document and the higher value in another priority document; 5. for a successful attack on inventive step based on a realistic starting point and common general knowledge, whether it is necessary to have a pointer to combine the starting point with that general knowledge. > *These are all interesting questions, all of which were decided in favor of the claimant. We will see how the Court of Appeal deals with these issues (and others). Can the Court, of its own motion after the oral hearing, accept evidence of which the JR had ruled that it was late and that it would not be admitted which ruling was accepted by the other party as it did not ask for a review?* 1. There is one consideration with which I fundamentally disagree. It is the statement that Art. 3 of the Enforcement Directive may dictate that, in the case of infringement, an injunction should be granted. That is not the way I read Art. 3. In this case, for instance, I think an injunction would be totally misplaced. The only reason why GSK invokes its patent is to receive monetary compensation for its invention and, assuming that the patent is valid and infringed, it is entitled to that. However, the grant (or threat of grant) of an injunction only has the effect of putting a gun to the heads of defendants who simply cannot afford (and would then probably not act in the best interest of public health) not to supply the vaccine anymore in order to pay an unreasonable (license) fee. There are situations in which, as also expressed in Art. 3, in my opinion an injunction is not the justified remedy in light of the requirement of proportionality. It would be good if the CJEU gave an answer to these questions, certainly in a situation where injunctions are immediately enforceable and suspensive effect can be obtained only in exceptional cases. 2. In this case, GSK itself realized that an immediate injunction would not be proportionate and that was prudent and smart. 3. Next week (at my age!), I am getting vaccinated! Thank you GSK! **Disclaimer** My firm participated in this case but I have not had any personal involvement in the case. #### **\*11 November 2026** **Court of Appeal, Paustian v Hurom/NUC** [UPC-CoA-163/2026; UPC-CoA-166/2026; UPC-CoA-167/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/4ee66618-19ed-416f-8531-874af8b6b834.pdf) ***Public access*** **Facts** 1. Paustian sought access to pleadings in three appeal cases between Hurom/NUC because of a professional interest. 2. The parties stated that they assumed that the request concerned the redacted versions of the pleadings in the appeals, without the exhibits. 3. NUC Korea sought the redaction of further information in the Statement of appeal in accordance with R. 262.2 RoP. **The JR of the Court of Appeal** 1. The JR cites the applicable principles: after the closure of the proceedings, access is in principle granted upon a reasoned request specifying the pleadings and evidence to which access is sought. 2. Personal data will be redacted. 3. The JR accepts the confidentiality and redaction of the information as requested by NUC Korea. **Comment** Although I certainly agree that NUC Korea’s export arrangements are in principle confidential, this information (as I understand it) was contained in pleadings without being protected by a confidentiality regime in accordance with R. 262A RoP and was therefore accessible to the other parties, their experts, etc. without a confidentiality obligation. How can such information then be qualified as confidential? In my opinion, information that has been published in pleadings without a confidentiality regime (or on an agreement between the parties with respect to confidentiality) cannot be classified as confidential under R. 262 RoP. #### **\*12 November 2026** **Local Division Brussels, In(k)control v Esko** [UPC\_CFI\_871/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/69ab4615-26f9-45f4-9c7c-0cc9e8adafa1.pdf) ***Confidentiality*** **Facts** 1. Esko seeks a confidentiality regime for certain parts of its defence pleadings, stating that, if the Court does not want to grant such confidentiality under R. 262A RoP, it should at least order confidentiality vis-à-vis the public (under R. 262.2 RoP). 2. Following this request, the Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) suggested that the parties reach a general agreement covering all confidentiality issues. 3. The parties agreed, except with respect to the confidentiality club. 4. The Court decided who will belong to the confidentiality club and defined a general confidentiality regime for the entire proceedings (referred to in English as the default regime). 5. With respect to R. 262.2 RoP, the Court accepted, on a preliminary basis, that this confidentiality also applies to requests from members of the public but the ultimate decision depends on the content of the request. **Comment** 1. In my opinion, the JR’s idea of getting the parties to agree on a general default confidentiality regime applicable for the whole proceeding and whenever a party invokes confidentiality (and simultaneously files a redacted version) is an excellent idea. 2. “Default” because a party always has the right to argue that the information is not confidential or that the agreed confidentiality club is not appropriate for that information. 3. As to the public, in my opinion it is better to have a default system under which everything that is confidential is also confidential for the public but a member of the public is entitled to challenge the confidentiality. 4. As I have already often advocated: if information has been filed in proceedings without confidentiality, that information automatically cannot qualify for confidentiality under R. 262.2 RoP, except in a situation where all the parties to the litigation are bound by confidentiality (and where, during the interim conference and the hearing, the necessary measures are taken to keep the information confidential). 5. Parties who master English (as these parties and their representatives do) should preferably not use a language that only a few people/judges master. It makes the choice of international judges difficult, is impractical before the Court of Appeal and makes decisions inaccessible. Here, different from some other Local Divisions, the JR at least provides a translation of the extensive headnotes. Bravo! #### **4 November 2026** ***(late published)*** **Local Division Paris, SEB v SharkNinja** [UPC\_CFI\_840/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/50e4dbc1-06f2-4acd-bfe4-671d6a50fc91.pdf) ***Infringement / equivalence*** **Facts** 1. An infringement case with respect to EP 3 991 615 with respect to a “removable heated lid” (official French text: “couvercle chauffant amovible”. 2. SharkNinja filed a counterclaim for revocation and SEB auxiliary requests. **The Court** 1. The Court has jurisdiction and competence with regard to the SharkNinja companies operating in the UPC. 2. The Court discusses the patent, the problem and the solution: > *21. The invention lies in the use of two distinct mechanical actuation means, located at different radial distances from a lateral edge of the lid, which allow the safety device to be activated in a stable and secure manner on containers of various sizes (\[0015\]).* > > *22. To this end, the patent discloses a lid that can be used with utensils of different sizes and which includes first and second actuation means. The first actuation means are formed by a first shoulder on a component of the lid that is capable of translational movement, and the second actuation means are formed by a second shoulder on this same movable component (\[0039\]).* 1. After stating that the skilled person is an electro-mechanical engineer, the Court interprets the different claim elements by adopting a rather liberal interpretation, finding that actuating means can be formed as part of one and the same component. 2. The Court decides that there is no literal infringement of claim 1. With respect to equivalence, the parties and the Court apply the test of the Local Division the Hague. 3. The Court cites the test: > *1) Technical equivalence: does the variation solve (essentially) the same problem that the patented invention solves and perform (essentially) the same function in this context?* > > *2) Fair protection for patentee: Is extending the protection of the claim to the equivalent proportionate to a fair protection for the patentee?* > > *3) Reasonable legal certainty for third parties: does the skilled person understand from the patent that the scope of the invention is broader than what is claimed literally?* > > *4) Is the allegedly infringing product novel and inventive over the prior art?* 1. The Court concludes that there is no infringement under this doctrine of equivalence because condition no. 1 (technical equivalence) is not fulfilled. 2. During the hearing, SharkNinja made its counterclaim for revocation conditional upon the finding of infringement. 3. The parties agreed that each party will bear its own costs with respect to the conditional counterclaim. **Comment** 1. I have already advocated several times that I prefer the (US) “means function result” test for establishing equivalence. That would in this case make no difference as no. 2 and 3 of the The Hague Local Division test were not relevant here. 2. The Court did not have to deal with the argument of SharkNinja that, if the accused product is inventive over the patented product, it cannot be an equivalent. That is an argument that is often heard but that is wrong as general statement. In the pemetrexed case the invention was clearly located in the used anion and although the claim was only for the disodium salt the dipotassium salt, it was held to be an equivalent, even if an alternative salt would have had inventive properties over the used salt. I do not see why there would not be an infringement. 3. The parties agreed on the fact that each party should bear the costs. That is fine but without agreement SEB should have had to pay the costs as it lost the case. #### **6 November 2026** **Local Division Hamburg, Fraunhofer v Acer** [UPC\_CFI\_2231/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/224f879b-4bff-4291-aff8-bf8e7cef67f1.pdf) ***Stay / SEP*** **Facts** 1. This case concerns an infringement case based on EP 2 304 723 related to audio coding. 2. The patent is listed as a SEP for the Opus Audio Codec. 3. The claimant did not give any undertaking with respect to licensing. 4. In a case before the Local Division in The Hague, Acer filed a counterclaim asking for rate setting with respect to another SEP belonging to the Audio Codec Standard. 5. An oral hearing in the present case is set for 9 March 2027. 6. The defendants asked for suspension of this case before the Local Division Hamburg and the oral hearing. 7. They argue that in the The Hague proceedings rate setting has been asked for the same pool. 8. According to the defendants, such a decision would be prejudicial or at least important for the case at hand. **The Court** 1. Another case with respect to another pool contributor pending against the same defendants, who raised a FRAND defence in both cases, does not justify postponing the - already scheduled - oral hearing as it goes against the general objective of the UPC that an oral hearing shall be conducted within one year (Preamble Nr. 7 of RoP). 2. The outcome of a Counterclaim for rate-setting at another Local Division is not prejudicial for the present dispute, as the parties are not identical. The factual implications of the two cases are mutual; any decision on a FRAND defence against a pool contributor, be it by a UPC panel or by a national Court, is of factual interest for the next decision. **Comment** 1. The defendants argue that the patent is not a SEP and the claimant, although it licenses its patent via a pool license with Vectis as pool administrator, has never made a FRAND declaration. 2. Why should the LD Hamburg then stay the proceedings until the LD The Hague has set the FRAND rate for the pool? If the patent is non-essential then there is in principle no entitlement to a FRAND defence. 3. However, apparently, according to the decision, the factual situation is such that the defendant is entitled to raise a FRAND defence also in Hamburg and that FRAND defence is the same defence as in The Hague. 4. The Court does not want to stay and therefore cites the principle that the UPC has an objective to deliver decisions after an oral hearing within a year and that a decision on a FRAND rate in The Hague or national courts is only of factual interest. 5. These arguments are not very convincing, given that the delay is minimal and we are not talking about a decision of a different court, but of the same court. If a Division of that same court decides on the FRAND royalty for a license to a certain patent pool, this is a decision of the court. In my opinion, it would not be possible for the same court (but another local Division) to then grant an injunction against a company that has obtained such a license with respect to a patent belonging to the pool. 6. Therefore, I do not find the arguments of Hamburg very convincing. It looks as if the Local Division Hamburg does not want to exclude the possibility of granting an injunction before The Hague has decided. 7. It is hoped that the Court of Appeal will quickly decide how SEP cases should be handled. #### **9 November 2026** **Court of Appeal, Stadapharm v Merz** [UPC-CoA-203/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/8fc51ee8-5798-4b4c-b475-492388116111.pdf) ***Access to file*** **Facts** Stadapharm requested access to the written pleadings and evidence in the appeal case between Viatris and Merz (UP-CoA-917/2025). **The JR** The Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) gives Viatris and Merz until 19 November 2026 to respond. **Comment** 1. I cannot tell from the publication whether the request is “reasoned”, although this requirement has no real meaning once the case has ended. 2. As mentioned previously, I suggest that the Rules are changed in such a way that after the case has been terminated in first instance, access to the redacted pleadings and evidence is automatic, and that the same applies after the appeal proceedings. #### **9 November 2026** **Local Division Milan, Ericsson v ASUS** [UPC\_CFI\_319/2024; UPC\_CFI\_728/2024](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/32d531a9-a503-4e18-b439-6927b421041a.pdf) ***Added matter*** **Facts** 1. Ericsson sued ASUS c.s. for infringement of European patent EP 3 076 673 for “Decoding and encoding of pictures of a video sequence”. 2. The patent was a Standard Essential Patent for the HEVC/H.265 standard. 3. The case started in June 2024. **The Court** 1. The Court describes the different procedural steps from the start of the proceedings in 2024 to the decision. 2. The Court describes the patent and explains the technology concerned (video encoding and decoding). 3. The parties agree on the meaning of claim 1. 4. The parties disagree about whether the HEVC Draft forms part of the prior art. The Court states that the terms of reference of the JCT-VC make clear that the Draft was publicly available and that the Draft is also cited as prior art in Ericsson’s own patent application. 5. The Court defines the skilled person, holding that this is not very important, as its decision is not based on an assessment of inventive step. 6. The Court cites the Court of Appeal with respect to what constitutes added matter (UPC-CoA-764/2024). With respect to the parties’ dispute as to whether the addition of “other than the highest layer” to “belonging to a layer” is an allowable limitation or an “undisclosed disclaimer”, the Court rules that it is an undisclosed disclaimer. 7. After that consideration, the Court comes to the conclusion that there is added subject matter and that all claims are invalid. 8. The Court nevertheless also discusses the novelty objections. 9. As the priority document did not disclose “said current picture belonging to a layer other than the highest layer”, the patent cannot invoke priority. As the invention was published during the priority year, the patent lacks novelty. 10. The auxiliary request removed the limitation and replaced it with “such method being performed on pictures in multiple layers of a multilayer video sequence comprising multiple layers of pictures”. 11. The Court considers this request to lack clarity, which is also evidenced by the parties’ different claim interpretation of the auxiliary request. 12. The Court revoked the patent and dismissed the infringement claim. **Comment** 1. What is the difference between an undisclosed disclaimer and a limitation of the claim? I was surprised that the Court came to the conclusion that there was added matter. It would go too far to discuss the whole reasoning of the Court and I limit myself to the following remark. As I understand the history of the limitation, it was included because the original claim, which also included the top layer, was too broad, as the method with respect to the top layer was not inventive. Ericsson apparently argued that the application also contained a different inventive idea that was applicable to all layers except the top layer. For me, the question is whether or not the skilled person did read this also in the priority document (as, without priority, even Ericsson seems to accept that it loses). 2. I conclude from the above that stating that the definition of the skilled person is not relevant for deciding whether or not there is added matter does not seem correct and that I have question marks about the decision as a whole. We will see on appeal? 3. In general, a SEP owner has more patents reading on the standard. I would always go for the three best ones (assuming you have three “best” ones!). 4. Finally, the case started in 2024. In my opinion, the Court should in general not allow parties to agree to extensions and should not wait for precedent rulings by the Court of Appeal but should make sure that there is a decision within 12 to 14 months. #### **10 November 2026** **Local Division The Hague, CureVac v Moderna** [UPC\_CFI\_1407/2026; UPC\_CFI\_3154/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/489375b9-70d6-4f51-b2bc-508bd9ba0436.pdf) ***Infringement / Revocation*** **Facts** 1. This case concerns infringement proceedings against 13 Moderna companies with respect to EP 4 108 769. 2. The parties agreed on confidentiality. **The JR** 1. The Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) provided its order in conformity with that agreement. 2. Certain information is protected by R. 262A RoP. Other information is only protected by R. 262.2 RoP. **Comment** I assume that the parties have agreed that the information that is protected only under R. 262.2 RoP is kept confidential by the other party (CureVac). If CureVac (and its experts etc.) is not bound to secrecy, the information is not confidential and a member of the public could ask to lift the R. 262.2 RoP confidentiality. #### **10 November 2026** **Court of Appeal, ZTE v Samsung** [UPC-CoA-106/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/59a8818f-d802-432f-abcc-92ac2c67db93.pdf) ***Settlement*** **Facts** 1. The Local Division Mannheim partially revoked ZTE’s patent EP 3 965 790, dismissed the infringement claim and the application to amend the patent and declined jurisdiction with respect to the FRAND counterclaim. 2. ZTE appealed and filed its Statement of Grounds for appeal. The oral hearing was set for 22 April 2027. 3. On 4 November 2026, ZTE filed an application to withdraw and Samsung filed an application to withdraw the counterclaim. **The JR** 1. The Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) granted the requests, and issues no decision on cost as the parties agreed to bear their own costs. 2. The JR orders the reimbursement of 50% of the court fees. **Comment** 1. The parties settled. The result of the withdrawal is that the partial revocation has lost its force and the whole patent is (*ab initio*) restored. 2. A settlement before the closure of written proceedings entitles the parties to a 50% fee reimbursement. #### **10 November 2026** **Local Division Milan, Pirelli v Yuanxing Rubber** [UPC\_CFI\_2297/2026; UPC\_CFI\_2300/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/1cfc0880-63c2-438a-bda7-da2c1d64c01e.pdf) ***Withdrawal of cost proceedings*** **Facts** 1. On 26 June 2026, Pirelli filed an application for costs in relation to the proceedings for provisional measures and the proceedings on the merits. 2. On 28 July 2026, both parties requested a stay of the costs proceedings because they had to finalize a settlement agreement. 3. The Court granted a stay of the cost proceedings until 1 December 2026. 4. On 3 November 2026, Pirelli filed a request to withdraw the costs proceedings. **The JR** The Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) grants the request. **Comment** Apparently, the parties agreed on the costs. That is wise but it would have been wiser to do so before the decision which would make the cost proceedings unnecessary! #### **11 November 2026** **Court of Appeal, Netflix v DivX** [UPC-CoA-176/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/63a64f8a-3b35-4ec1-9631-166b180fb842.pdf) ***Suspensive effect*** **Facts** 1. Netflix was injuncted by the Local Division Munich on 15 September 2026. 2. The Court of Appeal refused to grant suspensive effect on 2 November 2026. 3. Netflix applied again for suspensive effect. **The JR** DivX is invited to comment before 18 November 2026. **Comment** In its decision of 2 November 2026, the Court refused to suspend the enforcement, although the Opposition Division had revoked the patent after the decision of the Local Division, apparently disagreed with the Local Division. I do not know what is in the application but in my opinion a second application seems possible if there are new facts which the Court of Appeal did not consider during the first application. #### **11 November 2026** **Central Division Milan, Light Guide Optics v Biolitec** [UPC\_CFI\_292/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/696153a4-801e-45fc-a143-f8fe657242bb.pdf) ***Revocation action*** 1. The claimant brings a revocation action against EP 4 458 303, concerning a medical device that uses a waveguide to deliver laser energy within a vein affected by venous insufficiency. 2. Biolitec filed 13 auxiliary requests and 10 further requests shortly before the oral hearing. **The Court** 1. The patent is a fourth-generation divisional patent. 2. The patent was granted on 28 January 2026. Opposition is pending. 3. The patent was not filed by the claimant but, as it is the subject matter of the proceedings, the Court can consult it *ex officio*, unlike other pieces of evidence (such as prior art etc.), which must be produced by the party invoking them. 4. The Court discusses the patent, stating that it is not directed to a medical treatment but to a technical apparatus intended to be suitable for medical use. 5. The Court defines the objective problem and the skilled person (a team). 6. The Court interprets the claim and adopts a broader purpose of use (for venous insufficiency) than that advanced by the patentee (for varicose veins). 7. The patentee’s other efforts to convince the Court to adopt a limiting interpretation also generally fail. Biolitec, for instance, argues that “sealed” means gas-tight sealed but the Court does not accept this interpretation, referring to the technical function of the seal. 8. The Court rejects the insufficiency attack, holding that: > *“the patent is not required to reproduce the governing formula or to prescribe every parameter where the skilled person can select and adjust them by routine calculation and a reasonable amount of testing”.* 1. As neither party has produced the patent, the Court deals with the added-matter objection based on the published application. 2. The Court also rejects an added-matter argument on the ground that “venous insufficiencies” is narrower than the original term “blood vessel”. 3. The Court also holds that claim 11 contains added matter, as the document allegedly providing a basis for claim 11 has not been produced by the patentee. 4. The objection that claim 16 protects a medical method is rejected because claim 16 is a device claim. Whether the method steps recited in the claim are limiting the claimed device is not relevant. 5. With respect to the novelty attacks, the Court refuses to consider Exhibit 24, as that exhibit was not originally presented for a novelty attack. However, claim 1 is not novel over D7. 6. The Court agrees with the claimant that, if D7 did not take away the novelty, the patent would also lack inventive step based on D7 and routine measures. 7. The Court held that removing a claim from a claim set is always allowed but amending a claim, including a dependent claim, requires an auxiliary request. In this case, the invoked auxiliary request was filed late. The Court cited the following criterion: > *“Under Rules 49.2 and 50.2 in conjunction with Rule 30.2 RoP, a subsequent request to amend the patent may be admitted only with the permission of the Court. In deciding whether to admit it, the Court must take account of all relevant circumstances, including whether the party seeking the amendment can justify that the amendment could not have been made with reasonable diligence at an earlier stage and that it will not unreasonably hinder the other party in the conduct of the action. The Court of First Instance has a margin of discretion in that assessment, so appellate review is limited”.* 1. The Court then considers the timely filed auxiliary requests, which are not affected by the added-matter problem of claim 11 because claim 11 was deleted. 2. Light Guide Optics did not file a Rejoinder to the Application to amend the patent. 3. In paragraph 215, the Court states: > *“At each stage, the party advancing the objection must set out the corresponding arguments and, where necessary, submit the supporting evidence. A general assertion of invalidity based on a combination of two documents cannot, in the Court’s view, replace the reasoned analysis required at each step of the inquiry.”* 1. The Court concludes that the claimant did not do so. 2. The Court nevertheless addresses the inventive step of the auxiliary request 10 and considers that auxiliary request to be inventive. **Comment** 1. Not filing the patent you want to attack, not filing a Rejoinder with respect to the invalidity of the auxiliary requests and not raising lack of inventive step of the auxiliary request in a substantive way following step by step the road book provided by the Court of Appeal does not earn you the first prize in the representative beauty contest! 2. I find it strange that the Court (or, rather, the Registry, which was checking the formalities) did not ask the claimant to produce the patent. Assessing added matter on the basis of a published application does not seem very satisfactory! 3. This decision is a good lesson for representatives. Also note the difference in the consequences of deleting a claim and amending a claim! #### **11 November 2026** **Central Division Munich, Wittenstein v Vestas** [UPC\_CFI\_3387/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/c8318136-d2df-429e-9a6c-199bf825d203.pdf) ***Cost proceedings*** **Facts** 1. The value of the proceedings in respect of which both parties initiated cost proceedings was EUR 500,000, resulting in a ceiling of EUR 56,000 for recoverable representation costs. 2. The parties had agreed not to dispute each other’s representation costs up to that ceiling. 3. The Court had decided that the claimant had to pay 90% of the defendant’s costs and the defendant 10% of the claimant’s costs. 4. The claimant had requested EUR 5,600 and EUR 2,000 for 10% of the court fees. 5. The defendant had requested EUR 212,573.24 in legal costs and, in the alternative, EUR 56,073.00, claiming that these costs were reasonable and proportionate. **The JR** 1. The Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) grants the costs requested by the claimant. 2. With respect to defendant: 1. The defendant did not request an increase in the ceiling for recoverable costs during the proceedings. Such a request must be made as soon as possible during the proceedings. Any such request made now is too late. 2. This means that the defendant is entitled to 90% of EUR 56,000.00. The costs of a taxi ride are included in the representation costs. The costs of obtaining a copy of an essay (EUR 57.50) are other costs and the defendant is entitled to 90% of them. **Comment** 1. A lesson for representatives. If you think that your representation costs will (largely) exceed the ceiling defined by the value of the litigation and you think that this is reasonable and proportionate because of exceptional circumstances, then you have to ask to raise the ceiling as soon as possible during the proceedings. 2. I do not agree with the JR that reasonable travel costs are representation costs. However, I agree that their taxi costs should not be reimbursed. The representative could have walked through beautiful Munich! #### **11 November 2026** **Local Division Hamburg, Evonik v Air Products** [UPC\_CFI\_2889/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/f27b9d48-4549-438b-b5e5-424d21c73133.pdf) ***Preliminary Objection*** **Facts** 1. Evonik brought an infringement action against three defendants: > *Defendant 1: a US company* > > *Defendant 2: a French company* > > *Defendant 3: a German company.* 1. As an example of infringement, the claimant cited a membrane gas separation plant in France. 2. All three defendants filed preliminary objections challenging the competence of the Hamburg Division. **The JR** 1. The Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) cites Art. 33(1)(a) and (b) UPCA. 2. The claimant alleged that defendants 1 and 3 had sold and built a plant in Germany, which means that the Local Division Hamburg is competent. 3. With respect to Defendant 2 (the French company), no acts in Germany were alleged. 4. Competence in respect of Defendant 2 can only be based on Art. 33(1)(b) UPCA. Defendant 3 is located in Germany, so the question is whether there is a commercial relationship between Defendants 2 and 3. The JR states that Defendants 1 and 3 belong to the same group and that there is clearly a link between Defendants 1 and 2. This is sufficient to establish a commercial relationship, emphasizing the need to avoid conflicting decisions. **Comment** 1. This is clearly a move by the claimant to have the case heard in a Local Division in Germany. The US company acts throughout Europe, offering gas separation plants. The claimant states that an example of such a plant had been built in France by a French independent company acting only in France. So, this is a case which should have been brought before Paris Local Division, with the French company as the anchor defendant for the US company. The plant is in France, the evidence is in France and an inspection can take place in France etc. If the claimant seriously also wanted to attack the activities of the German subsidiary, it could easily have obtained an injunction against the US parent also covering the activities of the German subsidiary, which, by the way, did not build plants. 2. The Hamburg Local Division comes up with a complicated line of reasoning as to why it also has competence in respect of the French company, which does not have any activities in Germany and is not a German company. 3. In my opinion, the Local Division should have ruled that it lacked competence with respect to the French company. #### **11 November 2026** **Local Division Munich, BSH v Arçelik** [UPC\_CFI\_770/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/02dc8928-a06e-44bb-b533-ef9953c82b78.pdf) ***Infringement / Revocation*** **Facts** 1. This was an infringement case concerning a “Dampfgargerät” (for non-German speaking readers, a steam-cooking appliance, or more simply, a steam cooker) protected by EP 3 673 210, which was granted in German and therefore prevented the defendants from requesting a change of language. 2. During the interim conference, both parties withdrew their objections to the late-filed submissions. **The Court** 1. The Court discusses the patent in light of the prior art and states the technical problem and its solution. 2. The Court interprets the claim elements in dispute after establishing the skilled person, in accordance with the parties’ submissions: a mechanical engineer with several years of experience in the development and construction of steam cookers. 3. The result of the claim interpretation is that the defendants’ arguments in favor of a narrower interpretation are rejected. 4. The Court dismisses the Counterclaim for revocation. 5. With respect to the “extension of subject matter” the Court rejects the intermediate generalization attack. The word “insbesondere” (“especially”) is used as an example and does not limit the meaning to that example. 6. The patent does not suffer from insufficient disclosure. 7. The Court considers the patent novel over each of the ten cited prior art publications, setting out the content of each publication and then discussing the consequences for the novelty attack. 8. The Court rejects the inventive-step attack based on various combinations of prior art documents because of the lack of a pointer. 9. The Court, not surprisingly in light of its claim interpretation, concludes that there is infringement. 10. As to damages, I translate the “Leitsätze” below (the defendants were the Turkish manufacturers, Beko Germany and Beko France). > *“1. Anyone who consciously participates in the division-of-labor implementation of a joint distribution venture—one that encompasses multiple nation-states as target markets—is not merely responsible for the specific actions they performed pursuant to an organizational assignment; rather, the planned contributions of the other participants also serve to realize the joint venture and are likewise attributable to the individual. Consequently, internal task allocation does not limit external liability. Instead, the scope of attribution is determined by the actual cooperation that takes place based on the shared plan of action.* > > *2. By virtue of their status as co-perpetrators, each defendant is—in principle and in relation to third parties—liable to compensate for the total damage caused by all participants; however, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the damages only once (a concept known as joint and several liability).”* **Comment** 1. This seemed to me an uphill battle for the defendants. If you need ten prior art publications to attack novelty, then, in general, you do not have the best of cases! The same is true for the numerous inventive-step attacks. As almost always, the decisive point is the pointer (incentive, “Anlass”) to combine. It is of no use to argue a lack of inventive step based only on the combination of two documents. That is clearly an approach tainted by hindsight. 2. The reasoning with respect to holding all defendants fully responsible for all damages on the basis of holding them as joint tortfeasors responsible for all infringements goes, in my opinion, (too?) far. 3. It remains unfortunate to publish “headings” only in a language that only a limited number of users, representatives and even judges master. The UPC is an international system! #### **11 November 2026** **Local Division Munich, Epsilon v Pišek** [UPC\_CFI\_571/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/6ebe2798-16c4-4b74-8f71-b27acbfd48f6.pdf) ***Infringement / Revocation*** **Facts** 1. This was an infringement action concerning EP 2 947 037, relating to a crane. 2. The defendant invoked one prior art publication to attack novelty and 12 combinations of prior art documents to attack inventive step. It also invoked extension of subject matter and insufficient disclosure as invalidity attacks. **The Court** 1. The Court describes the patent, the problem of potential damage to the hose lines connecting the crane column to the first crane arm and the solution. 2. The Court defines the skilled person as a mechanical engineer with several years of experience in the development and construction of cranes. 3. The Court interprets the claim and does not follow the defendant’s limiting interpretation. 4. There is no extension of subject matter. The Court specifically refers to the drawings, which also define the content of the application. 5. In arguing insufficient disclosure, the defendant in fact invokes a lack of clarity, which is not a ground for revocation. 6. The patent is novel and inventive. 7. With respect to all combinations proposed by the defendant, there is no pointer, or incentive, to combine. 8. The defendant’s crane infringes. Following the interpretation of claim element 4, there is literal infringement. 9. Apparently, the defendant had requested that an expert be heard as one of the measures to be ordered by the JR during the interim conference. However, the parties had agreed not to hold an interim conference, so the Court considered the request obsolete. **Comment** 1. Also in this case, just as in the other mechanical case of the Local Division Munich reported this week (BSH v Arçelik, UPC\_CFI\_770/2026), infringement and validity seem rather straightforward and you wonder why the defendants put up a fight and do not seek a settlement (although we do not know whether they tried but did not succeed). 2. Both cases show that the busy Munich Local Division tries to be as efficient as possible, convincing the parties to skip the interim conference and to withdraw objections concerning late-filed documents. That is all fully understandable but both cases could have been heard by a far less busy Division and that would, in my opinion, be the preferred way to deal with such cases. In order to give the Munich Local Division more time and the judges a normal working schedule, I would advise the subregistry to advise claimants in such cases to start the case in a less busy Division. Claimants cannot expect to get a decision in a year if they file in notoriously busy Divisions and, if the UPC is to remain a success, parties should realize that not choosing a less busy Division may in the end make the UPC less successful or worse. **– All comments above are** [**Prof. Hoyng**](https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/our-team/legal-experts/prof-willem-hoyng "https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/our-team/legal-experts/prof-willem-hoyng")**‘s personal opinions –**