UPC Unfiltered, by Willem Hoyng – UPC decisions week 20, 2026

2 April 2026 (late published)
Local Division Munich, Laitram v ScanBelt

UPC_CFI_642/2025; UPC_CFI_472/2026

Date oral argument

Facts

1. The Court proposed several dates for oral argument and asked the parties to react to these suggestions before a certain date.
2. The defendant did not react before said date.
3. The Court subsequently set the date for oral argument on 8 December 2026, which was confirmed by the defendant as its preferred date.
4. About a month later, the defendant asked for postponement because the managing director of their client could not attend on 8 December 2026.

The Court

1. A party should react within the deadline.
2. After a date has been set, that date can only be changed for compelling reasons that make it unreasonable to require a party to appear.
3. No such compelling reasons were given.
4. The request is dismissed.

Comment

1. Logical decision of the Court.
2. The representatives of the defendant seem to be disorganized. First, they did not react in time; then, they accepted the date of 8 December; finally, a month later, they asked for a change of date (a request that they even repeated after a first rejection). The client is now likely unhappy because its managing director cannot be present. 

9 April 2026 (late published)
Local Division The Hague, Philips v TCL 

UPC_CFI_1079/2025; UPC_CFI_1080/2025

Confidentiality

Facts

Disclosure and confidentiality requests of both parties.

The Judge-Rapporteur (“JR”) 

1. The JR decides on various elements of the disclosure and confidentiality requests.
2. If parties have agreed that certain information exchanged between them is confidential, then only R. 262.2 RoP (confidentiality towards third parties) is necessary.
3. As all defendants belong to the same group and raised the same defence, it is not necessary that a natural person of each defendant gets access.
4. The JR also orders that the natural persons to whom access will be given to license agreements with third parties, will have to sign an undertaking that they will adhere to the imposed confidentiality regime and accept the jurisdiction of the UPC in case of disputes regarding potential breaches.  

Comment

1. Indeed, if parties in proceedings are bound vis-à-vis each other with respect to confidentiality, then a R. 262.2 RoP order can still be imposed if a member of the public asks for access.
2. Can the Unified Patent Court deal with the consequences (damages etc.) of a breach of a confidentiality undertaking? Maybe the national court in The Hague Court is better suited for this?

29 April 2026 (late published)
Local Division The Hague, IQIP v TMS

UPC_CFI_1695/2025; UPC_CFI_721/2025

Request to produce evidence

Facts

1. Infringement proceedings. The defendants allege public prior use of the plugs claimed in the patent EP 2 148 123.
2. The defendants state that these plugs were used by the patentee in two projects in 2008.
3. The defendants ask the Court to order the claimant to provide information about the plugs delivered for these projects.
4. The claimant states that certain documents do not exist, argues that the request is overly broad, and wants a confidentiality regime with respect to certain information.

The JR

The JR partially allows the request after citing the requirement for a request to produce evidence.

The JR further proposes a practical regime outside the CMS system for the preservation of confidentiality.

Comment

The Local Division in The Hague is starting to build a reputation for receiving and granting (within reasonable boundaries) R. 190 RoP requests during litigation that can be helpful for a party to prove infringement or invalidity.

4 May 2026 (late published)
Local Division Munich, Miele v Melitta

UPC_CFI_1148/2026 

Court costs after withdrawal of preliminary injunction application

Facts

1. On 2 April 2026, the claimant makes an application for a preliminary injunction (“PI”) against Melitta.
2. On 7 April 2026, the Court orders Melitta to respond to the preliminary injunction application within two weeks.
3. The Court considered the answer and informed Miele that it intends to dismiss the application in view of a novelty-destroying document produced by defendant.
4. Miele files a withdrawal request.
5. Miele requests reimbursement of 50% of the court costs because it withdrew before closure of the written procedure.

The Court

1. The Court accepts the withdrawal.
2. It awards costs to Melitta based on a value of the litigation of € 350,000.
3. It decides not to return any court fees, referring to R. 270.9(e) (which gives the Court the possibility not to return court fees in exceptional cases).

Comment

1. The Court provides a service to the claimant. It warns the claimant that it will issue a negative decision but gives Miele two days’ time to withdraw its application so that it would not be embarrassed by a lost court case.
2. The answer of Miele is not “thank you Court”, but give me 50% of my court fees back (while after a negative decision, that would not have been possible).
3. The reaction of the Court is completely understandable.
4. No good publicity for Miele!

5 May 2026 (late published
Local Division Milan, Agathon v Intercom

UPC_CFI_727/2024; UPC_CFI_493/2025

Infringement proceedings

Facts

1. On 2 December 2024, Agathon commenced infringement proceedings against Intercom with respect to EP 2 363 263 for a centering device for a forming tool.
2. Intercom denied the infringement and filed a counterclaim for revocation.
3. Agathon filed 4 auxiliary requests.
4. During the oral hearing, Intercom refused to make the revocation action conditional upon the finding of infringement.

The Court

1. The Court discusses the patent and formulates the core of the invention.
2. The Court interprets the patent claim, especially the claim elements that are disputed.
3. Referring to the fact that the claimant gives a different reading to a claim element than it did during prosecution (which reading led to the grant of the patent), the Court remarks “In view of the legal certainty, the complete turnaround in the statements made by the applicant/proprietor must be taken into account in the assessment”.
4. The Court cites the case law of the Court of Appeal (amongst others, UPC CoA No. 402/2024 and 405/2024, Orders of 20 December 2024, Alexion v. Amgen and Alexion v. Samsung Bioepis) considering that a statement during grant proceedings with respect to the meaning of a claim element can be seen as the meaning of such claim element for the skilled person at the time of the patent application.
5. After citing the criteria in the case law of the Court of Appeal, the Court concludes that claims 1 and 2 lack novelty over D3. Most of the further claims are considered to be novel.
6. The Court considers the inventive step attack against claims that are considered novel as largely inadmissible because they are insufficiently substantiated. In particular because
   1. there is no detailed explanation of the reasons that would have led the person skilled in the art to arrive at the subject matter of the claim, starting from one of the prior art documents;
   2. the defendant failed to provide any description of what constitutes the common general knowledge.
7. What is stated above under point 6 is however not the case for claims 3 and 4. The inventive step attacks against these claims are sufficiently substantiated. After citing the criteria developed by the Court of Appeal for inventive step, the Court considers claims 3 and 4 inventive.
8. The Court considers the first auxiliary request to be new and inventive and dismisses the revocation.
9. The Court dismisses the infringement action.
10. As the two defendants raised the same invalidity defences, they each get 50% of their costs.

Comment

1. The Milan Division points to legal certainty if a claimant gives a different (broader) reading of a claim element during litigation than during the prosecution of the patent in a case where that more limited reading led to the grant of the patent.
2. This is why file wrapper estoppel defences exist. I immediately add that this does not mean that one can use that argument in all situations. If a patentee limits its claim because of an objection under Art. 123(2) of the European Patent Convention (“EPC”), i.e. extension of subject matter, that should not prevent the patentee from arguing in infringement proceedings that it is still entitled to a broader meaning of the claim based on the doctrine of equivalence. In such circumstances, the limitation of the claim was only for formal reasons, not because the broader version of the claim was considered not novel or inventive by the EPO.
3. The Milan Division correctly follows the teaching of the Court of Appeal in order to reach the desired file wrapper estoppel result.
4. The Court is rather strict in requiring a substantiated reasoning for the inventive step attack against all claims. I believe that normally, if the main claim is not inventive, you can say that, for the same reason, the dependent claims are not inventive either, as nothing inventive has been added to the independent claim (except if it is clear from the description that such dependent claim has its own inventive merit).
5. Defendants were not willing to cooperate in making the revocation claim conditional (saving the Court unnecessary work). The result is now that their client will have to pay the costs for the revocation! Not very smart!

6 May 2026 (late published)
Local Division Düsseldorf, Otec v Anca

UPC_ CFI_1536/2026

Seizure and inspection order

Facts

1. On 4 May 2026, Otec requested an evidentiary seizure and inspection order during an exhibition in Stuttgart, based on EP 2 983 864.
2. It is not possible for Otec to obtain the allegedly infringing machines.
3. Discussions between the parties have only led to a denial of the infringement but without the possibility of verification.

The Court

The Court allows the inspection, but does not allow the inspection to be carried out by the lawyer or patent attorney of the applicant. They can only be present when the expert together with a bailiff carries out the seizure and inspection.

Comment

1. The JR is correct. R. 196.3(a) RoP states who may represent the applicant when the measures are being carried out. R. 196.4 specifies that the Court shall specify the persons who shall carry out the measures. It is clear that that should be a different, independent person.
2. It goes without saying that a lawyer or patent attorney for the defendant may also be present, but it will often be difficult to get one present on very short notice. 

7 May 2026 (late published)
Local Division The Hague, GSK v Moderna

UPC_ CFI_616/2025; UPC_ CFI_1439/2025

Preparation of interim conference

Facts

1. GSK sues 15 Moderna companies for infringement of EP 2 590 626.
2. The parties made several applications.
3. GSK made an application for hearing witnesses based on R. 176 RoP.
4. Moderna applies (once again) for a week extension for filing its next submission.

The JR

1. GSK wants a hearing of the two experts of GSK and the three experts of Moderna on the day before the oral hearing “to elaborate on the evidence contained in their written statements including inter alia on the challenged facts”.
2. The JR dismisses GSK’s request. The UPC does not provide for a general hearing of all experts as witnesses. GSK did not specify which specific facts it expects each expert to confirm.
3. Only in exceptional circumstances an extension is granted. There are no such exceptional circumstances in this case. The JR dismisses Moderna’s request.
4. The JR asks the parties to inform the JR what issues they want to discuss during the interim conference. 

Comment

1. The JR is not planning to organize a general hearing of all experts with a UK-style cross examination. That is also not envisaged by the Rules of Procedure, which dictate that an oral hearing should in principle not take more than a day.
2. The JR informs the parties that it is advisable that all experts attend  the oral hearing (live or by video), and at that time – if necessary – questions can be raised.
3. Very good that the parties are invited to inform the JR of what issues will be discussed. The JR already mentioned the number of validity attacks and auxiliary requests as issues. I expect that the parties will be asked to restrict these considerably!

8 May 2026 (late published) order of 19 March 2026
Local Division The Hague, Ericsson v Transsion 

UPC_CFI_ 11568/2025; UPC_CFI_1791/2025; UPC_ CFI_1793/2025

Case management hearing

Facts

1. Ericsson sues 10 companies for patent infringement with respect to three patents in three cases.
2. Defendants 8 and 9 were served late and still have time to file their Statement of Defence.
3. In many countries, parallel proceedings have been filed against Transsion.
4. In the UPC proceedings before the The Hague Local Division, Ericsson only asks for a FRAND declaration.

The JR

1. The JR suggests that the parties agree on a confidentiality regime with respect to the information (license agreements with third parties) for all UPC proceedings that Ericsson has filed and for which it asks a confidentiality regime.
2. If no agreement can be reached, Transsion has to respond to Ericson’s request before 10 April 2026.

Comment

1. An order of 19 March 2026 being published on 8 May 2026 is a bit strange. In normal circumstances, we would never have seen this order as the UPC – with its strange publication strategy – would not have published it on 8 May but amongst the other decisions of 19 March 2026.
2. Apparently, the Local Division The Hague has now started assigning decisions an additional date, namely the date of publication. If all Local Divisions do so, we would not have to go through all previous decisions every week, in order to see if a new decision has been (late) published. We currently do so as we want to be complete, so that the reader does not miss any decision.
3. In this case, Ericsson only asks the Court to make a declaration on what the amount for a FRAND license has to be. It is a so-called rate setting procedure initiated by the holder of standard essential patents.
4. The case is still at a very early stage. Together with its Statement of Claim, Ericsson submitted license agreements with third parties who have agreed that these can be disclosed to the defendants’ representatives on an attorneys’-eyes-only basis. Ericsson appears to be seeking the defendants’ agreement on that, as under the Rules of Procedure at least one person of the defendant should get access.
5. The JR has given some suggestions for such an agreement but the Court will decide if no agreement is reached before a certain date.
6. In my opinion, the interesting aspect is the rate-setting, and if and how the Court is going to handle that. We will see!

11 May 2026
Local Division Düsseldorf, Yangtze Memory v Micron 

UPC_ CFI_1034/2025; UPC_ CFI_931/2026

Confidential information

Facts

1. Yangtze sues Micron for infringement of EP 3 909 047.
2. The claimant submits a report originating from US proceedings, which is relevant for the question of infringement.
3. The claimant’s representatives have obtained the report from US attorneys but had to agree not to show it to their client because of US confidentiality restrictions. 

The JR

1. It has already been decided that a confidentiality regime requested by the claimant in which the claimant itself does get limited access to information is possible. The defendant gets (in this case) access without limitation as to the natural persons who can get access to the information, but all persons who get access are bound to confidentiality.
2. The JR grants the request. 

Comment

A logical decision, especially as the JR also states that there is no doubt that the information is not public. If a party has no problem with the fact that they cannot see certain information that their representatives want to use in litigation, it is difficult to see what objection there can be to a confidentiality regime under which the claimant itself does not get access but the defendant and natural persons of the defendant can get access, subject only to the obligation to keep the information confidential. 

11 May 2026
Local Division The Hague, Avient v Xingi

UPC_ CFI_478/2025; UPC_ CFI_585/2026

Infringement action

Facts

1. Avient alleges patent infringement by Xingi.
2. On 12 December 2025, Xingi filed a defence and counterclaim for revocation.
3. On 27 March 2026, Avient filed an application for an order to produce evidence based on R. 190 RoP.
4. Avient asks:
   1. 30 KG of different samples;
   2. internal documentation with respect to ballistic properties;
   3. all versions of a company introduction video removed from public access during the proceedings;
   4. all internal communications with respect to the removal of the video.

The JR

1. For such order the following requirements have to be fulfilled:

   1. the requesting party must have presented plausible evidence “reasonable available” in support of its infringement claims;
   2. evidence must be specified and in the control of the other party;
   3. confidential information has to be protected.

   Each order to produce evidence must satisfy the requirements of necessity, proportionality, equity and fairness.

2. Only if invalidity is prima facie clear, such an order should not be granted.
3. The JR, in applying the above, partly grants the request.

Comment

1. A very balanced and in my opinion correct decision.
2. We have seen successful requests for orders to produce evidence in the Local Division of The Hague at the start of proceedings, as well as now after the claimant has read the defence.
3. It is a less invasive alternative to a seizure and inspection order, but one can only ask for it during proceedings. 

12 May 2026
Regional Division Nordic-Baltic, Edwards v Meril

UPC_CFI_775/2025: UPC_CFI_776/2025; UPC_ CFI_777/2025

Settlement of cost proceedings

Facts

1. On 21 July 2025, the Court gave a decision in infringement and revocation proceedings and decided on the obligation to pay costs.
2. Both parties started cost proceedings.
3. Parties settled the cost proceedings, and filed applications for withdrawal and for confidentiality with respect to certain information filed in the cost proceedings.

The JR

1. Granted the requests for withdrawal.
2. Ordered the confidentiality.

Comment

1. It is always good if parties agree on costs. It is even better (and possible) to do it during the case on the merits.
2. The parties’ representatives do not want to disclose how many hours they worked on their case and what their hourly rate is (so we do not know how efficient they work with how many people and if UK firms are indeed more expensive than continental firms etc.).
3. It is interesting to see that the JR explicitly states that the confidentiality obligations remain in place after the case has ended. I assumed that that speaks for itself. Confidentiality obligations that end when the case ends, do (in general) not make sense. 

12 May 2026
Local Division Düsseldorf, Align v Angelalign

UPC_CFI_1747/2025

Preliminary injunction application

Facts

1. Align files an application for a preliminary injunction (“PI”)on the basis of EP 4 295 806.
2. The patent was the result of a divisional application and was granted on 26 November 2025 with unitary effect.
3. The claims of the patent cite various steps performed by an aligner (an orthodontic appliance).
4. The defendant argues that it does not infringe, because the various steps of alignment are not performed with one aligner, contrary to what is claimed in the patent.
5. The defendant further argues that the patent is invalid because of insufficient disclosure and lack of inventive step of claims 1 and 14. 

The Court

1. The Court cites the general principles for obtaining a preliminary injunction including that it is for the applicant to establish that it is more likely than not that the patent is infringed and for the defendant to establish that it is more likely than not that the patent is invalid.
2. The Court discusses the patent and the claim features and cites the principles of claim interpretation (UPC_CoA_335/2023, Order of 26 February 2024, 10x Genomics v. Nanostring).
3. The Court accepts the (broader) definition of the skilled person proposed by the defendant.
4. The Court concludes that it is clear from both the literal wording of the claim and the description that all the steps described in the claims have to be performed with one appliance (although during the treatment period more appliances can be used).
5. The Court rules that different from what the applicant seems to think, the burden of presentation and proof of facts allegedly establishing infringement lies with the applicant. It is not, at the outset, the defendant that has to establish that it does not infringe.
6. The applicant did not prove conclusively that all the elements of the claim are realized with one appliance.
7. The requests of the applicant are dismissed.

Comment

1. First of all, I wonder why the US claimant chose to start these PI proceedings in the very busy Düsseldorf Division. Was it because Align was told the untrue story that German Divisions are more pro patentee than other Divisions?
2. Furthermore, Align gets a hard lesson about the principles of the burden of proof, which of course should be clear to each claimant attempting to get a preliminary injunction.
3. Reading the decision (and the thorough way the Court shows that convincing evidence of infringement is clearly lacking), you get the impression that Align could have done a better job, already with the drafting of the patent via a divisional (when it apparently attempted to formulate claims reading on Angelalign’s method) but also during the litigation.
4. The result is if you want to look like an angel you can still use the Angelalign method!

13 May 2026
Court of Appeal, Huawei v Quinn Emanuel and MediaTek

UPC_ CFI_52/2026; UPC_CFI_53/2026

Request for documents

Facts

1. Quinn Emanuel asked the Local Division Munich for certain documents filed in the proceedings between Huawei and MediaTek after these infringement proceedings had been terminated in a settlement.
2. On 27 January 2026, the JR of the Local Division granted the request with exception of blacked out parts of the pleadings.
3. Huawei asked for revision.
4. The Munich Local Division confirmed the decision and did not give leave for appeal.
5. Huawei asked for discretionary review.

The standing judge

1. The question whether the decision of the JR of 27 January 2026 can be revised (R. 333 RoP) and if/how against that decision can be appealed raises fundamental questions of law which have to be clarified by the Court of Appeal.
2. The appeal is admitted. 

Comments

1. The niceties of UPC procedural law! The standing judge on appeal allows the appeal in order to resolve the question as to how to proceed if a party does not agree with the decision of the JR with respect to a request for pleadings and evidence.
2. The JR of the Court of Appeal teaches some lessons:
   1. the JR in first instance called its decision to allow Quinn Emanuel’s request for access to certain pleadings a “Verfahrungsanordnung” (procedural “order”) but that is incorrect; it is an “Entscheidung” (decision);
   2. the whole panel called its review decision an “Anordnung” (order) but that should also have been “a procedural decision” (for the purpose of R. 220.2 RoP).
3. If it is an Order for the purpose of R. 220.2 RoP, Huawei could ask for discretionary review when leave for appeal has been refused (R. 220.3 RoP).
4. However, there is something odd then: R. 220.2 RoP states that you can also appeal an order together with the appeal against the decision. However, here, it does not concern a procedural order in a case on the merits because there is no such case.
5. Also, the whole review procedure has nothing to do with a question of procedure; it is about a third party asking for pleadings.
6. You then realize the importance of the correction by the JR of the Court of Appeal that the rulings of the JR and of the Local Division were decisions and no orders.
7. Moreover, in my opinion, it seems that this decision of the JR is a final decision. That would mean that you can appeal without leave for appeal.
8. So in the end, the Local Division Munich was then correct in saying that the application for review was not admissible.
9. In my opinion, Huawei should not have asked for review but should have appealed within two months after the service of the 27 January 2026 order.

10. If that is indeed the outcome of all this (the decision of the Local Division Munich to rule that Huawei’s review application is not admissible), then I suggest that, when the Rules of Procedure are revised, decisions by a JR with respect to access of documents, be put in R. 221 RoP with respect to an appeal.  
     

     

– All comments above are Prof. Hoyng‘s personal opinions –