General Remarks
The International jurisdiction of the UPC is ruled by Art. 31 UPCA which refers to the Brussels I Reg. The Regulation’s special regime for “common courts” ties the UPC into Brussels I bis via Art. 71a(1) (“the UPC shall be deemed to be a court of a Member State”) and Art. 71b(1) (UPC has jurisdiction where the courts of a Member State party to the UPCA would have jurisdiction under Brussels I bis).
Art. 4(1) Brussels I Reg establishes that persons domiciled in an EU Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State. The CJEU has repeatedly referred to this as the Brussel I Reg’s “general rule”, and it has been a cornerstone of the EU’s legal framework on jurisdiction in civil matters since its first iteration.
Nevertheless, the Brussels I Reg allows some exceptions from the forum of the defendant’s home state court (Art. 4 I Brussels I Reg), which are important in practice. The additional heads of jurisdiction provided for in Art. 7(2) and 8(1) Brussels I Reg are particularly relevant for the UPC.
Art. 7(2) Brussels I Reg establishes jurisdiction of the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred. Hence, a defendant can be sued in the courts of the place where the patent infringed is claimed. Due to Art. 71b(2) Brussels I Reg, this is irrespective of whether the defendant has its seat in a UPC Member States, an EU Member State or a Non-UPC/EU-Member State (such as the US).
Art. 8(1) Brussels I Reg establishes jurisdiction for a defendant if (i) jurisdiction can be established for a co-defendant according to Art. 4(1) Brussels I Reg and (ii) the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.
Is the UPC a home state court for anyone based in UPC territory?
Where jurisdiction is based on Art. 4(1) Brussels I Reg, the defendant’s home-state court may adjudicate claims against that defendant concerning conduct in any third country. This includes patent infringement in any such third country, as recently confirmed in the CJEU’s well-known judgment of 25 February 2025 in C-339/22, BSH v Electrolux. Several UPC divisions now frame their reasoning around BSH. BSH answers what a home-state court can do; but it does not answer which UPC division is the home-state court when the division seized sits outside the defendant’s actual state of domicile.
Post-BSH, UPC first-instance decisions diverge on Article 4(1).
If the UPC is a single court common to all Contracting Member States, for Brussels I Reg purposes under Art. 71a(1), then any division seized against a defendant domiciled anywhere in UPC territory would be that defendant’s Art. 4(1) home court. Several decisions follow this approach and, building on BSH, treat Art. 4(1) as conferring universal jurisdiction vis-à-vis that defendant- leaving only internal allocation to Art. 33 UPCA.
For example, in the Hurom/NUC & Warmcook case (decision of 11 March 2025, UPC_CFI_159/2024), the Mannheim Local Division found UPC internal jurisdiction based on Art. 4(1) Brussels I Reg. The defendants had their principal place of business in Germany and France. Another example is the Haas/Windhager case (decision of 12 September 2025, UPC_CFI_338/2024), in which the same division based the UPC's international jurisdiction on Art. 4(1) Brussels I Reg for a defendant domiciled in Austria.
Other panels read Article 71a(1) as deeming the UPC to be a court of each participating state when exercising Brussels I bis jurisdiction (cf. the use of the singular in Art. 71a(1) Brussels I Reg: “a court of a Member State”). On this view, only the local or regional division in the defendant’s state of domicile is the Article 4(1) home court; outside that state, the division must rely on Article 7(2) or Article 8(1). This position seems to be taken by the Hamburg Local Division in the Dyson/Dreame case (decision of 14 August 2025, UPC_CFI_387/2025). The Court found that international jurisdiction over the Swedish defendant was established under Art. 8(1) of the Brussels I Reg, while establishing international jurisdiction over the German defendants based on Art. 4(1).
Given these competing approaches within the Court of First Instance, guidance from the Court of Appeal is to be expected. Ultimately, the CJEU will need to clarify the meaning of “a court of a Member State” in Art. 71a Brussels I Reg and, in particular, whether Art. 4(1) can be invoked by any UPC division or only by the division of the defendant’s domicile.
What is the scope of the UPC’s jurisdiction under Article 7(2) Brussels I Reg?
As already described, Art. 7(2) Brussels I Reg provides that the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred shall have jurisdiction. Consequently, Art. 7(2) Brussels I Reg governs not only international but also local jurisdiction, so that Art. 33(1)(a) UPCA must be read in the light of Art. 7(2) Brussels I Reg.
As in Art. 4(1) Brussels I Reg, the term “court” here refers to the court of an EU Member State, as follows from Art. 7 Brussels I Reg when read as a whole (“A person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in another Member State [...]”). Pursuant to Art. 71a(1) Brussels I Reg, the UPC is deemed to be a court of a EU Member State. However, unlike Art. 4(1) Brussels I Reg, it is settled case law that where jurisdiction is assumed by courts of the Member State where a harmful event occurred ex art. 7(2) Brussels I Reg, such jurisdiction is limited to that Member State only (i.e. is not cross-border jurisdiction). See, e.g., ECJ, judgment of 7 March 1995, C-68/93 - Shevill.
On the basis of this case law, it could be argued that the jurisdiction of the local or regional division of the UPC is confined to its own territory.
However, whether the Shevill doctrine can be transposed to the UPC context is not free from doubts. A distinction between the place of the event giving rise to the damage and the place where the damage occurred appears artificial in patent dispute, since – due to the territorial nature of patent protection – the place of action and place of effect usually coincide. Moreover, the Shevill reasoning may not reconcile with the nature of the Unitary Patent, whose infringement is to be assessed uniformly under the UPCA, such that its adjudication should not depend on territorially differing rules.
The Local Division Hamburg recently held in the case Dyson v. Dreame that the jurisdiction under Art. 7(2) Brussels I Reg is not limited to the Member State of the Court seized (decision of 14 August 2025, UPC_CFI_387/2025). The Court, however, relied on a different line of reasoning, deriving international jurisdiction from the territorial scope of the court’s decisions under Art. 34 UPCA.
This conclusion is by no means compelling. First, the territorial scope of a judgment and the jurisdiction of a court are not necessarily congruent—especially as the territorial scope may depend on the requests submitted and question of material law (e.g. prior use). Second, it is questionable whether extending international jurisdiction under Art. 7(2) Brussels I Reg on the basis of Art. 34 UPCA would be compatible with the primacy of EU law (Art. 20 UPCA).
A stronger justification for the jurisdiction of the court seized over all UPC Member States may be derived directly from the Brussels I Reg itself—specifically from Art. 71a(1) Brussels I Reg. According to this provision, the UPC (as a whole) is deemed to be a court of a Member State. The “place where the harmful event occurred” within the meaning of Art. 7(2) Brussels I Reg could therefore be understood as encompassing the entire UPC territory.
Against this interpretation, it could be argued that Art. 71a(1) Brussels I Reg speaks of “a court of a Member State” and not of “a court of the Member States”. This suggests that Art. 71a(1) Brussels I Reg merely clarifies that the UPC, for the particular Member State concerned, is to be treated as a court within the meaning of the Brussels I Reg – placing it on an equal footing with national courts – but was not intended to create a court with transnational territory. Also, the legislative intent behind Art. 71a(1) Brussels I Reg was to integrate the UPC into the systematics of the Brussels I Reg, i.e. without altering its fundamental objectives and balancing of interests between claimant and defendant.
However, one may argue that a limitation of the territorial jurisdiction of a UPC court competent under Art. 7(2) of Brussels I Regulation would not fall in line with the general objective of the UPC. Defendants who have their seat in a state which do not host a Local or Regional Division of the UPC, hence no home state court in the UPC territory, could only be sued in a court competent under Art. 7(2) Brussels I Reg. If the territorial jurisdiction of the court would be limited to the forum state, the claimant might be compelled to file several lawsuits. If the territorial jurisdiction of the court were limited to the forum state, the claimant might be compelled to file multiple lawsuits, which would run counter to the UPC's objective of concentrating jurisdiction in a single court.
Conclusion
The integration of the UPC's jurisdiction rules into the Brussels I Regulation has not been implemented in an ideal manner. The decentralized concept of the UPC is in tension with the rules of the Brussels I Regulation. For example, it is not consistent with the intended protection of the defendant under Art. 4(1) Brussels I Reg that a defendant based in Finland can have its home state court in Portugal.
On the other hand, the provisions of the Brussels I Regulation should be interpreted in such a way that the UPC is able to act as effectively as possible in accordance with its intended purpose. As the UPC considers these issues, it will surely have in mind the efficacy of the Court as a whole. But ultimately these questions may have to be put to the Court of Justice of the EU.