# News Detail Share now [](https://www.linkedin.com/uas/login?session_redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.linkedin.com%2FshareArticle%3Fmini%3Dtrue%26url%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.hoyngrokhmonegier.com%2Fnews-insights%2Fdetail%2Fupc-unfiltered-by-willem-hoyng-upc-decisions-week-34-2026%26title%3DUPC%20Unfiltered%2C%20by%20Willem%20Hoyng%20%E2%80%93%20UPC%20decisions%20week%2034%2C%202026%26summary%3D "Linkedin") # UPC Unfiltered, by Willem Hoyng – UPC decisions week 34, 2026 24 August 2026 UPC Unfiltered News Hot Topic News Below, [Prof. Willem Hoyng](https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/our-team/legal-experts/prof-willem-hoyng) provides his unfiltered views on the decisions that were published on the website of the Unified Patent Court (“UPC”) last week. His comments offer a unique insight into the UPC’s case law, as he chairs the Advisory Board of the UPC and participated in drafting the Rules of Procedure of the UPC. Interested in more of this? Stay tuned and subscribe [**here**](https://mailchi.mp/8fbd8890d03b/upc-unfiltered-by-willem-hoyng) for weekly updates. Find all decisions, commentary and more on our [**UPC Intelligence Platform**](https://upcintelligence.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/). On the go, multi-tasking or just prefer to listen? “Willem Hoyng’s UPC Unfiltered AI Podcast” – your weekly, AI-generated podcast discussing Willem Hoyng’s commentary on UPC case law of last week, offers a convenient alternative. Listen on [**Spotify**](https://open.spotify.com/show/53wwzF7LNSqqouR0wzXgJD?si=ae84739b09904ee1&nd=1&dlsi=71b6a174bdbd4f32) or [**Apple Podcasts**](https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/willem-hoyngs-upc-unfiltered-ai-podcast/id1806092389). #### **23 July 2026 (late published)** **Central Division Paris, ALD v Nanoval** [UPC\_CFI\_999/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/90aac2d7-9366-4ce3-aa9c-a6ee50248d92.pdf) *Revocation* **Facts** 1\. In October 2025, the claimant files revocation proceedings with respect to EP 3 083 107. 2\. The claimant is a subsidiary whose parent company was sued for infringement in Munich. In those proceedings, they also filed a counterclaim for revocation. 3\. The parties settled both proceedings. 4\. The claimant requested a refund of 60% or, subsidiarily, 50% of the fees. **The Court** Accepted the withdrawal and awarded a 50% refund of the fees. **Comment** 1\. I like the claimant’s application, who de facto argued that the Court of Appeal was wrong to hold that the new fee structure applies on all requests for a refund of fees submitted after 1 January 2026. I agree with the claimant! However, the Court of Appeal has decided otherwise (which is better for the finances of the Court). So Don Quichotte should give up! 2\. The UPCA (a political compromise between bifurcation and non-bifurcation) has led to the possibility of fighting the revocation of the same patent in two Divisions. The idea of the bifurcation fans at the UPCA negotiating tables was that the infringement court would refer the revocation case to the Central Division, thereby saving the bifurcation system. However, judges are more practical than politicians, and in practice that is not happening. As the Central Division cannot refer the revocation to the Local Division, we see now “smart” parties filing for revocation in both Divisions. That causes unnecessary double work for the Court. What is the solution?? Do we need a Central Division? #### **14 August 2026 (late published)** **Local Division Brussels, Labs v Aesthetics** UPC\_CFI\_1357/2025 ; UPC\_CFI\_629/2025 *Further written proceedings* **Facts** 1\. Defendants (Aesthetics) filed an objection against the content of claimant’s rejoinder to the reply to defence to counterclaim stating that that rejoinder did bring new arguments which were not in response to the reply and asked the Court to order Labs to file a version without these arguments. 2\. Labs stated that it had done nothing wrong but alternatively asked to allow the arguments as if they were the result of a R. 36 RoP request and it filed also a R. 36 RoP request. The JR 1\. A R. 36 RoP request for a further submission should be filed in a separate substantiated application. There is only one other road to additional submissions and that is if the JR orders so during the interim conference. 2\. The JR decided that most new arguments were not allowed and with respect to what was allowed defendant got 16 days to react. 3\. The JR came to his decision after studying all the submissions in great detail and in fact implicitly indicating that a request for revision will not be appreciated by the other judges as they will also have to do all the time consuming analysis! **Comment** 1\. We see in this case (which we see more regularly) totally undisciplined parties who do not care about the clear Rules which results in substantial work for the JR. Quite frankly I admire the JR but in his place I would have been far less indulgent. The Rules are very clear (R. 29(c) and (e) RoP, R 31.3 RoP). In my opinion if it is clear that a party ignores these Rules the Court should rule the whole submission inadmissible. That may be the only way to get these Rules respected. There is no Rule change necessary because the Rules are very clear what a submission may not contain. 2\. If there is a genuine necessity (in extra ordinary circumstances) a party can lodge an R. 36 RoP request or suggest to the JR during the interim conference to order further written submissions. #### **17 August 2026** **Court of Appeal, Network v Qualcomm** [UPC\_CoA\_69/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/a7a28969-195d-4f8d-976f-c85896e57b64.pdf); [UPC\_CoA\_71/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/5e0a8230-f3af-4d67-bb1d-ff8f61da25e3.pdf); [UPC\_CoA\_72/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/7279c51c-db22-4101-afaa-45061809c4af.pdf) *Appeal of a R. 190 RoP Order* **Facts** 1\. On 4 March 2024, NST started infringement proceedings against Qualcomm with respect to three patents. 2\. On 4 February 2025, with its Statement of Reply, NST lodged a request for an order to produce evidence (R. 190 RoP). 3\. The Munich Local Division rejected the infringement claim with respect to all three patents, revoked EP 1 552 669, and dismissed the counterclaims for revocation with respect to EP 1 552 399 and EP 1 875 683. It also refused the R. 190 RoP application. 4\. NST appealed, among other things, the decision on the R. 190 RoP request and filed another request with the Court of Appeal. **The Court of Appeal** 1\. The Court decides that the appeal against the rejection of the R. 190 RoP request should have been filed within the applicable 15 days from its service, according to R. 220.1(c) RoP. 2\. The time limit for lodging an appeal is mandatory and cannot be extended (see R. 9.4 RoP). 3\. The completion of the validation process by the Registry is irrelevant. It is ultimately for the Court to decide if the formalities are fulfilled. 4\. The error is not excusable. The situation is different from the extraordinary circumstances in AIM v Supponer. In this case, the Munich Division did not indicate a wrong appeal period. **Comment** 1\. A logical, well-reasoned decision of the Court of Appeal, and indeed R. 220 RoP is crystal clear. It shows how diligent and careful a representative has to be and that a representative should follow and know the case law. If the representative had done so, they should have known AIM v Supponer and the warning it contains. As said before, just read or listen every week to the Unfiltered, and even if that is too time consuming, read at least the Court of Appeal summaries. 2\. The lesson for representatives: a. An order is an order, even when it is called a decision or when it is contained in a decision. b. An order can be issued by the Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) or by the Court (or by the Presiding Judge); that makes no difference, it remains an order. c. So (especially if the JR refers a decision on a request to the final decision) one has to be careful when reading such decision to check wether it also contains a decision with respect to requests for an order and, if so, make sure to determine what kind of order it is. If it is an order referred to in R. 220(1) sub c RoP (such as a R. 190 RoP order), you have to appeal within 15 days from service of the decision (containing the order). If it is a different order (R. 220.2 RoP), you can appeal against that order together with the appeal against the decision (but make sure that it is clear that you also appealing against that order). d. No request for a re-establishment was made, but the Court of Appeal notes that the requirement of “all due care” does not appear to have been met. e. An application refiled on appeal requesting the production of substantially the same evidence is inadmissible. f. Nor can you remedy on appeal an inadequate request for the production of (in essence) the same evidence. \_\_ #### **17 August 2026** **Court of Appeal, AorticLab v Emboline** [UPC\_CoA\_40/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/21a1c0ac-b6a3-4aca-9477-d51e4f5d7afa.pdf); [UPC\_CoA\_123/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/17528b11-0244-4c8f-a1b2-4fbefcb4660f.pdf) *Conditional revocation* **Facts** This case concerns a request for review of the order of the JR of the Court of Appeal of 10 July 2026, in which the JR laid down rules with respect to the possibility of filing a conditional counterclaim for revocation (or making such a counterclaim conditional during the ongoing proceedings) and what has to be done by the defendant if it wins the infringement case at the first instance (and therefore the condition in the revocation case is not fulfilled) and the claimant in the infringement case may file an appeal. **The Court of Appeal** 1\. Rejected the request for review. 2\. The Court of Appeal held: a. A counterclaim for revocation conditional upon finding of infringement is possible. This follows also from the fact that the subject matter of a claim for revocation is defined by the party bringing it. b. Making a claim conditional is a limitation which should be allowed. R. 263.3 RoP is applicable (at least by analogy). It is not a withdrawal in the sense of R. 265 RoP. c. Making the counterclaim conditional upon a finding of infringement by the Court means that this conditional counterclaim remains pending during the appeal period (“Court” meaning both the CFI and the CoA). d. As the infringement and revocation case are different cases, this means that if the claimant appeals against the decision in the infringement case, the counterclaimant may appeal against the decision of the Court of First Instance not to decide on the counterclaim. The counterclaimant may lodge an appeal under the condition that the claimant appeals. If the condition is fulfilled, the regular appeal fee has to be paid. e. The JR’s decision that the Court of Appeal as a rule will deal with the counterclaim for revocation itself if it considers the appeal in the infringement case successful is confirmed. **Comment** 1\. The practical instructions given by the JR are confirmed by the Court of Appeal. 2\. Representatives now know what to do: a. make the claim conditional upon a finding by the Court that there is infringement (use “Court”, not “Court of First Instance” or “Division”); b. if you win the infringement case: file a conditional appeal in the revocation case and, only if the claimant appeals, pay the fees. 3\. The decision on costs in this case is subject of the appeal in the main case. I have already expressed that, in my opinion, contrary to what the Munich Division decided, the costs of the conditional counterclaim (which is clearly a defence against the infringement claim) should be borne by the defendant in the counterclaim (the claimant in the infringement case). #### **17 August 2026** **Local Division Düsseldorf, Yangtze v Micron** [UPC\_CFI\_1034/2025; UPC\_CFI\_931/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/564f4bf0-0168-490b-a6f5-cd2b02c3457b.pdf) *Confidentiality* **Facts** 1\. Infringement case based on EP 3 909 047. 2\. On 20 July, the defendants submitted their pleadings and, at the same time, filed an application for the protection of confidential information. 3\. The defendants classified certain confidential information (the first category) as highly confidential, to be used only in these proceedings and to be accessible only to 4 named persons of claimant. The claimant did not object. This was granted by the Court. 4\. The second category is also highly confidential, but defendants requested an “attorneys’ eyes only” regime for this (technical) information or, alternatively, that access be given to only the Patent Dispute Manager of the claimant, subject to the restriction that he will not work on the development of the SDRAM product. **The Court** 1\. Refuses the “attorneys’ eyes only” regime, even if such regime would be necessary to comply with US export restrictions. 2\. The Court imposed confidentiality with a different confidentiality club. 3\. Allowed the defendant to withdraw certain confidential information in order to avoid violating US export restrictions. **Comment** 1\. The Court’s decision is understandable because the (unfortunate) rule is that an “attorneys’ eyes only” regime is not possible unless the other party agrees. 2\. Assuming that the defendants’ submissions are correct, this means that the defendants will have to withdraw certain evidence in order to avoid violating US export restrictions. 3\. Assuming that this evidence would be the “killer” evidence, it is rather unsatisfactory that a defendant cannot bring such evidence (all assuming that no exception can be obtained under the US rules). I wonder if, in such a situation, the other party (who would/should be able to use independent experts as part of its litigation team) has sufficient legitimate interest in refusing to agree to an “attorneys’ eyes only” regime and whether this could not be qualified as obstruction of justice. If, indeed, under such extraordinary circumstances, a party refuses to agree, I can imagine that a Court would allow an “attorneys’ eyes only” regime. #### **17 August 2026** **Local Division Düsseldorf, Boa v FLA Europe** [UPC\_CFI\_996/2025; UPC\_CFI\_737/2026; UPC\_CFI\_742/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/a2f90bb2-3881-4807-a267-c520cb0410bc.pdf) *Further auxiliary requests* **Facts** 1\. The claimants filed an application in the rejoinder to the reply to the defence to the counterclaim, asking permission to file further auxiliary requests. 2\. The claimants state that they want to file the further auxiliary requests because of new arguments raised by the defendant in its reply or, alternatively, request that these new arguments not be allowed. **The JR** 1\. Does not make a decision and provisionally allows the auxiliary requests. 2\. Grants the defendant extra time for its rejoinder with respect to the request to amend the patent. 3\. Also invites both parties to comment on the request in the light of Fujifilm v Kodak of 13 July 2026. **Comment** 1\. The JR is appointed for case management. In my opinion, this is not the desired way to manage a case. The idea is that parties know what is relevant during the oral hearing. The JR should not postpone decisions but, if at all possible, make the decision. Here, this was simple. The defendant did not say anything about the alternative request. The JR should have granted that request, as it would have made the further auxiliary requests unnecessary. 2\. If being the foreign judge on the panel makes you a bit hesitant about making such a decision without having the approval of the other judges (he should not be!), he can always informally call, for instance, the presiding judge to obtain her opinion. 3\. The complication here is apparently also that the further auxiliary requests were, in fact, not auxiliary requests but involved invoking a granted dependent claim. R. 30(2) RoP is then, in fact, not applicable; instead, this would fall under R. 263.2 RoP (and not, as the JR writes in no. 4, R. 262.2 RoP). If the claimant had not invoked that dependent claim in its Statement of Claim, then, at this late stage, the criteria for allowing an amendment of the claim or a further auxiliary request would be very similar, and the outcome should have been the same. #### **17 August 2026** **Court of Appeal, Knaus Tabbert v Härtwich** [UPC\_CoA\_365/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/51ee2198-3fb9-45d1-a8aa-eea3d6a22640.pdf); [UPC\_CoA\_367/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/3d16c022-37df-4dd5-a3ad-0ec8e52f2cb3.pdf) *Infringement prior to the UPC* **Facts** 1\. Härtwich is suing Knaus Tabbert for infringement of patent EP 3 356109. 2\. Before the patent application was filed, the inventors and Knaus Tabbert signed a development agreement, and the inventors built three test models for Knaus Tabbert. 3\. Knaus Tabbert sold caravans based on the models provided by the inventors without having obtained usage rights. 4\. Härtwich alleges that these caravans infringe the patent. Knaus Tabbert filed a counterclaim for revocation. 5\. The LD Düsseldorf found infringement and dismissed the counterclaim. 6\. Knaus Tabbert appealed both decisions. 7\. After the oral hearing on appeal, the parties tried to settle but failed. 8\. Knaus Tabbert requests, in the event that the Court of Appeal does not dismiss the infringement claim, a referral to the Court of Justice with series of questions concerning the Vienna Convention, the Rome II Regulation and the Enforcement Directive. **The Court of Appeal** 1\. The appeal against the decision on the counterclaim is dismissed. 2\. The Court of Appeal discusses the patent and the problem for which the invention provides a solution (“to provide a lightweight, yet stable and heat insulating structural component for the frame of a vehicle as well as the frame itself”). 3\. The Court defines the skilled person and interprets the claim, holding that “The description constitutes its own lexicon with regard to the terms mentioned in the patent claim”, and basically rejects all Knaus Tabbert’s arguments. 4\. The Court rejects Knaus Tabbert’s arguments on “insufficient disclosure” and “no novelty”, endorsing the view of the Court of First Instance. 5\. The Court also rejects the public prior use arguments of KnausTabbert, holding: “185. The prior art comprises everything that, before the filing date of the European patent application, has been made available to the public by written or oral description, by use, or in any other way (Article 54(2) EPC). Use is any use which, by its nature, is capable of enabling third parties to recognize the technical teaching. This includes acts of use, which may consist of manufacturing, offering, placing on the market, or using a product, or of offering or placing on the market a process or its use, or of applying the process.” and “218. A general term (here: mechanically stressed structural component) does not readily disclose all specific terms falling under it but not explicitly mentioned. Even if explicit mention is not required, the disclosure content of a prior publication can only include what a person skilled in the art would readily recognize upon careful reading and take for granted.” 6\. With respect to inventive step, the Court remarks: “219. Knaus Tabbert has not claimed that features 1 and 5 are obvious. The defendant, who is bringing a counterclaim for invalidity, must provide substantiated reasons why an inventive step should be denied. It must be substantiated why a particular prior art document is of interest to a person skilled in the art as a starting point for solving the problem according to the invention and, if applicable, why this prior art document is combined with other prior art documents. For each feature, it must be substantiated why it is obvious to a person skilled in the art in the respective prior art document. Knaus Tabbert has failed to do so with regard to features 1 and 5. 7\. The Court of Appeal also rejects the appeal against the infringement decision. 8\. The UPC has jurisdiction with respect to infringements that started before the entry into force of the UPCA. That has nothing to do with retroactive effect. With respect to substantive law, national law applies to infringements committed before the entry into force of the UPCA, while the UPCA applies to infringements committed after its entry into force. 9\. Accordingly, with respect to damages and the right to information with respect to acts of infringement committed before the entry into force of the UPCA, national law applies. The same is true with respect to the use of a patent application before the entry into force of the UPCA. 10\. If an appellant disagrees with a finding of the Court of First Instance, it has to indicate which finding (or part thereof) is challenged, give reasons why it is wrong, and identify the facts and evidence on which its challenge is based. 11\. The Court explains why the patent is infringed (no. 271 - 288). 12\. There is in Germany no entitlement based on prior private use, as the three invoked models did not have features 1 and 5 of the claim. 13\. The defendant also cannot rely on a license agreement. 14\. The burden of proving national law lies with the party relying on that national law. 15\. As national law should be in conformity with Art. 13(1) of the Enforcement Directive, it is presumed to be the same as under the UPCA (Art. 68(1)). The same is true with respect to the right of information (Art. 8 of the Directive). 16\. There is no reason to refer questions to the Court of Justice. All the suggested questions are either irrelevant or are acte éclair or eclairé. 17\. The appeals are dismissed. Klaus Tabbert bears the costs. **Comment** 1\. In my opinion, a convincing decision (as was the decision at first instance). The Court of Appeal gives the appellant value for its money with a very detailed treatment of the invalidity and non-infringement arguments. 2\. On the other hand, it summarily dismisses all the far-fetched arguments for a referral to the EU Court of Justice. 3\. It is a bit of a pity that the decision and the headnote are in German. However, the most important points are reflected above, including what you have to do in your appeal brief if you disagree with a finding of the Court of First Instance (see hereabove under 10). #### **17 August 2026** **Local Division Brussels, Barco v Yealink** [UPC\_CFI\_806/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/7a4865cc-bd57-4107-80ad-5bc258259764.pdf); [UPC\_CFI\_185/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/a1d62f7f-63a0-44f3-bd9c-e8e6ec6d509a.pdf) *Amendment of claim / case* **Facts** 1\. Barco starts infringement proceedings invoking claims 1, 6, 11, 12 and 13 of EP 3 732 827. 2\. After the written proceedings (on 4 August 2026) and before the interim conference of 6 September 2026, Barco applied for leave to change its claim or amend its case (R. 263 RoP) in view of the outcome of Opposition Proceedings. 3\. During the hearing of the Opposition Proceedings (on 18 June 2026), Barco filed a new auxiliary request that was not on file in either the Opposition Proceedings or the UPC proceedings. The Opposition Division allowed the request, found no formal objections and decided to deal with inventive step on 5 November 2026, two days after the hearing scheduled in the UPC proceedings. 4\. Yealink had already asserted in its last submission that the auxiliary request (now pending in the opposition proceedings) was not on file in the UPC proceedings and, moreover, contained the subject matter of claims 8 and 9, which had not been invoked in the UPC proceedings and were not subject of the revocation proceedings. **The Court** Dismissed the request of Barco because the conditions of R. 30(2) RoP and R. 263(3) RoP were not fulfilled. **Comment** 1\. A logical decision, as it is clear that this amendment will unreasonably hinder the defence, apart from the Court’s argument that the auxiliary request is not a response to the counterclaim for revocation (which did not address claims 8 and 9) and the fact that the auxiliary request could have been filed far earlier. 2\. As the Court also notes, there seems to have been no coordination between the patent attorneys dealing with the opposition and the representatives in the UPC proceedings. 3\. Moreover, the opposition was filed before the litigation started. You would think that patent attorneys handling the opposition and the representatives would have had many discussions about possible auxiliary requests. It is quite amazing that the final auxiliary request was only formulated on the day of the opposition hearing (and its introduction was allowed!). 4\. The question now is: what should Barco do? Withdrawing and starting anew after success in the opposition is not attractive. Moreover, that seems also impossible if the defendants do not agree. So the best course of action seems to be to win the case in the UPC, appeal the decision of the Opposition Division, and convince the Board of Appeal that the patent is valid as originally granted or at least with a combination of claims as alleged in the Statement of Claim and found valid by the UPC. A bit of a Houdini act, but Houdini could do it, so nothing is impossible. 5\. The lesson for parties: make sure that there is coordination (and not competition!) between patent attorneys handling the opposition and the litigators enforcing your patent. #### **18 August 2026** **Court of Appeal, Lepu v Occlutech** [UPC\_CoA\_87/2026](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/4a17eb69-6384-4843-b93e-623adc22f144.pdf) *Forfeiture of penalties* **Facts** 1\. Lepu lost PI proceedings and was ordered to cease and desist from offering, placing on the market or using, or importing or storing for those purposes, within the territories of Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Ireland, a medical implantable occlusion device as specified in the order, on forfeiture of a penalty of up to € 250,000 for each individual case of non-compliance. 2\. Occlutech applied for the forfeiture of penalties. 3\. The Hamburg Division ordered a penalty payment of € 58,000 for non-compliance and a recurring penalty of € 1,500 per day for further non-compliance. 4\. Lepu appealed the order. The Court of Appeal rejected the request for suspensive effect. **The Court of Appeal** 1\. The fact that Ireland is included in the PI order is irrelevant. Ireland was included in the request for injunction, and Lepu did not contest jurisdiction. 2\. The Court of Appeal repeats the system and principles it established in Kodak v Fujifilm (UPC\_CoA\_699/2025). 3\. The LD was right to hold that if the defendant uses a third party to comply with the order, the defendant remains responsible for compliance with the order. 4\. It is not sufficient to make it impossible to buy the infringing products for certain countries from a platform, because offering and placing on the market are different infringing activities. 5\. Lepu’s excuses (administrative oversight, minor fault, no risk of repetition) did not mean that Lepu was prevented from compliance. 6\. The fact that no infringing products were sold is irrelevant, as the offering itself is a clear violation of the order. 7\. Penalties have not only a coercive function but are also a punishment. 8\. A disclaimer as such is not sufficient if the text of the website can still be regarded as an offer. In this case, it was clear that potential buyers in Germany were intended to be reached, and there was an active invitation to contact Lepu in Germany. 9\. The appeal is dismissed. **Comment** 1\. Why did Lepu appeal? On the basis of the facts, I would have been very happy to get away with such a minimal payment. In my opinion, there was no reasonable doubt that Lepu did not comply with the order. 2\. This is a warning for all representatives: a. During the written phase, make sure that you discuss with your client the consequences of what the claimant asks your client to do (or refrain from doing) if your client loses. Is it possible to comply (within the demanded time period)? Is it reasonable? Is it clear? Etc. Make sure to address all of this properly substantiated in your defence. b. After the oral hearing, tell the client to make the necessary preparations to be able to comply with a negative decision and tell it not to rely on third parties but check compliance itself. If it has to change websites, publicity, etc., tell it to ask for your advice to make sure that it will comply. A layperson will basically think that a disclaimer such as “not available in Germany” is sufficient. It is not. c. The Court of Appeal gives also a subtle lesson to the Local Divisions, which should forget their national practices. The Court of Appeal states “the penalty amount and the time periods set for compliance, as provided for in the order of the decision, shall generally be the basis for calculating the amount payable by the defendant”. The Hamburg Local Division ordered Lepu to pay to the Court a penalty of up to € 250.000 for each individual case of infringement. It is clear that that this provides no basis for calculation, and the Division had to go through a complicated process in order to arrive at € 58,000. Why not simply have said € 5.000 for each day the infringement continues, with a maximum of € 250.000? A claimant should also formulate its requests that way. Then the calculation is easy, and the defendant knows exactly what it risks. Of course, if the € 250,000 is forfeited, the claimant can ask for a higher amount per day. The defendant can ask for moderation (as indicated by the Court of Appeal), but that should only be granted in special circumstances. All of this saves time for the Court and reduces uncertainty for the parties. #### **18 August 2026** **Local Division The Hague, KPN v OPPO** [UPC\_CFI\_565/2024; UPC\_ CFI\_2246/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/88191e30-f8d4-41fa-8f99-780d7f527663.pdf) *SEP and confidentiality* **Facts** 1\. KPN is engaged in infringement proceedings against OPPO with respect to SEPs EP 2 337 403 and EP 3 994 587. 2\. OPPO asks the Court to rule that its representatives can now give access to the License Materials, subject to the Confidentiality Regime imposed by the Düsseldorf Local Division, to the following persons: \[names of persons\]. 3\. KPN does not agree with (compared to Düsseldorf) the addition of two further OPPO employees to the confidentiality club. **The JR** 1\. The JR sees no reason to add further persons to the confidentiality club, as there is no substantiated reason why this is necessary. The fact that two employees in the (Düsseldorf) confidentiality club no longer work for OPPO is not such a reason, as three are still working for OPPO and KPN has an interest in ensuring that the confidential information is not disclosed to 7 instead of 5 natural persons. 2\. The JR requests more information about the license bar of 5 year requested for the three (remaining employees), especially if this has also been agreed in Düsseldorf. **Comment** 1\. The same parties are also litigating over a SEP in Düsseldorf. It makes a lot of sense to have the same confidentiality regime with respect to the same subject matter, namely the content of the comparable license agreements with respect to these SEPs. In my opinion, it would be even better to have, for these type of cases, a standard confidentiality template to be used throughout the UPC, while of course leaving the Divisions free to deviate from it for special reasons. 2\. I think the JR is right not to accept two more employees into the confidentiality club. The commercial information in such license agreements is very sensitive, and one has to trust that an employee who is a member of the confidentiality club will not leak such information to people within the same company who are negotiating licenses. Personally, in these type of cases, I would prefer an “attorneys’ eyes only” regime in which the attorneys can be supported by independent experts who do not work for a party, but that seems to be impossible in the EU if the parties do not agree with such a regime. #### **18 August 2026** **Local Division The Hague, Dolby v Acer** [UPC\_CFI\_1536/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/0698c28b-83ef-4ccc-9846-505f3e8460a8.pdf) *Review of order of the JR* **Facts** 1\. The Hague Local Division (JR) accepted a rate setting counterclaim against an intervener (Vectis), which intervened on the side of the claimant and is the manager of the pool of SEPs to which the invoked patents belong. 2\. Dobly/Vectis requested a review by the full panel. **The Court (full panel)** The Court denies the request for review and granted leave for appeal. **Comment** 1\. See my comments in week 31 with respect to the order of the JR of 1 May 2026. 2\. It again shows that the review possibility should be removed from the Rules of Procedure, as such requests (almost) never succeed, especially because, if a JR has to decide a somewhat more controversial matter or a new point of procedure, the JR can consult the panel and often will do so. Thus, the review is a waste of the Court’s time and makes the litigation more costly for the parties. #### **18 August 2026** **Local Division Munich, PAPST v Roborock** [UPC\_CFI\_492/2025; UPC\_ CFI\_1309/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/43fb5429-304f-4c55-a0d3-0a5eefd3da52.pdf) *Conditional counterclaim* **Facts** 1\. Infringement proceedings based on EP 3 030 943 with respect to a soil cleaning apparatus. 2\. The defendant files a counterclaim for revocation, which was made conditional during the oral hearing. **The Court** 1\. The fact that proceedings are already pending between the same parties before a German national court with respect to a patent based on the same original application as the patent at issue in this case, is not a related action in the sense of Art. 30(1) Brussels Regulation. 2\. The Court discusses the patent and, after citing the principles of claim construction, adopts a more limited claim construction than that advocated by the claimant, resulting in the conclusion that the patent is not infringed. 3\. The request for an order to produce evidence (in order to obtain the source code), made during the oral hearing, was late, insufficient substantiated and amounted to a fishing expedition. 4\. During the oral hearing, the defendants made their revocation case conditional upon the Court finding infringement. 5\. As the Court concluded that there was no infringement, it did not decide on the revocation claim. 6\. The Cout decides that the defendants have to bear the costs of the revocation proceedings, as these costs were unnecessary. **Comment** 1\. With respect to the narrower claim interpretation, the claimant had stated that it is not justified to limit the claim to the example described in the patent. The Court agrees that a claim should not be read on (and limited to) the example in the description, but that does not mean that, for other (further) reasons, the result of the claim interpretation cannot be a narrower reading of the claim (which may then coincide with the example in the claim). In my opinion, that is correct. 2\. I have more problems with the statement that, if a product falls within the literal wording of the claim but does not have the claimed advantages of the invention, that that cannot lead to a more limited interpretation of the claim. Although all this seems very much dependent on the precise circumstances of the case, I think that the fact that a certain (broad literal) interpretation of the claim leads to a finding of infringement of a product which does not have the advantages claimed by the invention, can be a reason to give the claim a narrower, plausible interpretation in the light of the description and drawings. 3\. The Court deals with the conditional revocation action fully in accordance with the decision of the Court of Appeal of this same week in AorticLab v Emboline. 4\. If you have read my earlier comments, it is clear that I disagree with the decision of the Court that the defendant has to bear the costs of the revocation proceedings because these costs were unnecessary. That is easy to say after the decision, but were they unnecessary before the decision? Of course not! Which representative would advise a client not to file a revocation action because the representative is sure to win the infringement case? In almost all cases, that would be a serious professional mistake! #### **19 August 2026** **Central Division Munich, Shinhoo v Grundfos** [UPC\_CFI\_835/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/5cdb6dc2-2089-4fa0-a013-896b8e6a88a3.pdf) *Revocation* **Facts** 1\. On 3 September 2025, the claimant filed revocation proceedings with respect to EP 2 778 423. 2\. On 24 June 2026, the claimant withdrew its claim and asked for return of 50% of the court fees. 3\. After the Court asked parties to agree on costs, the claimant changed its request and stated that parties had agreed on costs. **The Court** Granted the request. **Comment** After 24 June 2026, the Court suspended the case and asked parties with success to agree on costs, saving the Court time and the parties costs. After that agreement, the R. 263 RoP request could be granted without a costs order. All very practical! #### **19 August 2026** **Central Division Milan, LS9 v Bellissa** [UPC\_ CFI\_860/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/5bec2e04-638f-494b-826a-d6e9b538ec99.pdf) *Decision re revocation* **Facts** 1\. LS9 seeks revocation of EP 2 223589. 2\. The patent is the subject of infringement and revocation proceedings before the LD Mannheim, which had rejected the revocation claim. The appeal in that case is pending. **The Court** 1\. The fact that, at the start of the proceedings, the claimant’s present representative was the managing director of the claimant is not a problem, as in the meantime the representative has retired as managing director and owns only 40% of the shares in the company. 2\. The defendant did not invoke R.19 RoP in time to challenge the competence of the LD based on Art. 33.4 second sentence UPCA. 3\. There is also no reason to find a lack of competence because the case in Mannheim does not concern the same parties. Moreover, it is not the same case, because the content of a case is also determined by the prior art relied upon and the invalidity arguments made, and these are different. 4\. If claimants try to (mis)use the possibility of bringing revocation cases in different Divisions based on different arguments, this can be resolved on the basis of lack of interest. 5\. With respect to Art. 47.6 UPCA, which requires that a party “is concerned” by a patent if it wants to start revocation proceedings, the Court holds that a company is always concerned because a company can potentially infringe the patent (unlike a private person). 6\. The Court discusses the patent and the problem for which the patent gives a solution and interprets certain claim elements. 7\. The Court provides an extensive explanation of all the criteria for claim interpretation and does the same for novelty and inventive step. 8\. The Court concludes that claim 1 is not novel. The defendant does not defend separately the dependent claims. 9\. Auxiliary request 1 is the combination of claims 1 and claim 6. 10\. The auxiliary request is new. 11\. New arguments for the validity of the main claim cannot be raised in the defence to the request for amendment of the patent. 12\. The patent is maintained according to auxiliary request 1. **Comment** 1\. For German speaking students who want to have a complete overview of “what is the same case”, what means “concerned by the patent”, claim interpretation, novelty, and inventive step, the decision is an interesting read. 2\. Personally, I wonder if such extensive lessons in each decision are really necessary. That is more for the Court of Appeal. 3\. However, for (some) representatives, the decision contains important lessons: a. If you only attack claim 1 and not the dependent claims, that means that those claims remain valid. On the other hand, if all claims are attacked but you do not specifically defend the dependent claims (as in this case), then they go down with the main claim. b. Here again, we see the strange defence of a dependent claim in the form of auxiliary request. You should not file an application to amend the patent because you are defending a granted claim 2 (which includes the text of claim 1). c. You cannot raise, without the consent of the Court, new validity arguments with respect to the granted claims in the answer to a request to amend the patent. 4\. The first headnote, which reads in English translation: “The subject-matter of an action for revocation before the Unified Patent Court is determined not only by the grounds for revocation invoked within the meaning of Article 138(1) EPC, but also by the prior-art documents and arguments relied upon in support of the revocation” is a bit cryptic. This finding was made because, in this case, the question arose whether the same revocation case between the parties was already pending on appeal. #### **19 August 2026** **Court of Appeal, Hartmann v Omni-Pac** [UPC\_CFI\_908/2205](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/e1eccfba-b67f-4a3b-9190-66698e8ac3e0.pdf); [UPC\_CFI\_909/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/ad7fda0b-8732-407e-a24a-66c9192bded7.pdf); [UPC\_CFI\_918/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/ad1dd5e8-af24-4ad1-a2c9-87c19ed6f747.pdf) *Infringement / revocation* **Facts** 2\. Hartman sues Omni-Pac for infringement of EP 2 755 901 (“A display and distribution package for eggs”) alleging infringement of claims 1, 5, 6 and 8. 3\. Omni-Pac lodged a counterclaim for revocation. 4\. Hartmann filed 4 auxiliary requests. 5\. The Local Division upheld the patent on the basis of auxiliary request 2. 6\. The infringement action was dismissed. 7\. Hartmann appealed against both decisions. 8\. Omni-Pac appealed against the revocation decision, arguing that the patent should be held (completely) invalid. **The Court of Appeal** 1\. On appeal, a party (as Hartmann does here) may raise new legal arguments based on facts and evidence which were already part of the proceedings at first instance. 2\. The Court of Appeal, exercising its discretion, refuses to admit new evidence (“has low relevance and/or Hartmann could have produced it earlier”). 3\. General references to submissions made at first instance are only sufficient if the Court of First Instance did not address them. 4\. The Court discusses claim 1, the patent description, the background of the invention and the object of the invention. 5\. Referring to Nanostring, the Court construes the claim. 6\. The Court of Appeal states in 54: “Claim features must be interpreted in the light of the claim as a whole (UPC Court of Appeal, 13 May 2024, UPC\_CoA\_1/2024, VusionGroup v Hanshow, para. 29). The fact that a patent specification distinguishes itself from the prior art specifically described therein may be relevant to the interpretation of the patent claim, subject to the condition that the patent specification sets out with sufficient clarity what the distinction relates to and by means of which feature the patent distinguishes itself from that prior art embodiment (see decision of 27 May 2026, UPC\_CoA\_622/2025, Hefei vs Grundfos, para. 53).”. 7\. The Court repeats the principles for establishing inventive step, formulates the problem and identifies the realistic starting point (disagreeing with Hartmann), and agrees with the decision at first instance. 8\. The Court also rejects Omni-Pac’s revocation arguments, with the exception of those concerning claim 6, which the Court of Appeal does not consider inventive in combination with claim 1. However, as auxiliary request 2 is considered inventive, claim 6 in combination with auxiliary request 2 is also inventive. 9\. The Court of Appeal assesses infringement on the basis of auxiliary request 2 and concludes that there is no infringement. **Comment** 1\. The Court of Appeal gives the parties value for their money (with hardly any difference in the outcome), providing very extensive motivation with respect to validity and infringement. 2\. Again, it is clear that it is important for representatives to know the rules on appeal. It is important to discuss in detail each finding of the Court of First Instance with which you do not agree and substantiate why you disagree. That is only not necessary if the Court in First Instance did not deal with one or more of your arguments, but even then I would advise repeating these arguments on appeal and substantiating their relevance to the appeal. 3\. Again, both at first instance (a too late reliance of the doctrine of equivalence) and on appeal (refusal of evidence which could have been filed at first instance), it is important to realize that you are not before the EPO or your national court. The UPC is a front loaded system, and therefore timely preparation and anticipation are important. You have to do the thinking and brainstorming before you start proceedings before the UPC and, as a defendant (assuming you did not see the case coming), from day 1 after receipt of the Statement of Claim. 4\. I am somewhat confused about the costs decision in the revocation action (why did parties not agree?), but as I understand it, the decision at first instance remains the same: 80% for the Omni-Pac companies and 20% for Hartmann. That seems a bit strange because it was based on the fact that the revocation action with respect to claim 6 was unsuccessful, but on appeal this proved to be wrong, so the basis for that costs decision fell away!? In my proposed simplistic system (winner takes all), there is no single winner, so 50% for the claimant and 50% for the defendants, both at first instance and on appeal. Let us stop with the percentage game! #### **19 August 2026** **Local Division Paris, Orange v HMD** UPC\_CFI\_301/2025; UPC\_CFI\_713/2025 *Conditional counterclaim* **Facts** 1\. Orange sues HMD alleging HMD infringes a Standard Essential Patent and does only want to negotiate with us but not with the Via AAC pool through which licenses are granted. 2\. HMD filed a counterclaim for revocation, an exhaustion defence and the FRAND defence. 3\. During the oral hearing the counterclaim was made conditional on a finding of infringement. **The Court** 1\. Discusses the subject matter of the patent which concerns coding and decoding of digital audio signals especially suitable for encoding sounds that alternate between speech and music. 2\. In its claim construction the Court accepts the arguments of HMD proposing a more limited construction. 3\. Orange argues HMD implements the USAC standard which means that it infringes the patent. The Court remarks that the burden of proof rests on Orange and Orange has to prove that HMD’s products embody all the elements of the claim. 4\. HMD disputes that applying the USAC standard automatically means that you have to need the patent. 5\. The Court is not convinced by Orange arguments. 6\. The Court concludes that there is no infringement. The Court is not convinced that the claimed technical effect is achieved in the attacked embodiments. The demonstration given by Orange relies on additional corrective measures which is inconsistent with the teaching of the patent. 7\. The Court accepts (during the second oral argument) that HMD makes its counterclaim conditional. 8\. The Court dismissed the infringement claim and rules to Orange to bear the costs of the proceedings according to the agreement by the parties. Parties have agreed on the amount. **Comment** 1\. The patent reading on the standard does not automatically mean that you are infringing if you comply with the standard! If the standard can be implemented in different ways then may be one of these ways is not infringing. 2\. If the standard does not read at all on the claim then applying the standard means anyway not that there is an infringement on the basis that you comply with the standard. The Court keeps it simple. The patentee has to prove that all the claim elements are fulfilled. 3\. As now is standard case law. At all stages of the proceeding you can make a counterclaim conditional AND the Paris Local Division awards the costs of the procedure to HMD and does not like f.i. LD Munich let HMD pay the costs for the reconvention. Bravo Paris! All these costs also for the counterclaim for revocation have been made for the defence against the infringement and are necessary. #### **21 August 2026** **Local Division Düsseldorf, Dai Nippon v Zapp** [UPC\_CFI\_466/2025; UPC\_CFI\_869/2025](https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/da5502cf-0cc8-4075-b6db-6f9d29a8092c.pdf) *Request for simultaneous translation* **Facts** Dai Nippon requests a simultaneous translation to Japanese during the oral hearing in German. **The Court** There are two questions to be answered: a. Is it reasonable to allow simultaneous translation? b. If so, who has to pay for it? The party itself, or are these litigation costs? Answers: a. Yes. b. These are party’s own costs. **Comment** That is almost always the outcome of such a request. I think it is difficult to think of a reason that simultaneous translation not to be allowed, certainly where the language of the proceedings is a language other than English. It is of course important that hearings take place in rooms with the necessary facilities, and if there are no such facilities (such as a separate space for the interpreters with view of the room, etc.) then the party asking for simultaneous translation will have to take care of that. The Court should not allow so called “whispered” translation. In my experience, it is very annoying to hear the echo of what you say being whispered in another language! #### **21 August 2026** **Court of Appeal, Windhager v bellissa HAAS** UPC\_CoA\_894/2025 *Electronic signature* **Facts** 1\. bellissa sues Windhager for patent infringement. 2\. Windhager files a counterclaim for revocation. 3\. The LD dismissed the revocation case and ruled that Windhager infringed. 4\. Windhager filed an appeal against both decisions but the document was not electronically signed just as a request for suspensive effect. 5\. After the Registry demanded to correct formal mistakes and payment of the appeal fee, Windhager again reacted without electronic signature. 6\. bellissa requested to rule that the appeal is not admissible because it has not been filed within two months because the appeal brief did not have an electronic signature. 7\. Windhager (also after the JR asked if it had done so) did not file a request for restablishment of rights. **The Court of Appeal** Dismissed the appeal because the appeal is not admissible as R. 4.1 RoP which guarantees authenticity of the document has not been fulfilled. **Comment** 1\. A strong warning to all representatives: make sure you file submissions with your electronic signature. 2\. Furthermore always follow up on a suggestion of the Court to do something. 3\. Read your case law as it was already decided that filings without electronic signature are considered not to have taken place. 4\. Do not file minutes before the end of a deadline. It is electronics so it is always possible something does not work! #### **21 August 2026** **Court of Appeal, SharkNinja v SEB** UPC\_CoA\_61/2026 *Infringement / invalidity* **Facts** 1\. SharkNinja sued SEB for infringement of EP 3 689 198 (EP 198) and EP 3 689 201 (EP 201) in PI proceedings in the Local Division in Paris. 2\. After the withdrawal by SharkNinja of EP 201 the Paris Local Division held that it was mor likely than not that EP 198 was invalid for lack of novelty. With respect to claim 4 the LD concludes that SharkNinja had not contested the invalidity. 3\. SharkNinja appealed. **The Court of Appeal** 1\. The Court of Appeal ignored the arguments of SharkNinja which they put forward for the first time during the oral argument in first instance and the evidence and facts for the first time submitted on appeal stating (also) that they are not decisive. 2\. The Court concludes that the object of the invention is to integrate the functionality of several cooking devices into one single friendly cooking device (air frying mode; conductive cooking mode), 3\. The Court of Appeal interprets the following wording of claim element 1.2 (which refers to the air frying mode) “a first lid adapted to cover said opening < >”. The Court holds that one cannot limit the meaning of this claim element by reading in it that the cover has to be attached to the hollow chamber especially also as claim element 1.4 (for the conductive cooking mode) especially requires the cover (the second lid) being attached to the hollow chamber. 4\. The Court of Appeal states further: “As a general rule identical terms in a patent claim have the same meaning”. 5\. The Court of Appeal rejects the argument of SEB that the cover in the conductive cooking mode has to provide an airtight closure as there are several conductive cooking ways in which that is not necessary which is confirmed by the dependent claims which mentions pressure cooking (for which an airtight closure is necessary) as a species of conductive cooking and the description which states that conductive cooking is optional. 6\. The Court of Appeal rejects all SEB’s further arguments with respect to a limited interpretation of the claim. 7\. Without deciding the possibility of file wrapper estoppel the Court of Appeal rejects SEB’s argument based on the statements of SharkNinja during prosecution. 8\. With respect to invalidity the Court of Appeal different from the LD Paris doe not find the Tredy utility model novelty destroying and dismisses the expert declaration of SEB stating in no. 70: “The expert was not asked to interpret the publication as a whole and from the perspective of the person skilled in the art at the priority date. For this reason alone, the expert statement is unsuitable.” Moreover the expert was asked a leading question. 9\. SEB invoked during the oral hearing the expert declarations of SharkNinja for its point of view but that is not possible because at the request of SEB these declarations were not admitted in the proceedings. 10\. The Court of Appeal concludes that SEB does not argue lack of inventive step. 11\. The Court of Appeal concludes to infringement and considers all further requirements for a preliminary injunction fulfilled. 12\. The decision of the LD Paris is reversed and the PI granted. **Comment** 1\. After the appearance of the Air Fryer it was difficult to find space in our small Paris apartment kitchen for it. So there was a clear demand for space saving measures but SEB in this case did not argue lack of inventive step for combining two well known kitchen applications in one. Surprising? 2\. The decision teaches us: a. Reading limitations in a claim can only be done on the basis of very convincing arguments. b. Producing expert opinions based on leading questions and the wrong criteria for establishing the meaning of claim elements is not useful. c. Before a party argues that late filed declarations should not be allowed it is wise to read such declarations and see if they contain something useful for such party own’s point of view. d. Do not rely only on non novelty as a defence if there is also a possibility to argue the lack of inventive step for instance the combination of an (almost) novelty destroying document with the common general knowledge (of course not without arguing a pointer (incentive). #### **21 August 2026** **Court of Appeal, Nuna v Cybex** UPC\_CoA\_135/2026 *Suspensive effect* **Facts** 1\. In this PI case the Local Division Hamburg has given an injunction with respect to direct and indirect infringement. 2\. With respect to indirect infringement the Court ordered at the end of the order a measure which was not requested by the applicant of the PI. 3\. Nuna appealed and requested suspensive effect. 4\. Cybex declared not to enforce that part of the order. **The Court of Appeal** 1\. The order of the LD as far as it orders what was not in the request for a PI contains a manifest error. 2\. As the manifest error only pertains to a part of the order which can clearly be separated of the rest of the order then that does not mean, as appellant argues, that the suspensive effect has to be granted for the whole order. 3\. As the respondent has clearly undertaken not to enforce the erroneous part of the order appellant has no interest for obtaining suspensive effect. 4\. The Court of Appeal dismisses the request for suspensive effect. **Comment** This is all rather straightforward. If the obvious error (here: more granting than has been requested) is an isolated error, easily to be separated from the rest of the order (as here is the case), then suspensive effect can be granted for that isolated part if that is necessary but in this case already the opposing party agreed so the outcome was predictable! #### **21 August 2026** **Local Division Düsseldorf, Valeo v SEG** UPC\_CFI\_2788/2026 **Confidentiality** **Facts** 1\. PI application with request for confidentiality. 2\. Parties disagree about 3 or 5 persons in the confidentiality club. 3\. SEG wants more time for its response and it gives arguments why certain parts of the information are not confidential. **The JR** 1\. Grants the request for confidentiality after having corrected mistakes. 2\. The JR also states the following: “The parties' representatives are reminded that efficient procedural management is of particular importance, especially in expedited proceedings. To ensure efficient procedural management, the court sets specific deadlines (R. 209.1 (a), 9.1 Rules of Procedure) so that expedited proceedings can proceed swiftly and in an orderly manner for all parties involved, thereby making efficient use of available resources. The court recognizes that this is a special case and that coordination with the parties may be more difficult due to the holiday season. Given the unusually high number of submissions – compared to other expedited proceedings – it is reiterated that the purpose of setting a deadline is to ensure that all points relevant to the decision are addressed in a single submission. This is consistent with efficient procedural management; arguments should not be presented in a fragmented manner across multiple submissions. There may be excusable exceptions, but this is not the norm. The parties are expected to bear this in mind as the proceedings continue.’ **Comment** 1\. These representatives have not much consideration for the Court’s work! The Presiding Judge is (fully understandably) fed up with this attitude and let that know (which I also applaud!). It is never good tactics for a representative to make the work of the Court as complicated as possible and trust that judges correct their sloppy work. 2\. Why is Valeo a French company filing in German and not in English? Is that easier for their patent department and other internal employees? **– All comments above are** [**Prof. Hoyng**](https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/our-team/legal-experts/prof-willem-hoyng "https://www.hoyngrokhmonegier.com/our-team/legal-experts/prof-willem-hoyng")**‘s personal opinions –**